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ANDREW JOHNSON
and
THE FAILURE OF MODERATE RECONSTRUCTION

By Frances Jo-Ann Cartwright

1964

PREFACE

This paper represents an attempt to determine why Andrew Johnson's moderate policy for the reconstruction of the South failed. Because the paper is a study of Andrew Johnson, the politician, it dwells primarily only upon the political climate of 1865--although the importance of the social and economic changes occurring during reconstruction is recognized, they are herein treated only incidentally. In essence, the paper demonstrates the defeat of a politician. It is, furthermore, the contention of the paper that moderate reconstruction failed because of the ineffectiveness of its administrator--Andrew Johnson--not because of cabalistic intrigues hatched by those whom F.B. Simkins scoffingly calls "Carlyle's wild-eyed conspirators." Johnson was no helpless victim of the unconquerable radical forces about him, but became hopelessly ensnared in a defeat woven by his own inflexible, egotistical temperament which resulted in both political misjudgements and incompetent political maneuvers.

Never has there been a greater necessity for a good politician in the White House than during Reconstruction. Terminating at last after four years of struggle, the Civil War left in its wake a United States politically divided. Lincoln had desired to insure the perpetuity of the Union by restoring it as speedily as possible. Most of the Northern Republicans wished to delay the restoration until the South was well enough reconstructed that they would be able to preserve the victory by maintaining political supremacy. Generally, the Northern Republicans foresaw reconstruction as a continuance of what the Beards would call a progressive bourgeois revolution or the "second American revolution"--the Civil War. The Northern Democrats viewed reconstruction as the means by which the South would be restored as quickly as possible to a political existence, thereby restoring the Democratic Party to its former political importance. The moderate Republicans were concerned with attracting the greatest number of adherents and consequently supported the methods of reconstruction through which they would eventually wield the greatest power. Flexible and attuned to the opinion of the public, they--the moderates--were the ones whom Johnson should have made the greatest effort to cultivate.

Nevertheless, the problem of the South was before them and everyone agreed that these states had to be reconstructed; the differences evolved out of questions involving degree and the methods to be employed. Various proposals were available representing both the moderate and radical viewpoints. The moderate plan, of which Lincoln was generally considered the author, advocated the restoration of the South by the loyal inhabitants of each state. In opposition was the State Suicide theory as presented to Congress by the radical Charles Sumner in 1862. To Sumner, secession followed by armed rebellion constituted an abdication of all rights of the state

which should henceforth be governed by Congress as a territory. Only a small group of radical zealots composed of such men as the aforementioned Sumner and Thaddeus Stevens were in favor of a radical plan. As the military governor of Tennessee who had persecuted the rebels, Johnson had set a record favorable to the radical elements in the North. Unlike the radicals, however, the majority were content to wait and see the tone of action the new President would take.

Probably, it was the end of a grueling war enhanced by the immediate assassination of a beloved President which invoked a more vindictive Northern temper of opinion towards the South than Lincoln had judged. This is demonstrated by the almost universal support the seemingly radical Johnson received during his first two months in office. Indeed, the Nation was prophesying "an end to parties." The Herald denied this and stated that there were, on the contrary, "so many irons in this fire, that some of them must get spoiled by too much heat."¹ Both statements were actually well-founded. There was only one existing party--the Union one, but this party was composed of numerous elements which had united in response to the wartime necessity for union. And indeed, the various factions were toppling over one another in their haste to court the favor of the President. Surprisingly enough, the most radical--despite their heretofore radical reconstruction proposals--were the least active in this capacity. The moderates--Seward-Weed Republicans and the war Democrats led by Montgomery Blair and S.L.M. Barlow-- were the ones engaged in political maneuvers during the early portion of Johnson's administration. To further complicate the problem of reconstruction, these two moderate factions engaged in strong competition for the President's support. Each tried to convince the other that the President was supporting its party in policy.

Throughout the summer months of 1865, Johnson cultivated division in the political ranks by his refusal to state a position. His course was clearly that of uniting the moderates-- the Democrats and moderate Republicans-- rather than contributing to greater schisms within their ranks by a policy consistent only in its vacillation. If Johnson had found a common ground for these two groups and himself at the outset, he could have avoided the later political alienation and prevented the triumph of radical reconstruction.

Any political evaluation of Johnson requires a comparison between the seventeenth president and his predecessor, Abraham Lincoln, as Johnson supposedly attempted to follow his policy regarding the reconstruction of the Southern states. Superficially, the backgrounds of Lincoln and his successor appear analogous. Both were products of an Appalachian environment hostile to the northern and southern coastal factions. Both were self-made men who rose to power via the good will of their strong, simple, frontier neighbors. Towards the southern aristocracy, the two men were both inclined to be suspicious. Johnson, especially, had frequently been the brunt of their snobbery and prejudice. Lincoln, conversely, had no such backlog of dislikes manifested against these landowners. Thus, regarding reconstruction, Lincoln's primary motivation was derived more completely from a desire to preserve the Union whereas Johnson's was more on the order of a personal vendetta against the privileged slavocracy. Even in the early beginnings of his political career, this characteristic is visible. One of his earliest campaign platforms centered around the removal of a wealthy, controlling class when Johnson was elected alderman at the age of twenty. Throughout his political career, his life evidences many instances of one continuous struggle against privilege. As such, he rallied around him the support of the masses in their inevitable opposition to entrenched

privilege. Formal crystallization of his prejudice occurred during the Civil War. Johnson viewed this war as one perpetrated by the southern aristocracy in order to perpetuate its existing status as the privileged class. As a Unionist and military governor of Tennessee, he and his fellow Unionists were persecuted by the Confederate soldiers. Johnson believed that these soldiers acted as the unknowing implements of an unscrupulous aristocracy.

On his advent to power in East Tennessee, he proved the depth of his hatred through a zealous persecution of his former persecutors--the rebels. Although Lincoln's background was not one in which an attitude of trust might have been generated towards the ruling elite, neither does his life evidence as many injustices because of them. Consequently, Lincoln appears less vindictive in reference to the landed gentry; his amnesty proclamation does not single them out for specific punishment or revenge. Johnson, however, can conceal neither his animosity nor his resulting distrust. In his amnesty proclamation of May 29, it is scarcely remarkable to discover the inclusion of a new exception made for those worth twenty thousand dollars or more. Intensely, Johnson feared from this group a possible return to power. It was his contention that they were the true war criminals who had fostered rebellion and had used their power to dupe the basically loyal masses into a wicked adherence to the Confederacy. During his military governorship of Tennessee, he dwelled upon this point repeatedly in speeches made in April and May. One such example follows:

And while I say that the penalties of the law, in a stern and inflexible manner, should be executed upon conscious, intelligent and influential traitors-- the leaders, who have deceived thousands of laboring men who have drawn into this rebellion--and while I say,

as to the leaders, punishment, I also say leniency, conciliation and amnesty to the thousands whom they have misled and deceived.²

Under this banner, he was able to captivate the masses. It follows then that he would begin his presidency in a vein which had proved politically effective in the past.

Although similar in background, the two men could scarcely have differed more in character. Basically, Lincoln was pragmatic; Johnson was dogmatic. Lincoln was conciliatory; his successor was dictatorial. As president, Lincoln was often at odds with those around him--the Chase-Blair controversy in the cabinet is well-known as is the congressional problem manifested in the Wade-Davis Bill which was pocket-vetoed by Lincoln. Lincoln, however, was a shrewd politician and as such managed to concede just enough to avoid the creation of significant schisms within his own party. Johnson, conversely, was seemingly adept in creating havoc within the party ranks. In Tennessee, earlier, he had stimulated strife and a resulting chaos which made impossible the restoration Lincoln desired. Johnson even had difficulty maintaining the support of his Unionist allies--Brownlow particularly--largely because of his absolutist policies. As military governor, Johnson's tactics were those of a tyrant who suppressed, arrested, and exiled those who disagreed with him. Early in this career in Tennessee, he decided to hold a "test election" involving the post of circuit judge. When the returns showed the triumph of an anti-administration man, the victor was promptly ordered imprisoned. In relations with his constituents--in this case, primarily the military--he appeared no less the absolutist. During this period, the assistant secretary of war Thomas A. Scott wrote Stanton depicting Johnson in the following fashion:

The governor's relations with most of the lesser officers...were no

less strained. The fact is, he was self-willed, uncompromising and dictatorial, and once his mind was made up, intolerant of opposition or even of honest opinion in conflict with his own. Impatient and rough in speech, abrupt and belligerent in manner, his attitude repelled any calm discussion and adjustment of difficulties with officers accustomed to military etiquette and jealous of the dignity of their positions.³

Thus, whereas Lincoln was humble and generally asked the advice of his constituents, Johnson was, as the preceding description suggests, an egoist who remained impervious to the changes and influences which existed outside of his own subjective realm. By tempering firmness with flexibility, Lincoln managed to control his cabinet and Congress and thereby to retain political ascendancy. Combining indecision, stubbornness, and arrogance, Johnson alienated influential political allies in his cabinet--the prime example being Stanton--and in Congress--Stevens and Sumner--forcing his allies--the Weed and Seward elements--to desert to the enemy.

Good judgement is probably any man's greatest asset, but this is doubly so for a politician. Lincoln possessed it; Johnson did not. The appointments, political alliances, patronage, are all an essential part of it, but it is in timing that the greatest consideration must be shown. Only if the moment proves propitious can the most available advantage be secured. For the politician, public opinion serves as the timepiece which must be faithfully observed and correctly interpreted to prove effective. Being politically astute, Lincoln issued both his emancipation and amnesty proclamations at opportune moments. Concerning a policy to reconstruct the southern states, he was equally sagacious. In order to insure that his reconstruction policy would correspond with the relatively fluid concepts of the general public and those of Congress, Lincoln frequently altered it. Possessing that which psychologists would term an inaccessible

behavior pattern, Johnson, conversely, proved often oblivious to the consequences of the dynamic world of public opinion about him. Both Eric McKittrick and Robert Winston--authors of opposing works in relation to Johnson--support this. Winston, an admirer of Johnson, states that "Because of his (Johnson's) unwillingness to co-operate with political parties or organizations, Johnson waged but a guerilla warfare... . Always, however, he stood upon the old platform, equal distribution of government favors, equal treatment of rich and poor, farmer, laborer, mechanic, manufacturer or what not. A strict interpretation of the Constitution and observance of its letter had now become his guiding principle."⁴ Thus, Winston credits Johnson as being inflexible in ideals and principles. McKittrick goes further and intimates that Johnson first lost contact with the political world about him and then anchored himself to impressive theories and principles.⁵ The vacillation viewed in Johnson's policies in 1865--especially the early summer months--tends to substantiate McKittrick's premise. Nevertheless, both Winston and McKittrick maintain that Johnson was relatively alienated from the world of public opinion.

