Date of Award
2010
Degree Type
Honors Paper
First Advisor
Raymond T. Brastow, Ph.D.
Second Advisor
Bennie D. Waller, Ph.D.
Abstract
Real estate markets are excellent venues in which to study principal-agent incentive misalignments. Buyers and sellers who face relatively higher information costs rely on agents to reduce information costs and to assist their negotiation. Previous literature has focused on a typical dilemma real estate gents face - sales price versus time on market (TOM). This paper analyzes sellers' behavior when an exclusive listing contract nears unsuccessful expiration.
Recommended Citation
Zhang, Zhenyu, "Principal-Agent Conflict and Seller's Strategy Approaching Listing Contract Expiration" (2010). Theses & Honors Papers. 29.
https://digitalcommons.longwood.edu/etd/29
