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The Politics of Educational Vouchers

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PREFACE

The circumstances which prompted this proposal reflect the desire to show that my present pursuit of a double major in elementary education and political science are of relative value to one another. This issue obviously reflects educational matters, but it also contends with those of a political nature such as government control, regulation, budgeting, and public policy.

This paper engages in a comprehensive normative study which examines the origin and progression of the idea of an educational voucher system from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. Special emphasis focuses upon the theoretical arguments which support educational vouchers. Evidence obtained through extensive research has shown that an educational voucher system may be designed and implemented in such a way that positive outcomes are produced. A few of these positives outcomes include: the provision of equal funding for all pupils on a statewide level; implementation of parental and pupil "choice" within the educational system; increase in the economic efficiency of educational operations; and an increase in teacher effectiveness due to competitive market effects.

A discussion of the forerunners who originated the idea of a voucher system such as Adam Smith, Thomas Paine, and John Stuart Mill will illustrate the reasons why these men

believed this type of system would be of value. A look at twentieth century voucher schemes developed by authors such as Milton Friedman, Christopher Jencks, and John Coons will provide insight as to why the time may be ripe to implement testable voucher proposals.

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Chapter I

Introduction: Educational Vouchers

Under the present structure of the educational system, students and parents exercise limited control over matters concerning the school they will attend. Officials section pupils into districts according to criteria such as state and city boundaries, place of residence, desegregation laws, busing routes, and so on. These criteria give little regard to the more specific personal needs of the students. For instance, the academically talented and gifted student is forced to attend an inner-city school where much attention is aimed at simply the basics--just trying to get students through. A student with great potential to excel in wrestling is "bound" to a neighborhood school which does not sponsor a wrestling team. Another student who has a tremendous learning deficit and has been labeled a "low-achiever" may not reap the benefits of Chapter One because the overall student body reflects high achievement levels; therefore, based on the statistical majority, Chapter One services are not funded at that particular school. Another example of less concern, but certainly worth mentioning, is the younger student whose after-school day care service or babysitter is located right across the street from School A, but, due to zoning laws this student gets bused to School B an hour away.

Decisions concerning what school to attend are pertinent to students' educations. They should be determined, at least in some part, by the recipients of the

education. However, under the present structure students and parents may be viewed as "captive clients" with no direct input into school selection; thus they are rendered mere "consumers" to the monopoly of education.

A move has begun to force educators to compete for "comsumer" dollars through an educational voucher system. In its simplest definition, an educational voucher is a certificate issued to parents by the state which allows parents to "shop around" and choose which school would best meet the needs of their children. Parents in turn would give the voucher to the selected school, and the school would then "redeem" the voucher with the state. The element of competition thereby added to the system agitates educational policy, thus forcing reforms and improvements. The government would still retain its position as the primary source of educational revenue, but that support would take the form of vouchers thereby giving parental consumers the right of choice in a free-market economy.

Vouchers would create a marketplace within the educational system, offering the schools and their programs as products. Parents could "shop around," compare, and decide upon the best product in which to invest their vouchers. Barbara S. Davis, in an article appearing in Educational Forum, "Educational Vouchers: Boom or Blunder?" felt that,

> ordinary people are the best managers of their own affairs. Give them good

> information about schools; give them the necessary resources; give them professional counsel to help them choose. But do not force them into a school picked by administrators who have never met their child. Let them decide for themselves.[1]

Given students' recent performances on standardized tests, the nation's school system shows serious signs of downfall. Myron Lieberman, author of Beyond Public Education, researched the status of the educational system and found the educational system has been continually declining over the past twenty years.[2]

In August 1981, the U.S. Secretary of Education was charged with two responsibilities. The first was to review and synthesize data on the quality of learning and teaching in U.S. schools, colleges,and universities, both public and private, and the second was to examine curricula standards and expectations of other advanced countries and to compare those to our own system.[3] The commission's report released April 26, 1983, entitled, A Nation at Risk: the Imperative of Educational Reform, explained why educational deterioration rendered the U.S. in jeopardy. The report made the following observations:

-International comparisons showed that on nineteen academic tests, American students never ranked first or second, but repeatedly ranked last seven times among industrial nations.

-A substantial amount of illiteracy, especially among minority youths was ever-present.

-Achievement scores were lower on standardized tests than in 1957.

-There was virtually a continuous decline on college aptitude tests from 1963 to 1981.

-There was a devastating drop in the number and proportion of students exercising superior achievement on SATs.

-There was an enormous increase in remedial courses. For example, one quarter of all math courses in public four-year colleges were repeated.

-There were increases in the proportion of high school students studying under programs that lacked a central purpose.

-Lower expectations of students were revealed through declines in amount of homework required, grade curves, elimination/reduction of basic academic subjects as required for graduation, an increase in elective courses offered, increase in students' tendencies to elect the least difficult subjects, and decrease in college admission standards.

-A teacher shortage appeared in areas of physics, chemistry, and math; therefore, teachers were recruited from less able college students.[4]

If the U.S. is to maintain its status as a world power, educational standards are going to have to improve.

Students who continually rank last on standardized tests among industrialized nations are not likely to develop into the citizenry required to maintain the position of a world power. Over the past few years, many programs aimed at improving education have been implemented and to date, none have moved mountains. Increasing the academic standards of the present educational system is a must if the U.S. is to continue to compete on an international level in the future.

Myron Lieberman believes that "Conventional approaches to public education will not result in any fundamental educational improvements; for this purpose, changes in the governance structure of education are essential."[5] Efforts to reform and improve public education have existed as long as public schools themselves. In recent years massive amounts of time, effort, and resources have been devoted to educational reforms; however, as was shown in the conclusions of A Nation at Risk, it has been only in these more recent years that the educational system has been so rapidly declining. Family choice proposals are presently the only programs under consideration at this time to change the governance structure of the educational system. Paradoxically, they are for the most part ignored in reform documents.