Although he must have been superficially aware of the changes, Johnson refused to acknowledge them and thereby failed to heed the warnings they encompassed. To maintain popular support for his policy, Johnson had to demonstrate that the South had been reconstructed--at least, moderately so. Popular sentiment had made the Negro the measuring stick by which the South's reconstruction (abrogation of former beliefs) was to be determined. Johnson, nevertheless, failed to firmly persuade the assembled State legislatures to act in accordance with these dictates of public opinion. The tone of messages received from the provisional governors by Johnson clearly

asked to what extent the South needed to concede in terms of Negro rights. Johnson's continued delays in replying constituted a blunder which instituted a chain reaction in the other states resulting in an aroused public demanding a more stringent reconstruction of the still rebellious South. Then, it appears that in order to exercise good judgement, a politician must be something of a prophet foreseeing the result of his maneuvers. Johnson, however, was only an average man who was out of place outside his native Tennessee. Uncertain in the demanding role of president, he was indecisive and unable--because of his inflexible temperament--to adapt to the changed situation resulting from the termination of the war.

Basically, this inability to recognize and utilize such changes effected by the war's termination ultimately proved to be Johnson's most blatant error in political judgement. Handicapped by being Lincoln's theoretical heir, Johnson attempted to continue what he believed to be Lincoln's policy for reconstructing the South. Lincoln's reconstruction plans had been dominated by a concentrated campaign to negotiate the end of the war. Generally, Lincoln's proposed policy for reconstruction evolved out of an already executed plan designed to conciliate the all-important border states.⁶ The composition of his cabinet clearly reflected this in his choice of Edward Bates, Missouri and Montgomery Blair, Maryland. By utilizing the patronage, Lincoln sought to keep the border states within the Union. The pardoning power, he used as a mode of encouragement to create desertion and disaffection towards the Confederate government. Seceded states were to re-establish state governments following compliance with the clause of Lincoln's December 3, 1863 amnesty proclamation which required that ten percent of the population have taken the loyalty oath. Establishment of the Gamble government in the border state of Missouri probably initiated this proclama-

tion. In relation to pardons, they were to be granted to all those who took a loyalty oath. The exceptions to the general amnesty were the expected ones dealing predominantly with those who had fought in or directly abetted the rebellion. Primarily, the proclamation--especially that portion governing the exceptions--was general enough to allow greater leeway in the granting of pardons and the taking of oaths. It was in character, then, that he should apply the pocket veto to the more specific Wade-Davis Manifesto of 1864 as he did not, in his own words, wish "...to be inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration," nor did he desire that "...the free state constitutions and governments already adopted and installed in Arkansas and Louisiana shall be set aside and held for nought thereby repelling and discouraging (other) loyal citizens...",⁷ but he did intimate that Southern states acting in compliance with this plan would be recognized by him. Lincoln's guiding principle was the preservation of a union divided by war. To effect this end, any means within reason would be unhesitatingly employed. Consequently, Lincoln's plan proceeded in accordance with various essentials. First, the rebellion had to be stamped out--the North could not lose. Secondly, the South had to be restored in order to perpetuate this union. The former was irrefutably a part of Lincoln's plan; the latter has been implied. The first objective remained the most important determinant in Lincoln's policy; his assassination nipped in the bud his plans for accomplishing the second objective. Indeed, W.B. Hesseltine asserts that Lincoln died without an actual plan for either restoration or reconstruction of the conquered South. Thus, it would be difficult to ascertain whether or not Lincoln's wartime moderate plan of restoration would have been applied to the peacetime South or not. The only certain

thing about Lincoln's future policy would have been its assured flexibility geared to meet the fluctuating majority opinions of the times.

As Lincoln's heir, Johnson attempted to follow the policy which was generally considered to be that moderate, wartime restoration of the states promulgated by this successor. Johnson was devoted also to the preservation of the Union, and to him this would be effected by restoration of the states recently in rebellion. Eric McKittrick asserts that Johnson was concerned with actual reconstruction, however, only in connection with individuals, rather than in reference to the Southern states collectively. In view of the President's known aversion towards the landed aristocracy, this appears logical. Johnson apparently believed that an inclusion of the twenty thousand dollar property qualification in the list of exceptions of his May 29 proclamation thereby necessitating pardon would humble this proud class of individuals into a "reconstructed" state. Reconstruction, in any other form, was alien to his constitutional beliefs. Like his predecessor, Johnson's primary objective continued, therefore, to be the preservation of the Union, but he linked this principle with a firm belief in states rights. Both he and Lincoln rejected the theory that the war had taken away a state's constitutional right to a republican form of government. In his amnesty proclamation of 1863, Lincoln stated that "...this proclamation is intended to present the people of the states wherein the national authority has been suspended, and loyal state governments have been subverted, a mode in and by which the national authority and loyal state governments may be re-established within said states, or in any of them..."⁸ Johnson said much the same in a later address wherein he maintained that the function of the states had been nothing more than suspended:

The true theory is that all pretended acts of secession were from the beginning null and void. The States can not commit treason nor screen the individual citizens who may have committed treason any more than they can make valid treaties or engage in lawful commerce with any foreign power. The States attempting to secede placed themselves in a condition where their vitality was impaired, but not extinguished; their functions suspended, but not destroyed.⁹

Constitutionally, Johnson could therefore not accept Sumner's state suicide theory or Stevens' conquered province plan. Individuals--the aristocracy--could and should be reconstructed. The states, however, were to be restored to the natural position. Reconstruction was to be effected by the states themselves. Thus, Johnson's program encompassed individual reconstruction and state restoration.

In another instance, Johnson was further handicapped by his attempt to adhere to Lincoln's probable plan of reconstruction. The primary difficulty lay in the fact that the last reconstruction plan of his successor had been a war measure designed to divide the South, thus facilitating a Union victory. Johnson used much the same policy to unite the nation. Specifically, Lincoln used the pardoning power to turn neighbor against neighbor with the purpose of creating havoc within the Confederate ranks. Johnson pardoned to win support for selfish and political reasons. Lincoln's objective, however, was still in evidence, as the Johnson pardonings, intended to create unity, continued to instigate strife between the former loyalists and the newly pardoned. T.G. Clark of Savannah wrote to Johnson intimating this in October:

The State of Georgia is in almost as rebellious a condition at heart today as she has been any time during the war... . Before Pardons were granted the political instigators of the Rebellion were held in check; they were all endeavoring to see which could do most for the union and magnifying little acts of courtesy (sic) to union men... .¹⁰

The Unionists saw themselves as deprived of their rewards for remaining loyal to the Union. Loyalist protests aroused a vindictive North who, dedi-

cated to the protection of their southern Unionist allies, desired more a preservation of their hard-won victory than an immediate restoration of an unstable South-North union on the order of the ante-bellum sectionalism with the South resurrecting the old roadblocks to northern progress. The situation had changed from one of war to one of peace in which the nation had taken on the new divisions of conqueror and conquered. The Union had, for the moment, been preserved; whether or not it would be perpetuated depended upon how effective the method of restoration would prove. Hesselstine contends that the North fought the war specifically in order to reconstruct the South on the northern model. To the North, the question was one of timing. How long would it take the South to discard certain beliefs and practices which had formerly obstructed the progress of the nation? If the war had effected this already, the Southern states would act accordingly; if not, they would need to undergo further reconstruction in order to accomplish the result desired by the North. As aforementioned, Johnson was totally unconcerned with reconstruction. Indeed, it was outside the realm of his preconceived plans, all of which involved restoration. In November, George L. Stearns wrote Johnson apparently apologizing for his use of the word reconstruction. "Restoration," he said, "was in your thought, reconstruction in mine; hence the use of the word."¹¹ In accordance with Lincoln's wartime policy, Johnson was restoring the South, but peace had revolutionized both conditions and opinions. For Lincoln, the wisest course was to divide the South in order to unite the nation--this was possible only through a northern victory. For Johnson, the indicated course was to make--remake--the South acceptable to the northern conquerors. Therefore, Lincoln's wartime policy of restoration had coincided with the objective of the northern warriors--both desiring victory. Johnson's policy, on the other hand, foretold

a destruction of the northern desire for the fruits of victory. Public opinion, therefore, had favored Lincoln's policy but feared Johnson's similar one as a result of the changed situation.

Imperceptibly intermingled in the restoration plans of Lincoln and Johnson were their former political affiliations. In this aspect, the two appear primarily antithetical. Lincoln was a Whig who became a Republican; Johnson was a statesrights Democrat who became a Unionist. As a Democrat in the Jacksonian tradition, Johnson believed in the power and infallibility of the masses. As with Jackson, Johnson perhaps had too much faith in and identified himself too completely with the majority. As a Whig, Lincoln was inclined to be more conservative in reference to the will of the majority. A clever politician, he knew how to manipulate them--the masses--and give the appearance of submission to them. Johnson, on the other hand, was a rabble rouser who might say anything to win the applause of an audience. On receiving such approval, Johnson accepted it as the mandate by which he had been chosen the leader of the masses. He, Johnson, and the majority were one. However he acted, they would support him. The Whigs, generally speaking, were more Hamiltonian in outlook while the Democrats were more Jeffersonian or Jacksonian. In this context, the Democrats maintained a quasi-Jacksonian doctrine of states rights invoked towards internal improvements and the national bank. Johnson was in accord, but, like his hero Jackson, believed firmly in the preservation of the Federal Union. It was on this latter issue that he and Lincoln became allies and later running mates on the Unionist ticket. As the only southern senator to remain in Congress after the secession of his state, Johnson became progressively more closely aligned with the radical element. Had the slavery controversy

never provoked war, Johnson would quite probably have remained in the Democratic ranks. Indeed, when he acceded to the presidency, the consensus of opinion, becoming increasingly more creditable, was that he was rapidly returning to his former political affiliation. Frequently, indeed, Johnson's states-rights principles revealed an obvious handicap. One example of this is found in Johnson's attitude towards Negro suffrage. Johnson believed that the problem involving enfranchisement of the former slaves should be left to the states for solution. A letter from H.M. Watterson to the President demonstrates the tenacity with which Johnson adhered to this principle:

At Richmond, at New Berne, and at Raleigh, I have reason to know that I have done some service to the administration by my representation of its head. I have often said in the right quarters that from two positions the Chases and Sumners would never drive the President: First, that the Southern States are in the Union, and have never been ¹²out; second, that the suffrage question belongs to the States alone.

