Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
11-25-2012
Abstract
This article investigates whether reputation-building strategies may guide US governors’ state cigarette tax choices and whether the federal cigarette tax influences such behavior. Using 1975–2000 data, we find evidence indicating that governors are prone to engage in reputation building, in particular in states with relatively important agricultural tobacco production. Moreover, lame ducks are more prone to raise the state cigarette tax the lower the federal tax.
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142112463045
Recommended Citation
Fredriksson, Per G. and Mamun, Khawaja, "Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States" (2012). Business & Economics Faculty Publications. 19.
https://digitalcommons.longwood.edu/business_facpubs/19
Original Citation
Mamun, K., Fredriksson, P. (2012). Tobacco Politics and Electoral Accountability in the United States. Public Finance Review, 42(1), 4-34. https://doi.org/10.1177/1091142112463045