Family choice proposals may be ignored for many reasons. The many family choice plans which exist may be too difficult to sort through and digest; a change in the structure of governance of the school system would

create much uproar among the public, legislators, school administrators, teachers, and so on; upper class citizens may not desire losing the "choice" and benefits that they possess under the present system (private schools, public schools in affluent neighborhoods with a higher tax base, etc.); or legislators seeking reelection simply may not wish to take the risk of supporting a voucher initiative.

Vouchers are a very radical concept. Restructuring a system that has been in tact for almost 100 years is a step which does not appear particularly enticing, especially among a cautious nation. Nevertheless, based upon the findings uncovered in A Nation at Risk, we cannot ignore the ever-present and growing danger that the school system is declining.

Chapter II

Voucher History

The voucher idea has quite an extensive history. Formerly mentioned in the writings of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, Tom Paine, and many others as a means of financing education, each author has developed his own individual, theoretical voucher plan. Following are basic descriptions of just a few of the more popular voucher plans proposed.

Adam Smith, author of A Wealth of Nations, may very well have been the first individual to suggest the idea of an education voucher. Smith felt that parents should be able to select from a competitive, free market system the type of education they wish their children to receive. He favored the idea of "consumer sovereignty"--giving parents the choice and authority to determine their child's education. Under Smith's proposal, government money would be provided directly to parents for the purchase of educational services. Parental choice would inject healthy competition into the stagnant monopoly of education.[6]

Thomas Paine basically reiterated Smith's concept. However, Paine believed that parents, not the government, should be responsible for the costs of educating their children, although poorer families would be eligible to receive government subsidies.[7]

John Stuart Mill, author of On Liberty, contended that it was the government's duty to require minimum standards of education for every child. However, he felt that parents should be free to obtain that education wherever and however they saw best.[8]

Following Mill's writings in 1859, very little appears on the topic of vouchers. This is largely due to the compulsory public education movement which gained momentum in the 1920's. The idea of compulsory public education became so strong that many states sought to legislate laws requiring all children to attend public schools. However, the Supreme Court ruling in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the right of a family to choose private education. Although the Pierce ruling allowed freedom of choice, this choice in reality was confined to those wealthy enough to afford private education.[9]

The idea of vouchers flared again in the late 1950's. Built upon the ideas of Smith, Paine, and Mill, Milton Friedman, an economist from the University of Chicago, purported an unregulated voucher system based upon the free market principles of supply and demand. While favoring government financed education, Friedman disliked the idea of having the government control such a monopolized system. Under Friedman's plan, the government's role in education would be limited to that of financing the child's education and seeing that schools were meeting minimum standards. Friedman's proposal called for the allowance of schools to determine standards, as long as they did not discriminate against racial minorities. Parents would be allowed to supplement the basic dollar value of the voucher if they wished, providing they could afford additional funds.[10]

In 1969, Christopher Jencks, of Harvard University, headed a committee for the Center of Public Policy which researched the theory of educational vouchers and published its findings in Educational Vouchers: A Report on Financing Elementary Education by Grants to Parents.[11] Upon conclusion of the research, Jencks proposed a voucher model entitled the "Regulated Compensatory Model." This model allows for the inclusion of both public and private schools. Its two basic components call for considerable government regulation through a voucher regulatory agency, and the disallowance of voucher supplements added by parents, although children of low income families would be eligible to receive a special compensatory voucher which would make these children more attractive candidates in a competitive market.

> Jencks believes that this plan would result in more racially, economically, and academically mixed schools, and that a variety of schools would spring up to meet the diverse educational needs of urban areas.[12]

Along about this time, Theodore Sizer, then dean of Harvard Graduate School of Education, devised the "Sizer-Whitten Model" which was actually only a partial voucher plan. This proposal provided vouchers only to

low-income families of children with special needs. Financial aid would be based upon a sliding scale whereby government subsidy decreased as family income levels increased. These vouchers could be used in any school with the intent that schools would be encouraged to provide adequate programs for these children, given the additional monies the school would receive.[13]

John Coons, William Clune, and Stephen Sugarman, from the University of California at Berkeley, became active in the voucher debate early in the 1970's. Entitled "Family Power Equalizing," their model was designed to allow parents to choose a school for their child based upon the school's ability to meet their child's learning style in relation to the school's approach to learning and the school's tuition level. Schools would be able to charge one of four tuition levels. Families would be taxed according to their income level and the tuition level of the chosen school. Thus, wealthier families would pay higher costs for the same level of schooling, yet all families would have a choice of levels and would pay more for higher levels. This system would be financed in part through the family tax, and the remaining balance would be paid by the state. The authors of this proposal intentionally left the details of this plan vague in order that the legislators could fill in the details to fit a given situation.[14]

This rather sketchy outline shows how different people may arrive at the same concept through different

perspectives. Given the number of proposals mentioned in this paper, along with the numerous other less popular proposals which exist, it seems that it would be possible to combine the best elements of each model and devise a workable voucher plan.

Chapter III

Vouchers and Society

John Coons and William Clune claim that the history of education has been a continued struggle between two forces; a desire by the members of society to provide educational opportunities for all citizens verses the desire of individual families to provide the best affordable education for their own children. Both desires lead to conflicting tones of resolution when financial provisions are at stake.

> [If] a family is to be able to provide for its children the best education it can afford, then it must be able to employ its economic resources to do so.[15]

At first glance, the present system seems to accommodate this task; however, this is not the case. Another means has derived by which wealthier families may provide superior educations for their children through financial expenditures, without having their expenditures spill over into the schools attended by the less wealthy classes.

This may be accomplished by taking up one's residence in a well-off neighborhood. Through modern technology--telephones, computers, and automobiles in particular, residential areas have had the opportunity to become homogeneous.

> ...when this economic homogeneity coincides roughly with local school

> taxation boundaries, then the wealthy in one district can confine their expenditures to their own children and those of other families of similar wealth.[16]

Hence, schools in less wealthy districts are left to finance their own educational system through a reduced set of expenditures.

It seems legitimate to argue that the quality of education is directly related to the local tax base. Charles Benson, who authored The Economics of Public Education, very descriptively outlined the effects of social-class isolation upon education.