Thus, despite northern public sentiment to the contrary, President Johnson attempted to allow the problem to remain with states whom the North considered vanquished and therefore without any rights whatsoever. Strong constitutional principles were fine as long as they did not blockade a utilization of the doctrine of expediency. Any attempt to promulgate principles, to the contrary, however, was punishable by disaffection of those in the power club who demanded that the political game be played according to the understood rules. Unfortunately, Johnson, the politician, neither knew these rules nor was inclined to learn them from competent advisers.

The Negro, indeed, proved to be an important consideration in the reconstruction policies of Lincoln and Johnson. Although Benjamin Quarles in his Lincoln and the Negro attempts to attribute to the sixteenth president a genuine concern for the rights of the freedmen, Lincoln seems, in

this instance as in every instance, preoccupied first and foremost by his desire to see the Union preserved. The Negro considered Lincoln his savior-- he had freed them from bondage by his Emancipation Proclamation. He, however, apparently ignored their problems as a whole--inadvertently championing them when the attainment of their rights coincided with the realization of his ultimate objective. In fact, even Quarles admits that Lincoln is frequently viewed as "dragging his feet" where Negro civil rights are concerned. Lincoln, however, realized the significance of the Negro question as the touchstone of political propaganda which would eventually determine the degree of reconstruction to be effected in the South. Johnson, on the other hand, virtually ignored the problem's intrinsic political capital. In actuality, Johnson had no basic understanding of the individual Negro's situation. As did Lincoln, Johnson viewed the Negro as the means to an end, but characteristically misinterpreted the channel in which the importance of the Negro was registered. For Johnson, the Negroes were linked with the privileged class and constituted the source from which that group drew their undemocratic power and influence; once they were emancipated, the issue was for Johnson closed. Only later was Johnson forced to reopen the subject when northern sentiment--regarding the Negro as the "index" by which they would evaluate the extent of southern repentance--demanded it. In this vein, Johnson wrote Sharkey in August as follows:

I hope that without delay your convention will amend your State constitution, abolishing slavery and denying to all future Legislatures the power to legislate that there is property in man; also... . If you could extend the elective franchise to all persons of color who can read the Constitution of the United States in English and write their names, and to all persons of color who own real estate valued at not less than two hundred and fifty dollars and pay taxes thereon, you would completely disarm the adversary and set an example the other States will follow. This you can do with perfect safety, and you would thus place

Southern states in reference to free persons of color upon the same basis with the free states... .¹³

This was extremely sound advice, the type Lincoln had given previously. Unfortunately, for Johnson, he again erred in judgement and failed to follow through on this step firmly enough to accomplish what the North anticipated. He suggested a qualified Negro suffrage. Had he insisted that such a limited enfranchisement was necessary, the submissive South would have probably granted it.

Throughout, Johnson's position in relation to the Negro question was ambiguous. Theoretically, Johnson would have not liked Negroes according to J.T. Trowbridge who stated that "East Tennesseans, though opposed to slavery and secession, do not like niggers. There is at this day more prejudice against color among the middle and poorer classes--the 'Union' men, of the South, who owned few or no slaves--than among the planters who owned them by scores and hundreds... . On reaching Nashville, I learned that the Negro testimony bill had been defeated in the legislature by the members from East Tennessee."¹⁴ A letter from one John W. Gorham of Clarksville, Tennessee, verifies this attitude as being present in the President. He writes that he remembers the President remarking to him that he is "for a white man's Government in America." Gorham proves prophetic of future issues when he correctly states that "The question of Loyalty was then Union but it's now Negro suffrage regardless of all States and Federal Constitutions..."¹⁵ However, Johnson was evidently, during the summer, closely allied with the conception of white supremacy largely due to his background. In an interview with G. L. Stearns of the New York Herald, Johnson appeared in league with the radical opposition to white supremacy when he said that if he were in Tennessee, he would "...try to introduce Negro suffrage gradually; first those who had served in the army; those who could read and write; and

perhaps a property qualification for the others, say \$200 or \$250. It would not do to let the Negro have universal suffrage now; it would breed a war of races."¹⁶ As president, Johnson did not feel that he could interfere in Tennessee or in any other southern state. He would, however, he believed, have been within his rights as governor of the state of Tennessee to initiate such action. The Negro issue was therefore inexorably fused with Johnson's constitutional conceptions--the whole again illuminating his tragic flaw, that of inflexibility. To him, the freed Negro represented the deprivation of the aristocracy's power; the qualified enfranchisement of the Negro represented an impediment to the radical plot to make it the decisive issue. In both instances, he was correct. His mistake lay in his failure to attach the proper degree of importance to the latter of the two and firmly forcing it--in a limited form--upon the Southern states as necessary to restoration.

Another instance of Johnson's short-sightedness occurred in relation to the Union party. Throughout, Johnson manifested a continuous inability to grasp the differences of the Union party during the war and during the ensuing peace. To Lincoln, such a party in time of war proved expedient. Expedient, too, was the choice of Andrew Johnson as Lincoln's running mate. Propaganda-wise, the formation of such a party was ingenious. Its very name represented a plea for a concentrated effort by all political factions to join together to preserve the Federal Union. Nonetheless, the composition of such a party remained primarily Republican and once the objective of the Union party was achieved, it would again become Republican, although nominally retaining the former classification for as long as the name proved of popular appeal. McKittrick substantiates this by pointing out that the terms Republican and Unionist were used interchangeably during the Reconstruction era.¹⁷ Johnson's view of the party, however, was quite different; he

apparently failed to realize that the end of the war left him outside the party which had elected him. True, as a former senator, Johnson had voted with the Republicans, but this was the result of the changed circumstances effected by the war and evolving out of the single desire to perpetuate the Union. The Union party as a workable relationship for Johnson was rendered obsolete by the northern victory. As R.R. Ormsby of Virginia wrote in June, Johnson was in a strange position:

You are in a peculiar position. You are so far as I can see, surrounded by the inveterate haters of the South, and in fellowship with scarcely a heart that would have been congenial prior to 1861.¹⁸

The Unionist name was retained for propaganda value; Andrew Johnson, the most obvious evidence of its existence, was tolerated simply because he happened to be president. Therefore, the Republicans, especially the Seward-Weed element attempted to reconstruct him according to Republican ideas and principles. They wanted to make him a Republican. The radical element had much the same idea. In July, Schurz wrote Sumner that "The President must be talked to as much as possible: he must not be left in the hands of his old associations that are more and more gathering around him."¹⁹ As president, Johnson wielded too much power to be ignored by the various factions. Therefore, he was zealously courted by all.

Such courtship was heightened by Johnson's policy of vacillation which proved a constant source of frustration to the surrounding political elements. G. William Curtis, the editor of Harper's Weekly, probably expressed the sentiments of the majority when he said that "I am getting very tired of this state of not knowing exactly where we are."²⁰ In December, he stated that "It must end soon for Johnson must express himself in his message."²¹

Such indecision derived primarily from Johnson's desire to form a new party, a National Union Party, composed basically of the moderate elements--the moderate Republicans, the war Democrats, and the restored Democrats. In Politics, Principle, and Prejudices, the Coxes--LaWanda and John--substantiate the existence of such a party by the evidence discovered in the only recently available Barlow papers. Such verification, however, can be ascertained from the Johnson papers themselves. For example, William Collins wrote Johns Hopkins in June as follows:

It seems to me that the course of the President is clear. If he will continue the battle he has long been fighting and give his confidence only to the true hearted union men of the country and offer himself as their leader under the banner of the Union, pure and simple, in my judgement, he will rally around him the true hearted conservative masses of the country and will be opposed only by the extremists of the North and South. This opposition will cement the great Conservative Party that will rally around him as the Union leader. If he adopts the reforms of the Republican or of the Democratic or of the Whig--or any other of the old parties--he dwarfs his position and power to do good... . I am much mistaken if he does not place himself at the head of a great party, able and willing to bind up the wounds of our country and to restore once more the National Patriotism.²²

Reports from Pennsylvania were likewise encouraging. Thomas C. MacDowell writes Johnson himself as follows:

Permit me to remark in this connexion (sic), that your policy is cordially endorsed by the masses in this state, that is by the Democracy en masse and by the conservative Republicans, who make up what is now, or soon will be, 'Known as the Johnson party of Pennsylvania!' a party I assure you, more formidable in point of numbers, than any since the days of General Jackson.²³

It was Johnson's delay in stating his position that precluded the formation of a National Union Party. The exigencies created in the aftermath of war demanded action, not indecisive neutrality. As long as Johnson's position remained unclear, confusion would continue to rampage in the ranks of those factions that he desired to coordinate into his great Johnson party. Each faction--the Democratic and the Conservative Republicans--was working

individually rather than in combination to secure presidential support and political power. Each side believed the President supporting its principles. Such confusion is revealed in the attempt of the moderate Republican organ--the New York Times--to erect a gulf between the reconstruction policy of the Democracy and that of the President. This is demonstrated by the following article:

Their (Democracy) theory is that the close of the war of itself revives the relations of the rebel states to the Union, On the other hand, President Johnson's principle is that the abeyance of constitutional rights does not pass away with the mere close of the war... . The Democratic Party, considers that the Southern States have a right to restoration, immediate and unconditional. President Johnson, on the other hand, deems it to be both his right and his duty to impose conditions.²⁴

