A Theory of Vertical Political Interaction in Cigarette Taxation
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
8-2012
Abstract
This paper examines the political interdependence of federal and state cigarette tax rates. We develop a lobby group model where a state's endogenous reaction to a federal cigarette tax hike depends crucially on the political responses of the cigarette producer and anti-smoking lobby groups.
Recommended Citation
Mamun, Khawaja, "A Theory of Vertical Political Interaction in Cigarette Taxation" (2012). Business & Economics Faculty Publications. 18.
https://digitalcommons.longwood.edu/business_facpubs/18
Original Citation
Mamun, K. (2012). A Theory of Vertical Political Interaction in Cigarette Taxation. Indian Journal of Economics and Business, 11(2), 261-269.
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