> The first thing to recognize on this topic, is that many poor families are bottled up in central cities and the second, that central city educational authorities have difficulty in coping with the schooling requirements of low-income youth.[17]

As low-income families find it difficult to acquire housing outside of the inner city, the argument to this point suggests that these households are not in reality free to exercise choice in terms of receiving a good, quality education, for this would mean moving to a more

affluent neighborhood with a higher tax base. This pitfall becomes especially monotonous for those parents who do, indeed, desire "equal opportunity education" for their children, but just cannot afford it. Such families are compelled to enroll their children into schools which continually show levels of accomplishments far below those in suburban areas.

> Lower-income parents might wish to have their children placed in predominantly middle-class schools for many reasons--less disruption and violence, access to well-trained and experienced teachers, and so on--but they might also expect that their children's achievement levels would be higher than if they attended "ghetto schools."[18]

Several extensive studies have shown that low-income youth enrolled in integrated school settings maintain higher academic records than those of their low-income peers in non-integrated settings.

Alan Wilson's report to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1967) studied 4100 students in the Richmond, California schools district, and found that the social class composition of a school directly relates to the academic

performance of both white and black students, regardless of whether the district is racially integrated or segregated.

> Social class segregation of students, through its effect upon the development of academic skills, has ramifying consequences for students' subjective sense of competence and belief that they can plan and control their futures.[19]

When the social class makeup of the student population is mostly that of a low-socioeconomic level, there exists a greater number of students who tend to consider themselves to be intellectually inadequate. These same students believe they possess little or no ability to control the consequences of their futures.

Eight years after Wilson's initial report, Donald R. Winkler carried out a major restudy of the Richmond school situation. Employing longitudinal data, he concluded that

> ...the coefficient on socio-economic status composition is statistically significant and indicates that reducing the proportion of low [socioeconomic status] peers by 10 percentage points would improve student achievement by 3.22 percentile points.[20]

In other words, by reducing the number of low-socioeconomic levels of students only slightly, student achievement levels improve considerably.

A later study carried out in 1975 by Anita A. Summers and Barbara L. Wolfe found that elementary students appear to have the largest levels of academic achievement in schools which are 40-60% black. "All elementary school students in the sample benefited in terms of achievement when they were in schools where the percentage of blacks about equalled the percentage of non-blacks."[21] While facially this statement concerns itself with racial effects, and says little in the way of social class, one must consider that the existing correlation between social status and race is one of basic equivalency. Black families more often than not, fall at the lower economic end of the spectrum.[22]

From the data found in Benson's report in The Economics of Public Education and in relation to the findings mentioned above, four conclusions may be drawn:

-There is a substantial amount of social-class segregation in the distribution of housing in the United States.

-The system of local finance and the system of geographic entitlement to local public services perpetuate social-class isolation.

-Income homogeneity of neighborhoods and the consequent concentration of low-income housing in central cities and larger suburbs seriously impair the possibility that residents will be able to escape the cyclic effect.

-Social-class isolation is peculiarly significant in depriving children from lower income families of high quality education.[23]

Another reason for the interest in vouchers stems largely out of the observations made by Milton Friedman in the 1960's. Friedman's theoretical plan was initiated out of the reasoning that government had grown too large. In 1960, at the end of the Eisenhower years, overall there were approximately 100 federal programs. By 1976 there were more than 1000.[24] Friedman firmly believed that government was now too large to effectively maintain a centralized educational system. Decentralization through a voucher plan would provide a much more rational means of delivering education.

There are times, Friedman admits, that government intervention into education may be justified, but for the most part, market principles should steer the course. This idea is justified in the following quote.

> The citizen of the United States who is compelled by law to devote [part] of his

> income to the purchase of a particular kind of [program] administered by the government, is being deprived of a corresponding part of his personal freedom.[25]

In other words Friedman believes that parents and students ought to have a say in their education, yet due to the nature of the present system, the government determines the outcome of educational decisions.

> Formal schooling is today paid for and almost entirely administered by government bodies...This has developed gradually and is now taken so much for granted that little explicit attention is any longer directed to the reasons for the special treatment of schooling. The result has been an indiscriminate extension of government responsibility.[26]

The wider the range of activities covered by the market, the fewer the issues on which political decisions are required. Vouchers would minimize the government's involvement in education.

Concluding that the present arrangement in distributing education is not meeting full potential for all households

involved, a voucher program could be a possible alternative. The intent of vouchers is to increase the power of individual households in making educational choices for their children. While Friedman could justify public support of elementary and secondary education through the aspect of social benefits, he could find no compelling argument in defense of public administration of the funds. Given Friedman's interpretation, there stands no reason why the government should not turn funding over to individual households to purchase education.

Chapter IV

Pros and Cons

Advocates of voucher proposals set forth several keen arguments which portray educational vouchers as a plausible device for raising educational standards, not just academically, but administratively and financially as well. For the past twenty years, the government has been pumping billions of dollars into the educational system in effort to improve the quality of education. For the past twenty years student testing scores have shown the system to be continually declining. Tax dollars are too valuable a commodity to be continually wasted away on traditional educational reforms which have proven themselves unsuccessful. The time has come to correct past failures in educational reform efforts. Many regard educational vouchers as the most productive solution available.

The Ills of Monopoly

Supporters of voucher proposals continually agree that "choice" is an important prerequisite to future school improvements. As has been stated before, voucher advocates view the present system as a monopolistic enterprise. Pupils stand as captive clients. With the exception of the few families capable of affording private education, pupils must take what is offered them by the public schools. Dissatisfactions easily go unheeded and mistakes unrectified because teachers and administrators lack sufficient incentives to respond. The numerous avenues open to dissatisfied parents such as the school board, legislative

elections, petitioning processes, and open hearings conducted by school boards, are either too sluggish or too remote to have any substantial effects concerning individual children. In addition, the school system possesses the power to decide "what" is to be taught "when and where" and "who" is qualified to teach it giving little concern to what parents might feel is right for their children. "Such monolithic enterprises are ill-equipped to meet the great variety of needs among the children they serve."[27]

The Virtues of Competition

Vouchers elicit a means of injecting competition into the public school system. Allowing parents and students to shop for schools results in two positive outcomes. First, schools have a strong incentive to provide programs which will attract students. Schools which fail to meet students' needs, as determined by students and parents, would lose enrollments to their competitors. Loss of pupils translates directly into loss of funds. In such a system, teachers and administrators become directly responsible for pupil satisfaction if only to eliminate the risk of job loss.