Barlow later treats this specifically in a letter to R. Taylor in which he states his expectation that "Seward and Stanton will seek to influence the new party as they have the Republican party in the past, and I am utterly opposed to any alliance with them and to the formation of any new party in which they are to become the permanent leaders."²⁵ Such animosity proved difficult to overcome. Johnson's political policies should have been based upon consolidation rather than fragmentation; he should have been concentrating on bringing the two elements together, specifying their points of agreement and obscuring their differences. The issue was reconstruction and the two elements agreed that it should be moderate. Johnson should have toned down the race question being proffered inopportunistically by the Democrats and urged union of the moderates to preserve the unity of the nation. Instead, he allowed their petty differences to gain in momentum. Not even the cut-throat campaign in New York between these two factions frightened him into solidifying the increasingly more fluid lines of his support. Therefore, the Democrats continued to labor for a united Democratic party with the President at its head,

and the moderate Republicans were forced to seek alignment with the radicals in order to prevent a triumph of the party whom they considered to have been in opposition to the recent glorious war. The Democracy's insistence upon provoking the issue of Negro suffrage further angered the moderate Republicans. The latter considered the Negro and the Unionists to constitute the "index" previously mentioned which would determine how moderate reconstruction could afford to be. To them, the issue was always that of reconstruction rather than restoration--the question being only one of degree. Unconditional restoration won Democratic approval as the most rapid means by which the party would be united and capable of contemplating victory at the polls. Johnson appeared to be in accord with the Democrats; in concentrating on restoring the South and thereby increasing his political support, Johnson exercised poor judgement. Apparently, he overlooked the fact that the South's future political existence depended upon the pleasure of the North. Therefore, Johnson's attempt to shift the emphasis of the Union party to the Southern Democracy was predestined to failure unless he, first, was able to secure a substantial portion of Northern political support.

All of these elements formed an integral part of Johnson's over-all program. At the time of his advent to the presidency, however, Johnson's course of action was enveloped in speculation nor did his forthcoming addresses relieve the political tension. In a speech before an Indiana delegation, Johnson showed the following characteristic ambiguity:

As to an indication of any policy which may be presented by me in the administration of the government, I have to say that that must be left for development as the administration progresses... . The only assurance that I can now give of the future is by reference to the past... .

The radicals consequently proceeded to remember his radical acts as military

governor of Tennessee; the Democrats recalled his Democratic, Southern background, and the moderate Republicans began vying for his favor. All were proceeding upon a policy based on wishful guesswork. With the amnesty and North Carolina provisional governor proclamations of May 29, a solidification of the President's policies appeared imminent. The amnesty proclamation was analogous to that previously issued by Lincoln, but it reflected certain Johnsonian tinges such as the twenty thousand dollar property qualification and the provision for executive pardoning. Typically Johnsonian also was the increased number of exceptions. Lincoln's plan had been made deliberately vague to allow flexibility; Johnson's demonstrated a rigidity which belied his later leniency. The proclamation appointing W.W. Holden provisional governor of North Carolina provided that the provisional governor should "prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper for convening a convention, composed of delegates to be chosen by that portion of the people of said state who are loyal to the United States, and no others, for the purpose of altering or amending the Constitution thereof, and with authority to exercise, within the limits of said State, all the powers necessary and proper to enable such loyal people of the State of North Carolina to restore said State to its constitutional relations to the Federal Government and to present such a republican form of government... ."27

Similar proclamations were issued to the other Southern states with the exception of the four states already set up by Lincoln. In order to attain restoration, the Southern state conventions were expected to declare secession null and void, abolish slavery and repudiate the debts incurred in the aid of the rebellion. After this was satisfactorily effected, the states were allowed to hold popular elections. These were the fundamentals of the

plan which Johnson seemingly followed to secure restoration. As to the actual reconstruction of the states, nothing was specifically stated.

Although restoration was Johnson's prime concern, he was also motivated by political aspirations. Throughout, the new President was attempting to establish a new middle-of-the-road party with himself at its head. His actions therefore veered towards reaching this ultimate objective. Especially is this evidenced in his utilization of the patronage and pardoning powers. Through patronage, Johnson hoped to retain the support of the various elements. Accordingly, he replaced the naval officership of the New York City customhouse with the Democrat Odell. The moderate and radical Republican elements were gratified by his maintenance of Seward and Stanton in the cabinet. It was around the aforementioned customhouse that a great deal of controversy revolved. Following the suicide of the collector, Preston King, this proved markedly so. All factions proceeded to exert pressure to fill the vacated post. Again, Johnson was dilatory and failed to appoint a successor until the following year thus engendering the suspicions of the various elements. Loudest in their bid for a benevolent patronage policy were the Democrats. In 1865, the Democrats were already engaged in what Barlow wrote they were attempting in '66 when he stated that, "...we are now trying to play cuckoo and lay our eggs in the Republican nest with Johnson and I think we shall succeed."²⁸ Thus, the Democrats were attempting to derive patronage benefits through a man elected on the Union ticket-- a party from which the Republicans primarily drew their support. During 1866, James Ford Rhodes says that Johnson had removed 1,283 postmasters in addition to numerous customhouse and internal revenue officials, but in '65, the President seldom utilized his patronage power. Those appointments

he did make were geared towards the conciliation of all factions rather than towards the solidification of a strong political front. Unheeded went the astute advice of the war Democrats who cautioned Johnson to appoint only the men who would "without doubt whatsoever support you and your policy in 1868."²⁹ Instead, Johnson tried to maintain the support of all which he did somewhat loosely. History has frequently shown the triumph of an organized minority and the defeat of the disorganized masses. A politician can rarely afford to live in the past or present; his ambition almost invariably associates him with the future. Johnson's policy appears enveloped in principles and aims designed to return the nation of 1865 miraculously to that of 1860. War, more than any other single force, demands change to adjust to its exigencies; once in motion, forces of change are not easily arrested, even for peace. In attempting to do the impossible--arrest change--Johnson would naturally arouse the hostility of those in the North who had fought the war specifically to create a world in which change would be allowed.

The epitome of Johnson's power of appointment is reflected in his selection of provisional governors for the Southern states. Generally, the President tried to maintain his neutral position by appointing neither unconditional secessionists nor unconditional Unionists. He tried to choose Unionists like himself who would be interested primarily in restoration. Of such union predilections were William Marvin, Florida; James Johnson, Georgia; Lewis E. Parsons, Alabama; A.J. Hamilton, Texas; W.W. Holden, North Carolina; William L. Sharkey, Mississippi; and B. F. Perry, South Carolina. Johnson simply recognized the ten per cent governors--F. Pierpont, Virginia; Issac Murphy, Arkansas; J.M. Wells, Louisiana; and William Brownlow, Tennessee. W.W. Holden, the first governor appointed

by Johnson, was far from worthy, proving a political opportunist who used the pardoning power granted to him by the President to curry influential favor within the state. Jonathan Dorris' Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson presents a detailed account of Holden's activities as provisional governor of North Carolina during 1865. In this account, Governor Holden appears in a most unfavorable light. Because of past actions also, Holden was unacceptable to the truly loyal. Prior to the war, he had been a secessionist. Although less unscrupulous, B.F. Perry of South Carolina proved scarcely more acceptable. Before the war, he had ardently opposed secession, but after the war had begun, he served as a Confederate commissioner, district attorney, and district judge. As provisional governor, he was most meticulous in reporting his pardons to the President, but he aroused Unionist suspicion when he reappointed all those who had held office at the time of the collapse of the state government. W.L. Sharkey, as a former states-rights Whig and Unionist, was the natural choice for provisional governor of Mississippi. Parsons, renowned for his Unionism and obstruction of the Confederate cause, became the provisional governor of Alabama. Murphy, Brownlow, and Hamilton were, as governors, the prototypes of Johnson as military governor of Tennessee. They also despised the aristocratic "authors of the rebellion" and desired revenge. There was for them no satisfaction in granting pardons and thus opening the way for the rebels' return to power. A victory had been won and they desired to reap its political rewards. Had Johnson remained governor of Tennessee, McKittrick is probably right in maintaining that he, as governor, would have opposed such a policy as the one he, as president, promulgated.³⁰

As president, Johnson, however, gambled for higher stakes; his goal

was a new, National Union party which would secure his nomination for president in 1868. Excluding the three previously designated governors, the others were probably nothing more than innocent accessories to the National Union party scheme. Most of them were respected by the state as a whole and would prove good contacts in Johnson's plan to carry the South in '68. As Unionists, they were to lead their states to reunion and restoration. The role Johnson assigned the Unionist provisional governors was to be duplicated by all Unionists in relation to the new party. They were to form the core of the governments and effect hasty restoration. In this instance, Johnson's reasoning was specifically fallacious. First, he underestimated the number of Unionists in each state--he pictured the states as miniature East Tennessees. James Johnson elucidates this fallacy in his response to Johnson's query regarding appointments. The governor answers that he "...has given all preference to union men... . When this is not the case it is because there is no other application for the place."³¹ Second, he failed to understand the political ineptitude of the Unionist group as a whole--the outstanding rebels were generally those with the greatest political experience. Third, Johnson again ignored the difference peace had made in the solution of the problem. His governors, like their superior, were trying to recapture the past rather than to reconstruct for a better future. They failed, as did Johnson, because they did not realize that the war had itself provided the beginnings of a reconstruction which necessitated completion as the only means by which a lasting peace could be projected. The sectional differences originally instigating the civil struggle had to be obliterated in order to forestall similar strife in the future. But the provisional governors had--as Simkins says of B.F. Perry in his

South Carolina During Reconstruction--too much blind faith in Andrew Johnson. This was the greatest flaw in Johnson's provisional governor appointments--Johnson, himself.

