Date of Award


Degree Type

Honors Paper

First Advisor

Raymond T. Brastow, Ph.D.

Second Advisor

Bennie D. Waller, Ph.D.


Real estate markets are excellent venues in which to study principal-agent incentive misalignments. Buyers and sellers who face relatively higher information costs rely on agents to reduce information costs and to assist their negotiation. Previous literature has focused on a typical dilemma real estate gents face - sales price versus time on market (TOM). This paper analyzes sellers' behavior when an exclusive listing contract nears unsuccessful expiration.

Included in

Real Estate Commons



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