A second positive outcome of a voucher system is its design of program specialization. Considering the variability in pupil needs and their learning paces and styles, students may select the program most adept to meeting his or her needs. Enabling students and parents to

select the most effective educational program based upon individual needs of pupils will improve the education of all involved.

Inherent Simplicity

Vouchers are proposed as a much simpler way of funding education than the current system. Existing district funding typically involves a complexity of tax levies, appropriations for multiple special programs from several governmental levels, state legislative formulas generated to accommodate partisan interests, and so on.[28] Administering this complex web of funding requires many regulations and levels of bureaucracy. Vouchers propose a much simpler way of funding by granting support directly to the child. Simplicity would result from the elimination of the many intermediate levels of school administration in state and local systems.

Reduction of Bureaucracy and Overhead

Voucher sponsors are in agreement that there is too much higher level administration in the existing system. If students are funded directly, much of the supervision and control in district, state, and regional administrations would become unnecessary. Through decentralization schools would be able to determine programming needs through results generated by the choice plan. Control would shift from the centralized administrative decision-making unit to the decentralized parent-pupil decision-making unit.

Inherent Fairness

Vouchers suggest equal funding to all students. This would resolve the long standing issue in the school finance reform agenda over the debate of unequal pupil spending within states and even local districts. Despite efforts on behalf of legislators to narrow the gap of pupil expenditures, per pupil spending still varies by factors of two or more.

Importance of Private Innovation and Diversity

This argument closely relates to those dealing with the competitive market environment. Increasing diversity among schools is one way of increasing competition. Including private schools in a voucher program is one means of achieving alternative choices. Private schools tend to vary considerably more than their public counterparts in methods, organizational formats, and philosophies. Many voucher proponents believe that the exclusion of private schools would hurt a voucher plan for the public schools alone would not provide enough variance within the system. "The preservation of diversity in schools is claimed as a value in itself, a value that would be enhanced if private schools were eligible for substantial public support."[29]

Social Equity

Parents would be allowed greater choices among schools.

Schools would have to be productive if they wanted to survive in the competitive environment. The increase in consumer choice along with the competitive environment would in all probably lead to greater educational benefits than those which would be received under the present monopolistic system.

It may be argued that the schools are expected to fulfill certain social functions such as acting as the vehicle for equalization of opportunities among social and racial groups. However, by equalizing per-pupil expenditures and providing pupils with the education which best meets their needs, students would be socially better off in the long run. For example, a student experiencing learning difficulties would be able to enroll in a school possessing a program in Chapter One. By receiving a proper education, he will be better able to function in the adult world. Selecting an individualized program would also decrease the chance of his developing a negative attitude toward school due to his successive failures in the regular classroom. Based upon this reasoning, individualized programs could result in a decrease in the dropout rate.

Accountability

If a school did not deliver the educational standards it claimed, parents could switch to a school which better met the needs of the child. After a school had lost enough voucher credits, it would either improve or close.

Enthusiasm and Commitment

Teachers will possess a vested interest in the success of their school programs since they helped to develop them. Parents and students also gain a feeling of involvement in decision-making. Parents begin to feel a sense of power in the educational future of their children. Power and decision-making would become more decentralized and less bureaucraticized.

Opposing views on vouchers spring from many areas. Leading the opposition are the public school educators. This is not surprising--after all, it is not only their institutions under fire, but their job security as well. Administrators and teachers are not alone in their skepticism. The academic community, parents, and even private school administrators have questioned the idea of educational vouchers.

Uncertainties of a Voucher Plan

A voucher system would certainly revolutionize the "business" of education, and therefore many aspects of voucher plans remain unknown and unpredictable. A completely detailed voucher proposal has yet to be articulated. The reactions of educators and families to actual as opposed to predicted outcomes of a voucher system are impossible to determine with a great deal of precision. Numerous questions have been raised: How many children would opt for what type of schools? How often would pupils switch schools? Would vouchers adequately cover individual pupil needs? If a new scheme retains some existing public schools, how will they plan their operations from year to year? How would a mercurial employment market work for teachers? Would uncertainty drive teachers into other professions? Would we be subjecting our children to an irreversible experiment? How would things be rectified if

no one likes the results of a voucher system?

Although these questions undoubtedly merit attention, answers in determining the outcomes will not likely be formulated without first experimenting with a voucher plan. Administrators concern themselves with the irreversible effects of implementing a voucher proposal--this being a leading drawback to experimentation. Yet, Alum Rock reported no ill-effects after their test run concluded. Answers and solutions to uncertainties of an educational voucher system will only be determined through the process of trial and error.

Survival of the Common School

Critics argue contemporary public schools serve some important public purposes which would suffer possible neglect in the organizational rearrangements implied by voucher proposals. Although voucher sponsors criticize the schools for their uniformity, core purposes remain evident in the present system. In addition to developing cognitive skills and social attitudes required to function in the adult world, schools strive to foster democratic ideals, develop an appreciation of a pluralistic society, and serve to promote the overall bonding with our national heritage. What voucher critics choose to ignore here is that educational vouchers serve as a means by which the above concerns may be satisfied. The U.S. is a country founded upon diversity--various personages coming together seeking

the freedom to live life in accordance with their own set of values. Fostering the practice of diversity among schools through a voucher system as opposed to the present means of fostering only the "idea" of diversity to students in the classroom setting, would embellish within students the tolerance to accept diversity in society. Growing up in an environment that actually practices the theory of diversity rather than just preaching it will likely mold children into adults who are more accepting and tolerant of others' values and beliefs.

Along this same line, voucher critics suggest that an extremely decentralized school system would lose its common direction. However, a core curriculum developed by the Education Voucher Agency (EVA) would keep individual schools on a coherent path. As long as testing results displayed common achievement levels, the means by which the educational levels are achieved should be of little concern. After all, no two children learn in quite the same way; therefore, they should be able to choose the school which offers a program best suited to their learning style.