In 1865, the issue was not as much that of Johnson's appointments--he made so few definitive ones--as it was his policy of granting pardons. The amnesty proclamation of May 29 had listed fourteen classifications of persons who were excepted from the general amnesty and who would remain so unless pardoned by the chief executive. Such terms were undoubtedly based upon Johnson's desire to effect general restoration but individual reconstruction. Johnson's wrath was directed specifically towards the aristocrats whom he desired to humble. Using the pardoning power as his equalizing instrument, Johnson was able to both placate his egotism and to restore, subject to congressional approval, the South to its ante-bellum status minus the objectionable slavery. Glorifying in the fawning admiration of those by whom he had always been scorned, Johnson used the pardon power indiscriminately, ultimately nullifying it by stimulating a Southern cocksureness which resulted in alarming the North. Unionist protests came from the South and were heard by a sympathetic North distrustful of a Democratic South. A Unionist of Henrico County, Virginia, wrote Justin Morrill in December that "President Johnson is pardoning all the rebels here and...men are getting pardoned who was (sic) never worth twenty thousand dollars in their life but want to take advantage of the northern men to borry (sic) money on account...." ³² Southern Unionists felt as indeed did the North that their persecutions by Confederates during the war should now be avenged. With each pardon, the possibility of such became increasingly more nebulous. Thus, Johnson as the executor of these odious pardons attracted a great deal

of suspicion which resulted in the disaffection of this Unionist group. In a letter from Savannah, Alex W. Wilson substantiates this increasing animosity of the Union men in reference to Johnson's leniency as follows:

All speak in your praise, but the hard headed union men who suffered persecutions are a little Soured. They say treason is not a crime when such men as Henry R. Jackson of Savannah...can get pardons and restored to all their original privileges. I think this is more from a desire to see such men punished through pride than patriotism, but it is a fact in Geo. that those who have been the best union men during the war are taking a position against the administration.³³

Reports and protests such as these angered the Republican North who believed that the Unionists should be rewarded rather than punished for their former loyalty. The Republicans, led by the radicals, therefore saw Johnson's policy as too moderate to secure the fruits of victory to themselves and the Southern Unionists and Negroes. Increasingly, they viewed a thorough reconstruction of the South as the only recourse.

However, Johnson's pardon maneuvers were not as irrational as they appeared superficially. The shift which occurred, seemingly demonstrated by the profuse exercise of this power to pardon, was calculated by Johnson to establish his own National Union Party. Strictly, the plan was a good one; had Johnson wielded his power more judiciously, it very well might have succeeded. As it was, however, he aroused much antagonism by what most considered to be a shift from a radical to a moderate policy towards the Southern states. These people remembered with what zealous measures Johnson had dealt with the rebels in East Tennessee and expected his presidential policy to be a carry-over from that. In fact, they were even quite frequently relieved that Johnson was the President instead of the beloved but too lenient Lincoln. In June, Samuel R. Snyder expressed this widespread Northern opinion in a letter to the new President as follows:

...yet I did believe that in the Providence of God he (Lincoln) had filled his mission as we all know taht he was too lenient to punish rebels accoring to their just deserts... . I agree with you that all the rebels that were ignorant and were misled into the rebellion (sic) should be gently dealt with but certainly all well informed and designing rascals should be severely punished and if they are treated otherwise I would not give a fig for our government. We will neither be respected at home or abroad.³⁴

As president, Johnson appeared a moderate engaged in pardoning unequivocally those whom he had formerly persecuted. Thus, he was accused of having drifted South; such was the charge made against him in a newspaper clipping sent to him in September which stated the forthcoming viewpoint:

It is about time for President Johnson to stop and take an observation of his latitude. He will discover that he has drifted 'South' a long way, and is in a dangerous current that may strand his craft on the Florida reefs. The sea thereabouts is filled with sharks and other monsters of prey. His only safety is to sail in Republican seas and remain in company with the victorious Union fleet of iron clads and monitors. When such sheets as the New York World, New York News, Chicago Times and Detroit Free Press praise his reconstruction policy, tender him their enthusiastic 'support,' then and gleefully compare his course toward the Republican party with that of John Tyler towards the Whigs, we submit that it is high time he 'slowed' down steam, stopped and took an observation of his present whereabouts and the direction in which he is sailing.³⁵

In reality, however, the man Johnson actually remained the same; the issues alone had changed by the revolution effected by the recent war. Johnson was still an ardent Unionist. To him, now, however, the definition of a Unionist was somewhat altered. During and following the war, a Unionist was one who believed the Union inviolate. Secession had, therefore, been impossible and disunion, inconceivable. As long as the South remained outside the Union, the Union was not held inviolate. Consequently, the Unionist after the war was to Johnson one who desired an immediate reinstatement of the Southern states thereby effecting total union. The pardon would constitute the tool by which such a reunion could be fostered. Devoid of their power--derived from slaves--and subject to the degradation of pardoning, the land-

owners could present no obstacle to the perpetuity of the Union. Likewise, Johnson's position in relation to Negro suffrage represented no actual change. As far as he was concerned, the war had been fought to preserve the Union, not to free the slaves. Formerly, in the Senate, he had voted with the abolitionists in alliance against such privileged power which he believed to be conspiring to destroy the Union. Being a Southerner and strict-constructionist, Johnson sincerely believed that suffrage should be left to the discretion of the states which were constitutionally delegated to set the voting qualifications. A discrepancy seems extant in Johnson's letter to Sharkey, recommending a qualified suffrage for the Negro. In reality, however, Johnson had little intention of allowing the Negro to vote; his suggested qualifications would have given the suffrage only to a minute portion of the South's freedmen. Moreover, Johnson failed to have a very substantial conception of the significance of the issue involving the freedmen. He, like Lincoln, was basically oblivious to the Negro; his concern was, during the war, the preservation of the Union; following the war, this concern shifted to a restoration of the preserved Union. There was no actual shift. Only inadvertently and in his desire to rapidly restore the South--thereby marshalling the support of a large number of components for his new party--did such a shift ostensibly occur.

An internal deterrent to the success of Johnson's reconstruction policy was the Freedmen's Bureau. This was an institution created by an act of Congress on March 3, 1865, which established a bureau for the control of all subjects relating to the freedmen and refugees of the South. More than any other phase of reconstruction, this organization aroused the enmity of the conservative whites. Theoretically, the purpose of the bureau was to wrest order from the chaotic conditions resulting from the war.

That there was a great deal of corruption appears evident from the reports primarily of John Wallace and those revealed later through the joint committee hearings. The prominent aristocrats viewed the Bureau as a scheme of its officials to profit themselves economically and politically. To them, the legal power wielded by the Bureau posed a potential danger; they believed that the Negro was in as equally great a need for discipline as for the welfare doled out by the Bureau. From the officers of the Freedmen's Bureau also came the belief prevalent among the Negroes that they would eventually be given the apportioned land of their former masters. General Grant warned Johnson of this in December:

In some instances, I am sorry to say, the freedman's mind does not seem to be disabused of the idea that a freedman has the right to live without care or provision for the future. The effect of the belief in division of lands is idleness and accumulation in camps, towns, and cities.³⁶

Such was the case. The vagrancy of the Negro was the spur which stimulated, more than any other single problem, the passing of the infamous Black Codes. Although the Bureau effected some worthwhile measures and righted some wrongs, it proved, because of its independent workings and questionable tactics, a point of contention which Johnson virtually ignored as he apparently made no effort in 1865 to oversee its machinery. His non-committal attitude--to boil forth only in later 1866--necessitated that the Southerners themselves combat the organization which they did with the Black Codes.

Such "nefarious" measures were thus enacted in the Southern legislatures assembling in the last months of 1865. Generally, in both the conventions and later legislatures, the Southern delegates proved too conservative to effect the radical changes demanded by the new dynamic age wrought by the Civil War. Half-heartedly, they did manage to act upon the three pre-requisites which Johnson intimated as necessary to restoration--abolition,

repudiation of war debts, and a declaration rendering secession null and void. The results were far from agreeable to the North. South Carolina complied with two of the three pre-requisites, refusing to repudiate the debts. Instead of nullifying the ordinance of secession, Georgia repealed it, thereby insinuating that it had been initially legal. The remaining states acted in accordance with Johnson's requirements, though in a dilatory and hesitant fashion. To the South in general and to B.F. Perry, in particular, the North, via the N.Y. Tribune issued the following warning:

It is scarcely good taste for the just-pardoned governor, Perry addressing a half-pardoned convention, to cast an imputation on the purposes of the loyal states, and to arraign a great dominant political party in those states for its views on national policy... . We assure him in all kindness that South Carolina must present herself at the doors of the House next December with words quite other than this on her repentant lips.³⁷

Northern indignation knew no bounds when the legislatures assembled and began the enactment of the Black Codes. By the time of Johnson's message to Congress in December, 1865, all of the legislatures except Mississippi had ratified the thirteenth amendment. It was, however, with the Negro that the legislation was primarily concerned. To Southerners, the Negroes were young children suddenly alienated from parental authority. As such, the Southern legislatures, forced to recognize such freedom, tried to adopt a code by which the freedmen would be disciplined by law. The result was the enactment of the so-called Black Codes dealing with crime, morality, apprenticeship, vagrancy, and labor contracts. Generally, the Negro was considered free but subject to certain necessary restrictions designed to keep him in check. The whites feared the chaos which the freedmen, as products of a disrupted order, had been allowed to precipitate. In addition, they feared an amalgamation with a race possessing equal rights, but one

they knew to be inferior to their own. The Black Codes were the natural result. On the other hand, the Negroes' position was considerably improved. To him were granted what appeared to the Southerner to be an adequate number of rights and privileges. He could hold property, marry, sue and be sued, and give testimony in litigation involving his own race. The whites did not feel that he was ready to vote, but neither did a majority of the North's population. Complacently, assured of a congenial reception of its magnanimous legislation by the President and, therefore, by the North as a whole, the South then proceeded to elect its congressmen and finally to be fully reinstated in the Federal government. In so doing, they generally elected prominent Confederates for the state and national legislatures whom they believed to be the best qualified for the positions. Georgia's effrontery in electing Alexander Stephens enraged the North. Increasingly, Northern sentiment regarded the South as having failed all the tests requisite to a reconstruction. Quite possibly, Johnson could have forestalled the harshness of the Black Codes had he demonstrated a firmer attitude towards the South and had he recognized the importance of the Negro as the "index."