Added Expense and Bureaucracy

Critics argue that the costs of running a voucher system would be exceedingly more than the costs of running the present system. Features and services enacted within the voucher plan would determine the costs of such a program An issuing/redemption agency would be required. Mechanisms

for the evaluation of individual pupil's voucher value would need to be established. A bureau would be needed to evaluate the eligibility of a school to be incorporated into the voucher system. Costs of pupil transportation could result in astronomical figures in the event that students select schools all the way across town. Information disseminating systems are likely to vary in success rates directly related to the amount of funding allotted the information agency. The more dollars pumped into the agency, the more efficient and effective that agency will be in distributing information to voucher participants and vice versa.

A counter-argument suggests that in reality a voucher system could actually be a more efficient and effective means of delivering education. As supported by evidence previously stated within this text, vouchers would help to alleviate social class stratification, thus influencing students of lower-socioeconomic backgrounds in a positive manner. This would increase their learning potential, and therefore less money would be required to support remedial programs. Also, academic, discipline, and drug related problems were greatly reduced when schools were socially integrated.[30]

Transportation costs would probably not jump to astronomical figures since some students who ride the bus under the present system would elect to attend neighborhood schools, while others presently attending neighborhood

schools would require transportation to schools located farther away. However, local districts pay astronomical costs under the present system for cross-town busing which more often than not, fails to achieve its established goal of racial integration. It should be noted that problems related to transportation did not arise in Alum Rock in its five years of existence.

Voucher programs require a lesser need for central administration. The money required to maintain a large administrative bureaucracy could then be pumped into an information disseminating agency.

Social Stratification

Social cohesiveness might suffer if school selection is influenced by racial, religious, or economic factors. However, vouchers can be weighted to alleviate this problem. For example, disadvantaged students, such as those of a lower economic status or the handicapped, may receive a voucher of higher dollar value than the average child. Voucher proponents assert that vouchers will foster segregation; however, under the present system, there exists no way for low-economic families to better their children's educations. They cannot afford private schools and enrolling them in a better public school would mean moving to more affluent neighborhoods. This needless to say is not likely or affordable. Vouchers could break this connection between residence and school. For example, Nathan Alazer

has pointed out, "The availability of private schools has been a critical factor in maintaining residential integration in Manhattan."[31] Families that would have moved out of the city chose to stay because of private school choice. The schools are racially integrated but tend to be less subject to academic, drug, and discipline problems that often characterize inner city public schools. "A great deal of white flight might have been obviated if acceptable private schools had been available."[32] For this reason, vouchers may contribute to residential integration.

Public Support for Religious Instruction

Voucher proposals call for the inclusion of private schools. Critics purport that supporting religious instruction with public dollars would be in violation of the First Amendment. Here again, the argument of the opposition consistently overlooks two factors of utmost importance. First, the majority of existing private schools are largely nondenominational. Second, Supreme Court rulings have consistently held in cases such as Everson v. New Jersey Board of Education 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947), Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 103 S.Ct. 3062 (1983), Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672.,91 S.Ct. 2091 (1971), Witters v. Washington 474 U.S. 481. 106 S.Ct. 748 (1986), and others that direct aid to the pupil does not

result in direct aid to parochial schools, and therefore is not in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause.

More Control of Private Schools

Another objection is raised by those so often thought to be in support of a voucher proposal--administrators of private schools. As participants within the voucher system, private schools would stand to gain substantial support in the form of public dollars, thus causing substantial savings to its clientele. But participation also includes the possibility that significant controls would accompany public funding. Private schools place a high value on their independence and self-determination. They believe that under a voucher proposal they risk losing their autonomy. Contrary to this argument, self-determination and local autonomy characterize the basic features of a voucher system. Certainly, minimal educational standards would be required of participating schools; however, these minimal standards, combined with the fact that parents and students select the school they wish to attend, work to promote the independence of schools to design their own programs and employ their own methods.

Advantage to Elites

It is argued that vouchers will favor well-off parents since low-income parents will not be able to afford

private schools because they will raise tuition. Also, well-off parents are likely to be more sophisticated shoppers of the choice system. The regulated compensatory model proposed by Jencks solves both of these problems. Not only were higher income families not able to add dollar supplements to vouchers, lower income families were provided with a voucher of higher dollar value to make them more attractive applicants to school admission officers. Within the Alum Rock demonstration, counselors were also provided to guide parents and help them select the proper school for their children.

The Difficult-to-Educate Student

A final objection argues that private schools will avoid admission of low-achievers, thus bolstering their reputation. Predicting that schools with high reputations will compete for the best students does not follow that there will be no competition among schools for low-achieving students. Gourmet resturants do not compete with McDonalds, and Leggetts does not compete with Lerners, but there is competition at both ends of the spectrum.

A further argument along these lines is that disabled students with special needs will be rejected by voucher schools. Here again this argument is countered by federal legislation prohibiting discrimination against disabled children. "..large numbers are [presently] enrolled in proprietary schools...[who]...compete to enroll them...Thus,

while voucher opponents charge that private schools will avoid the difficult-to-educate students, private schools are already educating large numbers of them."[33]

The structure of Jenck's "regulated compensatory model" works to ensure that harder-to-educate students are not left out in the cold. Low-achievers and disabled students are allotted a voucher of higher dollar value than the average student. This added provision would have schools competing for these students to earn the extra expenditures.

Chapter V

Alum Rock Demonstration

The federal government became involved in the voucher debate in 1969. Concerned with educational reform for disadvantaged children, the U.S. Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) provided Christopher Jencks, of the Center for the Study of Public Policy (CSPP), with a grant to research and experiment with a voucher model. Since Jencks' interest in educational vouchers emphasized a deep commitment to the equality of educational opportunity among the wealthy families of society and those less fortunate, it is of little surprise that the OEO turned to Jencks. The OEO staff members, distressed at the poor results of large infusions of federal funds to improve education of minority groups, concluded that radical reforms were necessary to make public schools more responsive. Jencks and his associates developed a highly specialized testable plan of action entitled the "regulated compensatory voucher model."[34]

Under this plan the government voucher would be regarded as full payment of tuition at all public or private schools. Parents would not be allowed to supplement the state voucher with private funds. Lower income families would receive a voucher of greater dollar value. All schools would be required to adopt uniform standards of suspension and expulsion and make available to parents an august variety of information about instructional programs, school facilities, faculty and staff, and students. A system of open enrollment would be

installed. In the event that a facility should fill to capacity before applications were exhausted, they would be required to fill fifty percent of the spaces at random, and fifty percent of the spaces in such a way that would not discriminate against minorities. Schools would be required to accept as high a proportion of minority students as had applied. If a school faced underapplication, all applicants would be admitted.

Voucher schools would not be allowed to charge tuition beyond the worth of the voucher. This safeguard deters affluent schools from segregating its clientele by charging tuition add-ons that might preclude lower class applicants.

> If large numbers of affluent families chose to spend more, argues Jencks, an unregulated market would lead to increasing segregation along economic lines.[35]

Critics of the model accuse it as being "pure Friedman." Yet, Jencks holds that his plan has elaborate safeguards built in to discourage segregation from setting in--a problem which would surely hinder Friedman's unregulated market theory.

An administrative organ, the EVA--Education Voucher Agency--would ensure that only schools complying with the

model would receive vouchers. The EVA would serve as a dispensing/redeeming unit. They would also have the responsibility of disemminating reliable information concerning each school.

Between 1969 and 1973, Jencks and the OEO were rejected by many middle sized city school districts. Six school districts were selected to receive grants from the OEO. These districts included: Alum Rock, in San Jose, California; Gary, Indiana; New Rochelle, New York; San Francisco, California; Rochester, New York; and Seattle, Washington. Of these selected districts, only one district decided to take the chance--Alum Rock.[36]

Superintendent William Jefferds of the Alum Rock Union Elementary School District, vigorously campaiging for massive school reforms, saw vouchers as a transition mechanism to bring about desired educational improvements through additional federal funding. During the 1960s, Alum Rock had been plagued with upheaval, vandalism, and arson. The district was further beset with financial problems. The outcome of negotiations for hosting a pilot voucher program was a healthy seven million dollar grant from the National Institute of Education. Jefferds strongly believed that decentralization of authority through a voucher program would make schools more responsive to students' needs.[37]

Five demonstration programs were launched, four of which took place in heterogeneous communities. Due to the

OEO's and the CSPP's concern for the underprivileged, these communities possessed large numbers of students from low income families and minority groups. The Alum Rock district served an estimated 15,000 students in a low income section of eastern San Jose, California. Most were from lower-middle class or lower class families. The population breakdown was as follows: Mexican-American, 55%; black, 10%; 35% Anglo and other ethnic groups.[39]

The voucher demonstration began in September of 1972. Probably because Alum Rock was the first test flight of a voucher program, school officials were permitted to make some critical compromises in the voucher program. In essence, Alum Rock was a test of greater diversity among schools and of greater parent choice. It was not, however, a test of a true voucher system, but it is the closest application thus far.

The system was a modified version of Jenck's "regulated compensatory model." Below is a description of the plan along with its modifications, as was implemented in the test run of educational vouchers.

1) Establishment of a local administrative unit, the Education Voucher Agency (EVA), whose responsibilities included:
   a) general administration
   b) establishing school eligibility

Table 29

PERCENTAGE OF PARENTS WHO WERE "SATISFIED" OR "VERY SATISFIED" WITH ALUM ROCK SCHOOLS (Q30)

Parent Group	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 5	Chi Square Within Groups Across Survey Years df = 3
Old voucher parents	86.8% 520	90.0% 289	87.2% 136	81.47% 219	χ^2 = 9.523 p < .02
New voucher parents	80.1% 193	87.2% 512	86.6% 181	78.67% 228	χ^2 = 14.545 p < .003
Nonvoucher parents (controls)	85.8% 145	80.3% 57	79.1%	76.5% 205	χ^2 = 5.659 p < .13 ns
Chi square between groups within a survey year (df = 2)	χ^2 = 6.207 p < .05	χ^2 = 5.337 p < .07	χ^2 = 4.577 p < .10	χ^2 = 1.960 ns	--

Table 30

PERCENTAGE OF PARENTS WHO THOUGHT THEIR CHILD WAS GETTING A "GOOD" OR "VERY GOOD" EDUCATION (Q8)

Parent Group	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 5	Chi Square Within Groups Across Survey Years (df = 3)
Old voucher parents	76.8% 443	82.9% 262	83.0% 127	75.7% 199	χ^2 = 7.767 p < .05
New voucher parents	70.6% 168	81.3% 462	83.7% 174	64.7% 185	χ^2 = 39.530 p < .001
Nonvoucher parents (controls)	80.7% 138	78.9% 56	78.0% 103	72.3% 193	χ^2 = 4.703 ns
Chi square between groups within a survey year (df = 2)	χ^2 = 6.077 p < .05	χ^2 = 0.738 ns	χ^2 = 1.894 ns	χ^2 = 8.450 p < .02	--

c)collecting and disseminating information to parents

d)technical assistance

e)districting and transporting

f)accountability

2)Vouchers for disadvantaged children were of greater dollar value than the average voucher amount.

3)No school was allowed to discriminate against pupils or teachers on the basis of race or economic status, and all schools were required to demonstrate that the proportion of minority pupils was at least as large as the proportion of minority applicants.

4)Schools were open to all applicants. Where more students applied than could be accepted, the school was required to admit applicants on a fair and impartial basis, preferably by lottery.

5)Schools were required to accept the voucher as full payment for all educational services. No participating school could require parents to make additional payments out their own pockets.

6)All schools were required to make available to parents information concerning the school's philosophy on education, teacher qualifications,

facilities, financial position, teacher/pupil ratio, and pupil progress. In short, the schools were required to provide sufficient information to enable parents to make wise decisions when they selected a school.