As this Southern legislation demonstrates, one of the most remarkable shifts occurred not in Andrew Johnson, but in the attitudes manifested by the South during this period. Primarily, these Southern views became known to Johnson through the reports of three men sent by the President to investigate and report on conditions and opinions in the South; these men were Carl Schurz, S.P. Chase--the more radical-- H. Watterson, the moderate. Following the Northern triumph, their--the Southerners--general reaction was one of submission. Carl Schurz noted this in a report to the President in late July:

In almost all the conversations I have had, this was their (the intelligent rebels) standing admission, and almost uniformly in the same words: "The war has decided that there shall be no secession and that the slaves are emancipated. We cannot be expected to give up our principles and convictions of right, but we submit to the result and want to be reinstated in the enjoyment of our rights.' Most of them are by no means willing to acknowledge the Constitutionality of coercion and of the Emancipation Proclamation. It is generally a submission to overpowering force."³⁸

J.H. Wilson wrote similarly from Georgia that "...there is no sentiment of true loyalty prevailing or that the affections of the people are directed towards the North and the legitimate government...but on the other hand there is no manifestation of hatred or a desire for farther opposition. The people express an external submission... ."39 During the summer months, the attitudes underwent a change largely because the President seemed to change towards them. After the surrender, the South appeared docile and attempted to placate its conqueror with studied submission-- in effect, it courted the favor of the government. The reversal came when Johnson--representing the government as Congress would not assemble until December--began courting the South in order to solidify the lines of his new party. In July, Barlow wrote Blair that "...the South, just as rapidly as his (Johnson's) reconstruction plans are carried out, will be a Johnson party, and that nothing can prevent this unless the President wills it otherwise."⁴⁰ The South was extremely vulnerable to such a scheme; the almost universal cry was as A.N. Wilson wrote Johnson from Tennessee "...what shall we do to be saved?"⁴¹ And Johnson became the savior granting salvation through the pardoning power. In September, Mrs. John A. Jackson of Tennessee wrote to the President that "Our Southern brothers are beginning to know that you are their friend, their protector, and to feel that. In thy hands a Nation's fate lies circled, its dangers great and its peril imminent. To you they look and pray for pardon... ."42 Rapidly, Johnson was recog-

nized by the South as the government; as the interpreter of Northern opinion and, as the government, they were deaf to instructions or opinions other than his. This, in part, resulted from the relatively mild demands Johnson made of them--they wanted Johnson's demands to be those and only those with which they had to comply. Doubtless, they had entirely too much faith in the President and totally failed to realize the vast chasm between the policies of Johnson and those desired by the Northern majority.

Johnson's profuse pardonings, vacillation, and leniency in the South did indeed rally their support to his party; however, by such policies, he also created an arrogant South, one who no longer carried the favor of the North as the conqueror, but who accepted such favor as its due. They no longer felt required to skulk in defeat; they now were able to walk proudly again recognizing the cause for which they had fought as a noble one. Thus, in September, Baton Rouge's Tri-Weekly Advocate contained the following proclamation:

President Johnson has 'forced' a number of men 'prominent in the rebellion' into high positions since he became President... . The long and short of it is, this cry about men not running for office who have fought heroically for the past four years in a cause they loved, is all nonsense... . Their past bravery and their frank submission to the Government is the best guarantee of their future fidelity, a fact known and already recognized by the President.⁴³

Both Johnson and the South made the mistake of concentrating too heavily upon one another and too little on the rest of the country and government respectively. Multiplying zero by zero, the product was zero. Johnson, without a party, and the South, without political existence, thus proved a combination easily defeated. Both attained the support of one another, but they lost the support of the majority; both became zealous allies of the politically impotent. In November, R.W. Flournoy wrote Stevens from Missis-

issippi that "Whatever genuine Union sentiment was forming and would in time have grown up, has been checked by Mr. Johnson's course, he has made a great mistake. He is now the favorite of all the diseffected (sic) elements here. . . ."⁴⁴ Most hostile to the presidential course were those Unionists who were being ignored by the President's favor. As early as June, Texas Unionists felt compelled to write Johnson recommending the more drastic military rule as the only safe course; the following demonstrates this:

We believe the people generally opposed to military rule, still we greatly prefer a loyal military government to a disloyal civil one. The disadvantages of delay will be felt by the loyal as well as by the disloyal. We earnestly hope that reorganization in our state will be deferred until the truly loyal feel that it can be successfully accomplished.⁴⁵

Johnson, however, remained adamant in his policy of pardoning towards the former rebels. Likewise, the South continued on its course impervious to Northern rumblings of dissatisfaction, trusting totally in the judgement of Johnson. The general consensus of opinion regarding the radicals was summed up by the Charleston Daily Courier which stated that "It may safely be said that the views and opinions of Sumner, Thad Stevens, Wilson, and some of the Northern Radicals have been considered too unworthy to be seriously commented upon by members of the convention. It is well known that the sentiments of those gentlemen are extremely unpopular in the North."⁴⁶ The sentiments of those gentlemen were perhaps untapped in the North, but they were extremely unpopular only to Johnson by whom the South erroneously gauged popular opinion.

For any sort of gauging instrument, Johnson was a poor choice. First, Johnson was not in his true position. As president, he was the recognized head of the government. Johnson, however, assumed the identity of the entire government and acted in his accustomed autocratic manner. Secondly,

his dogmatic mind had already characteristically determined the course he planned to follow and it would remain unalterable. Johnson revealed much the same to James G. Bennet, editor of the New York Herald, in October when he stated that he "...entered upon this Presidential term with a fixed and unalterable determination to administer the Government upon the principles which will bring the people, as near as may be, in close proximity with all the acts and doings of their public servants... ."47 In addition, Johnson not only insisted upon a "fixed and unalterable" course, but he also insisted upon considering such a course as being that which the "people" wanted. Thus, his letter to Bennett ended on a typical note when he said that "... so far, in public life, the people have sustained me. I have never deserted them, and if I know my own heart, I will stand by them now... ."48 Had Johnson devoted greater energy to adapting himself to the opinions of the period and less time to pursuing his "fixed and unalterable" course, he could have achieved the success he sought. Although by the end of December the South was actively pro-Johnson, this support had been won only because Johnson, in his ignoble benevolence, allowed them free rein. Legislation distasteful to the North was the result. In winning so complete a victory in the South, Johnson had alienated the North. As the South was a virtual political nonentity, Johnson's policies and, ultimately, Johnson, himself, proved unsuccessful.

The arrogant attitudes of the Southerner legislators triggered certain reactions in the North--the most vehement opposition coming from the Sumner-Stevens or radical elements. From the beginning, the radicals, as did the other elements, desired that Johnson ally himself with their interests. During the early stages of his presidency, Johnson's vacillation allayed any

particularly virulent political animosity. All elements believed that he favored their strategy or specific policies. With the radicals, the situation differed somewhat; it soon became evident that Johnson was following a more moderate policy towards the South than they might have wished. However, they, by terming such a policy experimental, managed to justify the President's actions. In June, L.M. Morrill wrote to Sumner categorizing the President's actions as an experiment. In essence, he stated that "The president is trying to demonstrate his theory of restoring states... . It will fail of course. There is constitutional revolution and Negro insurrection in it. Nobody approves it. Still, it is but an experiment--let him try it. That I think is the feeling."⁴⁹ On this basis, they tolerated, as the most expedient course, Johnson's lenient policy. Johnson himself soon cast doubts upon this concept when he wrote Schurz in August voicing a new idea concerning the latter's Southern mission. Originally, Schurz had been sent to the South as one of several--H.M. Watterson, Truman, and Carl Schurz--to investigate attitudes and conditions in the area. Generally, the Schurz reports proved unfavorable to Johnson's moderate program as they depicted the South as still rebellious and unreconstructed. In August, therefore, Johnson telegraphed Schurz expressing the true purpose of Schurz's mission as being one "to aid as far as practicable in carrying out the policy adopted by the Government (i.e., Johnson) for restoring the states to their former relations with the Federal Government."⁵⁰ He ended by saying that he hoped that "such aid had been given." By the end of 1865, even weak semblances of compatibility between the radicals and Johnson had been shattered by the actions of the Southern conventions and legislatures which proved too blatant to be ignored by the North. As early as July, Johnson

had received warnings from the radical faction; Stevens was probably the most candid among those who wrote. In a letter dated July 6, Stevens stated that "Among all the leading union men of the North with whom I have had intercourse I do not find one who approves of your policy. They believe that 'restoration' as announced by you will destroy our party which is of little consequence and will greatly injure this country. Can you not hold your hand and wait the action of congress and in the meantime govern them by military rulers--Profuse pardoning also will greatly embarrass congress if they should wish to make the enemy pay the expenses of the war or a part of it."⁵¹ Johnson was warned to move cautiously and admonished for his profuse pardonings; generally, it was a plea to better adapt his policies to those of the more radical elements.