7) Parents were successful in obtaining squatters' rights which guaranteed students a place in the school he/she was presently attending, as well as their siblings not yet of school age.

8) Teachers' job tenure and seniority rights were guaranteed.

9) Transportation was provided for all children attending non-neighborhood schools.[39]

ORGANIZATION

Each of the six voucher schools which participated in the first year, 1972-73, were required to offer at least two different educational programs or "mini-schools" (a school within a school) resulting in twenty-two programs from which to choose. Of the programs offered within the mini-schools, one was required to remain that of the traditional school setting. Seven more schools joined in the program in the second year, and at its peak in 1974-75, there existed fourteen participating schools with fifty-one programs.[40]

Each school submitted a description of their philosophy and programs to the EVA. Descriptions were

compiled within pamphlets describing the school and application procedures. Parents listed their top three choices respectively and returned the application back into the EVA. By design, every parent had to select a school, so there was 100% participation.

Enrollment assignments were made on a first come first serve basis. Transportation was provided for all children attending non-neighborhood schools. Funds were allocated in accordance to the number of students enrolled within each school. The voucher was redeemed by the school to the state. The value of the standard voucher was equal to the district's average per child expenditure, however, an estimated 69% of the students received a compensatory voucher worth more than the value of the standard voucher.

Each mini-school was an autonomous unit with its own budget. The programs were designed by teachers, and principals, with input from parents. Some were focused toward subject-matter while others placed special emphasis upon individual learning styles. Mini-schools varied in size from one to twenty-one classrooms, with the average mini-school containing six classrooms.

SELECTED FINDINGS

The majority of the information available about the Alum Rock experiment results from a questionnaire/interview

survey of 600 parents whose children participated in the program. The study compared three groups; those having choice beginning in year one of the demonstration; those having choice beginning in year two; and those who were not included into the choice program until year five.

Families involved in the Alum Rock voucher program had a tendency to select neighborhood schools. An overwhelming 70% of the parents interviewed selected a school based on its location. In the first year, only 11.2% of the voucher students attended non-neighborhood schools. As families became more familiar with the system and gained experience in its rationale and operations, children became more mobile with 18.4% attending non-neighborhood schools in year two and 21.8% in year three. In year two, 24.2% of students receiving a voucher for the first time attended more distant school buildings.[41]

The older the child, the less important geographical location became. While approximately 14% of children ages six and seven attended non-nieghborhood schools, this percentage almost doubled when considering children over the age of ten. Also, the more highly differentiated the voucher schools, the less important location was in parental selection. "Over time voucher parents changed their attitudes, and were less likely to say that school location was the single most important factor in choosing a school."[42] In support of this statement, the percentage of students attending non-neighborhood schools increased every year during the voucher demonstration.

Another factor determining parental changes in school selection was information level. Parents in an educational voucher system vary widely in their awareness levels of schooling options and the accuracy of the information they receive. Generally, information levels are higher among socially and economically advantaged families. Parental educational background also plays a large part in the awareness level. Over time, the differences in information levels between voucher parents in Alum Rock were reduced as parents gained experience and knowledge with the system. "Awareness of the choice system...increased among voucher parents, so that between-group differences in information levels were erased by the second year of the demonstration." 43

Willingness of parents to select non-neighborhood schools varied conversely with the rise in information levels achieved by parents.44

> This suggests that as parents learn more about their alternatives--as the choices became more differentiated in their minds--they became more willing to go outside their neighborhoods to get what they wanted for their children. 45

Table 13 traces parents' changing attitudes toward school location. Showing the percentage of voucher

students who attended non-neighborhood schools during the demonstration, the table reinforces the conclusions mentioned above. Comparing year one and year five, it appears that school location was less important at the end of the demonstration, this is especially true of the "new voucher parents" who had a percentage of 31.3% of their children attending non-neighborhool schools. The evidence roughly approximates the patterns predicted by Coons and Jencks that school location seems most important with inexperienced parents or when they cannot distinguish between available alternatives.[46] Interschool movement within the school building was also a popular practice.

Data collected from Alum Rock and Minneapolis (another modified voucher program but less extensive than Alum Rock) indicated that parents of higher income and higher occupational status selected open classrooms (characterized by a less structured, more independent, self-paced environment) more than Mexican-Americans and minorities who favored traditional classroom settings. For example, of those who selected the open classroom setting, 64% were families of income over $15,000, whereas 36% were from families with income level below $15,000.

As it turns out, the lower income/less educated parent was more likely to emphasize the child's obedience to authority, but the higher income/better educated parent was more likely to emphasize independence and intellectualism.[47]

This theory has been shown to relate to the work experiences of the parents. The lesser educated parents tend to possess and perform blue collar jobs whereby they are basically told what to do by the management. On the other hand, the more highly educated parents tend to hold white collar jobs in which they delegate tasks to be carried out to others in the work place, thus inspiring within them the quality of independence, while obedience is inspired in the blue collar worker. This is not to say that choices made by lower classes are any less competent than those of upper classes, but simply of a different nature.

Schools participating in the program showed fairly stable racial ratios. In 1975-76 the minority population in fifteen of twenty-five schools was within a remarkable ten percentage points of the district-wide total. In fact, between 1970 and 1976, the degree of racial imbalance (determined by the number of students who would be required to transfer to another school in order to achieve equivalent racial ratios district-wide) declined from 13.3% to 11%.[48] Although some mini-schools experienced racial imbalance, this was caused primarily by the effects of bilingual programs offered within those schools.

Imbalance related to sex was moderate. Programs exceeding 15% of the district norm tended to be math and science oriented, and some enrichment type programs as

well. The percentage of programs exceeding the 15% district norm was 5% in year one, 2% in year two, and 8% in year three. The percentage of students requiring district transfers to achieve district norms was 4.1%, 3.3%, and 4% in years one, two and three respectively.