Basically, however, the radicals were against Johnson's restoration policies and hoped that the experiment would fail. Johnson's policy would negate their plans which included political dominance and the perpetuity of the revolution begun by the war. Josephson calls this revolution a progressive bourgeois one in his Politicos. Such a revolution was initiated by the legislation passed during the preceding war--the Morrill tariff, the Homestead Act, and federal aid to the railroad--all of which would probably never have been passed had the South not seceded and absented itself from the Senate and House. The radicals did not want to battle again against a restored, obstructionist South. If Johnson, through his moderate presidential policy, could have reconstructed the South employing the Negro and Unionist as indices, the radicals would have accepted such a reconstructed South, but they were unable to accept a restored and unaltered one. To test the degree to which the South was actually reconstructed, the majority of the North

used the Negro as its index. The legislation passed by the so-recently restored states left no question in the minds of the radicals as to the position of the South. Led by the reactionary Johnson, the South was attempting to return to its ante-bellum past changing only its substitution of the wage system for the abolished slavery. Johnson had furthered such an aim by restoring almost immediately the formerly rebellious states. Throughout 1865 and primarily as the result of the reports received from the unhappy and afflicted Unionists decrying the still-rebellious atmosphere of the South, the radicals had cautioned delay which would allow time for the South to be reconstructed, but the President was intent upon his predetermined policy of haste. Sumner wrote Schurz in October that "The rebel states must not be allowed at once to participate in our government. This privilege must be postponed... . There must be delay. The president does not see this, every step that he takes is toward perdition."⁵² Again, Johnson erred in his attempt to adhere to Lincoln's wartime policy of restoration. Haste was necessary in wartime in order to effect greater dissension and chaos to divide the Confederate ranks. However, such a policy proved fatal in the post-war era in which the primary objective was that of unity rather than division. Indeed, Johnson seemed to ignore the radicals. The New Orleans Picayune noted that Johnson was pleased with Southern restoration and cared "...not a snap of his fingers whether the Radicals like it or not."⁵³ Johnson seemed unaware of the importance of remaining friendly towards the radicals who had, as James Michie of Chicago pointed out to the President, "...elected him." Increasingly, too, Michie pointed out, Johnson was allowing himself to be duped by the hated aristocrats--Johnson was becoming more closely identified with the Southern rebels.⁵⁴

Had he lost the radical support, Johnson could still have retained his political power had he managed to first unite and then maintain the support of the moderates--the Seward-Weed Republican elements and the Democrats. He did manage to retain control of the Democracy, but lost the more significant support of the moderate Republicans which proved ruinous to his scheme for a new Johnson party. The Democracy was too closely associated with the preceding rebellion to prove extremely advantageous to a political aspirant; thus, for propaganda purposes as well as for strength, the Republicans were vital to the survival of Johnson, the politician. Within the the Republican party, there were, as has been partially already demonstrated, several factions--the radicals, the moderates, and the pro-Johnson Republicans like Dixon and Doolittle who favored Johnson's every move, seemingly without discrimination. The most important of these various elements for Johnson to hold was the moderates. At the beginning, this element vied with the Democracy for Johnson's favor. This is readily observed in the moderate New York Times in which is evidenced also a gradual change from relative moderacy to relative radicalism by the end of 1865. It was furthermore the Times which set up the Negro as the index although denying that the real question was Negro suffrage. In August, the Times stated that "The real question as to the future political status of the Negro is whether he should be protected against injustice rather than suffrage."⁵⁵ Basically, they were prepared to support Johnson for, as they said in September, "President Johnson founds all his practical policy upon the presumption that the South is fit to be trusted. His radical opponents found theirs upon the presumption that the South is unfit to be trusted. When the contrary is shown, then and not until then, will the time come for a different policy."⁵⁶ In November, the Times warned the South that they

should grant more civil and social rights to the Negro in order to foil the radicals, adding ominously that "If the South will not do this, the nation Must. It cannot be left undone."⁵⁷ By December, the Times seemed extremely dubious concerning the humility of the vanquished South as is shown in the following editorial:

This high demand for an immediate return of the chairs that were kicked down is not humility. This impatient elbowing through the crowd to the Clerk's desk for the chance to say who shall be Speaker is not humility. We venture to predict that the loyal representatives will so conceive, and will with all due civility invite these gentlemen to keep the back seats in the lobby until they are sent for.⁵⁸

The Times is seen almost parroting the radicals' plea for caution in returning the South to Congress:

The northern people will not see with composure the wheels blocked by the insisting of these Southern claimants to seats... . A decision that is to carry with it such results should be formed with great caution, and only after the most conclusive proof that these states now possess a genuine loyalty, and are prepared to perform all their appropriate duties.⁵⁹

Such appropriate duties referred to the Negro. In November, the Times had appealed to the South to eradicate the Black Codes. "The infamous black codes must be swept out of existence to the last atom. Laws must be established calculated to raise the colored man to full manhood instead of forcing him down to the level of a brute."⁶⁰ By the end of December, the Times had been almost completely convinced that the South was not going to perform such duties; this was evidenced when the Times began referring to the codes as the "bloody codes." The South had proved itself to be still rebellious and, therefore, in need of the reconstruction demands by the radicals who based their platform primarily on Negro suffrage as the only means by which the Negro would be freed from the white man's oppression. The fault, in reality, lay with Johnson who, had he more firmly

demanded greater social and civil rights for the Negro, would have seen them granted. As it was, however, he lost the moderate Republicans. By December, the Times was still outwardly pledging support of the President, but it came out frequently at variance with the President's policy.

Contributing to the gradual shift of the moderate Republicans to a support of the radicals--that is, Negro suffrage--was the projected animosity of the Democrats. The Blair-Barlow elements opposed union with the Seward-Weed elements. Although this animosity ultimately frustrated his plans for the Johnson party, Johnson did little to amend the situation. Throughout, this Democratic element urged a studied cultivation of Southern support. Blair wrote Johnson in early August significantly that "The vote of the South will be drawn almost as a unit to the side of that party which it finds to be in opposition to a ministry known to be hostile to its dearest rights in the union... ."61 In effect, this only reiterated what Barlow had earlier written when he stated to Johnson that "...the whole party is today a Johnson party: that the South just as rapidly as his reconstruction plans are carried out, will be a Johnson party."62 In order to further strengthen their position, the Democrats attempted to make Negro suffrage an issue, erroneously believing the majority of the North to be opposed to this. The Times recognized such a design and denied suffrage claiming with the President that suffrage should be left to the states. Thus, from the first, however, the proclivities of Johnson and the Democracy were more closely allied. Both advocated that restoration be immediate and that Negro suffrage be left to the states, and both did this for the same reasons--constitutional principles and--more important--to win the South's political support. The Democratic organ, the New York World, made this clear in October in its

reporting of a conversation which the President engaged with the World editor, Manton Marble. The conversation ran as follows:

The president...told Mr. Marble... that he was determined to stand or fall on his plan for the immediate restoration of the Union. He had staked the success of his administration on that plan, and not only this, but he staked his own present and future place in the history of the country upon it.

Those who sustain me, added the President, I will sustain. Those who oppose, I will oppose.

In his whole conversation with Mr. Marble, he persistently avowed himself a Democrat--as much today as ever... .⁶³

It seemed that Johnson had capitulated to the Democracy, at least according to the Democratic press. Such notices further alienated the Republicans who were unable to trust the Southern and formerly Democratic President. To entrench their position with the President, the Democrats attacked the experiment concept perpetuated by the radicals and supported somewhat by the moderate Republicans. In September, the New York World blasted this idea in the following manner"

It has been, for a while, the cue of the Radicals to pretend that the President regarded his policy as a doubtful experiment... . But a succession of significant acts has destroyed this hope. The letter of congratulations to the Miss. convention, the reversal of the military order arresting the organization of the State militia by Governor Sharkey, the noble, magnanimous, and confiding speech to the Southern delegation, the policy of the President is fixed; that no choice is left them but open opposition... ."64

Thus, it was the Democrats, rather than the radicals, who forced radical reconstruction. By insisting upon immediate restoration minus any reconstruction, they frightened the North into an acceptance of a more radical--encompassing Negro suffrage--program.

Both the radicals and the Democrats represented the extreme factions of the period. The one demanded reconstruction, the other restoration. Both desired these unconditionally. The moderate Republicans, conversely, de-

sired restoration until the South demonstrated by its actions that it would have to be reconstructed. Johnson became too closely identified with the Democratic extreme--this extreme is deemed moderate generally because of its Unionist sentiments, but was extreme in reference to the South after the war, as indeed was Johnson. When Johnson began receiving the praise of such Copperhead organs as the Lancaster Intelligencer, it was time for him to re-evaluate his political moorings and re-align if necessary. Only towards the end of the year did Johnson obviously become concerned enough to telegraph his provisional governors regarding the Unionists' protests that the governors were appointing prominent rebels. Johnson obviously suspected that something was going wrong, but seemed reassured by the answers of the governors who generally denied the charge, later amending such denial by stating that in some cases it had been necessary to appoint former rebels when qualified Union men were not available.⁶⁵ Johnson, it seemed, however, again refused to accept any discrepancy between what he heard to be true and what he had already predetermined was true. Any deviation from his truth was erroneous. Therefore, by December, it was obvious that Presidential reconstruction had failed. As Luther C. Carter wrote to Stevens from New York in December, the North could not accept the present conditions in the South. He maintained that "This hand of fellowship has been but partially accepted, even outwardly, whilst in spirit, it has been manifestly rejected." Furthermore, he believed that "...an armed force of white men, should be kept in each one of the rebellious states, and at the expense of the property of such states, sufficient to keep the peace... . It seems to me that, there should be no further pardoning of, or dealing with the people of those states for the present"⁶⁶ The South had to be reconstructed on the northern model before

the North deemed it safe to readmit its states. To effect this, the stumbling block erected by the different policy of the President had to be overcome. By his own political errors, Johnson had become the opposition.

The events of 1865 prepared the way for the final break between Johnson and the moderates in 1866 which occurred over the Freedmen's Bureau Bill. In December of 1865, an editorial in the New York Times had clearly indicated the Moderate Republicans stand in reference to the maintenance of the Freedman's Bureau in stating the following:

...Without following through the most valuable reports of the assistant commissioners of the Bureau and General Howard's conclusions, we may observe that no reasonable man can read these calm official documents without feeling that...for some time yet military forces of the U.S. be retained in the South, and its (Freedmen) guardian protection both over Negroes and whites, through the Freedmen's Bureau, should be continued. The removal of that Bureau would throw everything in the late insurgent states into confusion."⁶⁷

Having used the Negro as the "index" by which the South's reconstruction was to be judged, this group was disappointed in the conditions which had resulted within the Southern states. As speaker Colfax phrased it, they felt that they could not "...abandon them (the Negroes) and leave them defenseless at the mercy of their former owners. They must be protected in their rights of person and property... ." ⁶⁸ Such protection demanded the presence of the Freedmen's Bureau or equality before the law for the Negroes. The stand of the moderates on this is demonstrated by the Times reporting of the Sharkey-Slocum controversy over the Freedmen's Bureau. Slocum, apparently, desired the total dissolution of the Freedmen's Bureau while Sharkey advocated the maintenance of the Bureau but a transference of court cases to the civil courts wherein the Negroes would be awarded the same rights as those granted the whites. The Times denounces Slocum and praises Sharkey.⁶⁹ Therefore, it follows that Johnson's veto would violate

the results of the "index" thereby alienating moderate support. By such a veto, Johnson identified himself with the Democratic element--the Democrat, Slocum, specifically--who viewed the Bureau as a deterrent to the rapid restoration they desired for the South. Although the Times demonstrates an obvious disagreement--shown in the preceding quotations--with the policy which Johnson later materializes as his, it, nevertheless, continues throughout the latter months of 1865 and early 1866 to pledge its loyalty to the President.

Frequently, especially in the rehabilitation biographies, Johnson is treated as the victim of a Republican conspiracy. Gideon Welles, the Democratic member of Johnson's cabinet, is generally cited as the source of this premise. The interpretation Welles gives in his diary is a credible one. As he sees it, the conspiracy is not a radical plot, but a Republican one. A Democrat, he makes little distinction between moderates and radicals. Intermittently, Welles casts reflections on the sincerity of Secretary Seward. On October 21, he writes in his diary that Seward made a speech the preceding day "glorifying himself and Stanton." It is, however, in January of 1866 that Welles makes his most explicit charge regarding a Republican conspiracy. His entry in January is footnoted in the following manner:

The President was at this time greatly embarrassed by the advice and suggestions of Mr. Seward, who, though personally friendly to the President and the administration, was himself so much of a party man, and so much under the influence of extreme partisans, as to be governed rather by party than by country. It was the aim and object of his N.Y. friends to keep alive party distinctions created by secession and the war, and to throw the power of the administration into the Republican, or, in other words, Radical hands...the New York politicians had, therefore, a double part to play, and Mr. Seward was their agent to effect their purpose. Whilst Thaddeus Stevens and the extreme Radicals were making war on the Executive, it was

important for the New Yorkers and indeed for men of similar views in other States not to break immediately with the President, but to use the power and patronage of the Executive to promote their own ends."70

This undoubtedly contains fact; the bias of Welles, however, must be considered. Probably more plausible is the theory that Johnson, by his own actions, alienated the moderates, than one implying that there was any preconceived plot between the moderate and radical Republicans to oust Johnson and wield all power themselves. When Johnson failed to effect the moderate reconstruction which encompassed securing Negro civil rights, the moderates were forced to seek the aid of other elements. To the moderates, the program they advocated had been the most moderate possible; a program less moderate, they felt, could not win sufficient popular support to insure political victory in '66 and '68. Their natural allies were their fellow Republicans who had been forced to a more radical stand on Negro suffrage by the equally radical--though radical conversely in being so reactionary--Democratic stand for white supremacy which had been instigated early and propagandized thoroughly. The moderates felt that their political being depended upon separation from Johnson who was rapidly becoming more closely aligned with the disaffected--the Copperheads, the Democrats, and the rebels.

By the end of 1865, the moderate reconstruction (i.e., restoration) policy of Andrew Johnson had failed. Its defeat resulted from the poor political judgement exercised by its executor which in turn effected inadequate maneuvers. Upon his advent to the presidency, Andrew Johnson was both blessed and cursed politically. About him, political blessings seemed to flourish. As president, he headed the great Union party which had been responsible for the recent war victory. In this position, he was lauded by all of the former ante-bellum Democratic and Republican factions--his

political possibilities seemed infinite. On the other hand, elements of contention existed. Primarily, these elements centered around the problem of reconstructing the recently rebellious South. As Lincoln's accidental heir, Johnson apparently believed himself obligated to carry out Lincoln's wartime policy of reconstruction which was actually one of restoration. Such a course revealed certain stumbling blocks raised chiefly by the defects in Johnson's inflexible character. Johnson, the absolutist, presented a startling contrast to Lincoln, the pragmatist, and their respective policies evidenced the imprint of this basic difference. In combining vacillation, inflexibility, and inaccessibility, Johnson allowed the favorable political atmosphere to disintegrate. His vacillation forestalled the vital solidification of the surrounding political elements into a party which would support him in 1866 and in 1868. His inflexibility committed him to a preconceived policy of restoration wrought out of his own biographical influences and Lincolnian inheritances. His inaccessibility made him impervious to public opinion. David Donald states in his article entitled "Why They Impeached Andrew Johnson" that public opinion was everything to Lincoln and nothing to his successor.⁷¹ Johnson, thus, followed unalterably a plan of total restoration while even the most moderate majority--the Seward-Weed element, particularly--advocated minor reconstruction--concerning civil rights--as a prerequisite to restoration.

Partisan-wise, Johnson was, again, at the outset, in a precarious position. Prior to the war, he had been a staunch Southern Democrat. His Appalachian background made him a Unionist for the duration of the war, and it was on the Unionist ticket that he was elected Vice-President. As a Democrat, Johnson was basically strict-constructionist and reactionary; as such, he quite naturally viewed the termination of the war as the moment to begin a restoration of the South to its ante-bellum status. The more

progress-minded North, however, was more concerned with the preservation of the political and economic fruits of victory. For them, the war had proved a revolution and they desired that its effects be perpetuated. The old South could not be reinstated as it would possibly attempt to reassert its former roadblocks to Northern progress. A new South, however, reconstructed on the Northern model, could be reinstated with impunity. To the North, the slave position of the Negro had provided the foundation of the old South. Thus, the North designated his--the Negro's--treatment by the South as the "index" or gauging instrument by which the degree of reconstruction in the Southern states would be judged. Johnson, by not recognizing the importance of the index, lost his political future. He had envisioned a great National Union Party composed of the Democrats and the moderate Republicans which would re-elect him in '68. By concentrating totally on restoration, Johnson precluded the necessary reconstruction thereby losing the vital moderate support. Reinstatement of the Southern states was the universal question. For Johnson, a rapid restoration would prove both politically advantageous and in character with his constitutional and reactionary views. For the North, delay was "the better part of valor." A delay would allow time for the South to be reconstructed and thereby prove more acceptable to the North. Consequently, as the year lengthened, the discrepancy between the reconstruction policy desired by the North and the one promulgated by Johnson increased. Increasingly, also, Johnson became affiliated with the hated Democracy who were attempting, it seemed to the Republicans, to discredit reconstruction as they had likewise tried to discredit the preceding war which had been fought primarily to effect such reconstruction. To combat the Democracy's platform of white supremacy, the radical Republicans advocated Negro suffrage. When Johnson seemingly acquiesced in the Democratic platform by his insistence upon his restoration policy, the moderate Republicans, believing their index violated, naturally

joined with their radical components to protect the Negro by securing his civil rights. Johnson was supported only by the disaffected. The Union party, largely Republican in composition, reverted to its pre-war Republicanism thus alienating Johnson and shattering his hopes for a bright future under the auspices of his National Union party. With the failure of his reconstruction policy, Johnson, the national politician, was deposed. With the failure of Johnson, the politician, radical reconstruction was substituted for the moderate policy of restoration.

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Cox, LaWanda and John, Politics, Principle, and Prejudice, p.53.
- 2 Chadsey, Charles E., The Struggle Between President Johnson and Congress over Reconstruction, p.31.
- 3 Hall, Clifton R., Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee, p.69.
- 4 Winston, Robert, Andrew Johnson, Plebian and Patriot, p.62.
- 5 McKittrick, Eric, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction, p.82.
- 6 Hesselstine, W.B., Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction, p.11.
- 7 Fleming, Walter L., Documentary History of Reconstruction, p.113.
- 8 Ibid., pp.110-111.
- 9 Ibid., pp.116-117.
- 10 Johnson MSS, October 4, 1865.
- 11 Ibid., November 13, 1865.
- 12 Ibid., June 20, 1865.
- 13 Fleming, p.177.
- 14 Ibid., p.81.
- 15 Johnson MSS, June 3, 1865.
- 16 McKittrick, p.155.
- 17 Ibid., p.4.
- 18 Johnson MSS, June 10, 1865.
- 19 Ibid., July 3, 1865.
- 20 McKittrick, p.181.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Johnson MSS, June 6, 1865.
- 23 Ibid., September 13, 1865.
- 24 Cox, p.80.
- 25 Ibid., p.114.
- 26 New York Times, April 17, 1865.

- 27 Fleming, p.171.
- 28 Cox, p.166.
- 29 Ibid., p.104.
- 30 McKitrick, p.139.
- 31 Johnson MSS, September 2, 1865.
- 32 McKitrick, p.149.
- 33 Ibid., October 25, 1865.
- 34 Ibid., June 5, 1865.
- 35 Ibid., September 22, 1865.
- 36 Fleming, p.317.
- 37 Simkins, F.B., South Carolina During Reconstruction, p.53.
- 38 Johnson MSS, July 27, 1865.
- 39 Ibid., June 15, 1865.
- 40 Cox, p.60.
- 41 Johnson MSS, June 16, 1865.
- 42 Ibid., September 1, 1865.
- 43 McKitrick, p.204.
- 44 Johnson MSS, November 20, 1865.
- 45 Ibid., June 10, 1865.
- 46 Simkins, p.42.
- 47 Johnson MSS, October 6, 1865.
- 48 Ibid.
- 49 McKitrick, p.79.
- 50 Schurz MSS, August 30, 1865.
- 51 Johnson Mss, July 6, 1865.
- 52 Schurz MSS, October 20, 1865.
- 53 McKitrick, p.203.

- 54 Johnson MSS, September 15, 1865.
- 55 New York Times, August 19, 1865.
- 56 Ibid., September 14, 1865.
- 57 Ibid., November 7, 1865.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 Ibid., December 1, 1865.
- 60 Ibid., November 13, 1865.
- 61 Johnson MSS, August 1, 1865.
- 62 Cox, p.60.
- 63 McKittrick, p.197.
- 64 Ibid., p.183.
- 65 Johnson MSS--letters to the provisional governors as follows:
August 22, 1865 to B.F. Perry; August 24, 1865 to Parsons;
August 25, 1865 to Sharkey; August 26, 1865 to Holden;
September 23, 1865 to A.J. Hamilton.
- 66 Stevens MSS, December 21, 1865.
- 67 New York Times, December 27, 1865.
- 68 Ibid., November 20, 1865.
- 69 Ibid., October 11, 1865.
- 70 Welles, Gideon, Diary of Gideon Welles, entry for January 12, 1865, pp. 425-26.
- 71 Donald, David, "Why They Impeached Andrew Johnson," American Heritage, p.22.

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