David Cohen and Eleanor Farrar evaluated teachers' attitudes toward the Alum Rock experiment and found that teachers felt they had gained considerable power within the schools due to the program. Gary Bridge noted that school faculty and administration felt they had greater control in areas such as curriculum, budget, and staffing. Teachers consistently reported an increase of six working hours per week with the implementation of the new program. Teachers identified strongly with their assigned mini-school and detested transferring. Teachers also felt the new program to be more advantageous to parents and students than the old system. Teachers viewed the competition among schools as helpful rather than harmful. Overall teachers felt strongly toward the program and did not seem to mind putting in the extra hours to help make it successful.

A drawback to the Alum Rock experiment was the salary modification of the EVA. More successful schools were not allowed to provide teachers higher salaries. Also, job security and a guaranteed salary were provided to teachers regardless of whether or not there were enough students to fill a school or not. Since the incentives were not available, teachers made the schools attractive enough

to capture students, but they did not compete to their fullest potential.[49]

Gary Bridge, in his research compiled in A Study of Alternatives in American Education, sought to find the degree of satisfaction parents obtained through the voucher program. The analysis produced the following conclusions concerning parents' general satisfaction with the schools:

1. Across time, voucher parents--old (those who took part in the demonstration in year one) and new (those who took part in years two through five) experienced significant changes in their satisfaction with the schools. As expected the satisfaction of voucher parents rose in year two and hit the bottom in year five when the voucher choice system was replaced by a limited open enrollment plan.

2. The satisfaction of nonvoucher parents--the comparison group--fell slightly but consistently across time.

3. Even in periods of least satisfaction, no less than 65% of any group expressed

> satisfaction with their children's school, however, no less than 76% expressed satisfaction with the quality of education available in Alum Rock.[50]

"All things considered, the majority of parents in every group and every survey year were satisfied with the Alum Rock schools." Table 29 presents the data for Question 30 the of Alum Rock parent survey which asked, "In general, how satisfied are you with the kind of education your child/children can get in Alum Rock?" Across the board, those parents with children enrolled in the voucher program were consistently pleased at a higher percentage rate than nonvoucher parents.[51]

Table 30 presents the data for Question 8 of the parental survey which asked, "In general, do you think that the education (child's name) is getting at (school name) is very good, good, fair, or poor?" With the exception of year one, the percentage of parents with students enrolled in the voucher program were continually more satisfied with the education their children were receiving than nonvoucher parents.

New voucher parents exhibited the biggest swings in satisfaction. Their overall satisfaction showed a large increase at the time they joined the program, but plummeted when the district shifted to a limited open enrollment plan.

Although both tables show satisfaction dropping after year two among voucher parents, it must be recognized that these parents were still more satisfied with the voucher program than those parents of nonvoucher schools. It has been suggested that the drop in parental satisfaction stems from the extreme high hopes parents placed in the voucher system to correct all of the ills which over time had developed in the Alum Rock School District.[52]

Chapter VI

Conclusion

Few subjects in education have received more theoretical and less practical attention than educational vouchers. Vouchers suggest a new and somewhat different way of structuring the school system. However, having had a basic system in tact for over 100 years, the idea of restructuring does not fall lightly upon the hands of educators. Yet, authorities have concluded time and again that effective changes must occur to improve the educational system. The Joint Statement of the President's Education Summit with the Governors which took place at the University of Virginia in September of 1989 reiterated the fact that the educational system must improve.

> The President and the nation's Governors agree that a better educated citizenry is the key to the continued growth and prosperity of the United States. As a Nation we must have an educated workforce, second to none, in order to succeed in an increasingly competitive world economy.[53]

The President and the Governors agreed at this meeting that something must be done to return student achievement levels to a paramount place among world competitors. The U.S. cannot continue to rank last among achievement tests and continue its status as a world power.

Four primary goals were established as steps toward elevating the educational system. These goals included: greater flexibility in federal expenditures, greater parental involvement, decentralization of authority and decision-making responsibility to the school site, as well as increasing student academic performance. The President and the Governors further agreed that significant steps needed to be set into action in aim of "restructuring" the educational system in all states.[54]

> We share the view that simply more of the same will not achieve the results we need. We must find ways to deploy the resources we commit to education more effectively.[55]

Of these objectives aimed at promoting educational improvements, vouchers appear to be a reasonable solution to achieving desired goals. With the exception of improving academic achievement levels, this paper has proven educational vouchers to be a means of attaining the objectives listed above. Below appears evidence from New York City's School District No. 4 located in East Harlem which upholds the contention that vouchers may be an effective device for raising students' academic achievement levels.

The inner city school district, known as Spanish Harlem, adopted a modified voucher program for elementary and middle schools. In its 12 years of experience with choice, the district was able to increase reading scores 16% and math scores 17%. Due to the gains in testing scores, Spanish Harlem moved from being the 32nd of thirty-three districts in both reading and math to the 18th in reading and the 22nd in math.[56] Another remarkable increase showed only 15% of the district's students reading at or above grade level before the program began. After just four years under the choice plan the percentage of students reading at or above grade level skyrocketed to 63%. Perhaps even more astonishing, despite the area's high levels of drug addiction and unemployment, District No. 4 now attracts students from several districts throughout New York City.[57]

The Central Park East District also located in the East Harlem was enabled to join the District No. 4 choice program in 1982, and in just five years the graduation rate had surged from a disreputable 7% to a magnificent 90%.[58]

To date academic outcomes based upon the Alum Rock experiment have yet to be measured; however, these remarkable improvements accomplished through a voucher program in the East Harlem District of New York speak loudly for the achievements which may be accomplished through the use of educational vouchers. Experiments with vouchers have by no means suggested that vouchers should be swept under the carpet and forgotten. If vouchers experiments have

proven anything at all, they have proven their potential to improve the educational system. Given the success rates of educational vouchers thus far, it seems worthwhile for educators and legislators to continue at an even faster pace experimenting with vouchers as a possible alternative to the future of education in the U.S.

Notes

[1]Barbara S. Davis, "Educational Vouchers: Boom or Blunder?," Educational Forum 47 (Winter 1983): 160.

[2]Myron Lieberman, Beyond Public Education, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), 4.

[3]Ibid., 40.

[4]Ibid., 5.

[5]Charles S. Benson, The Economics of Public Education, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, Co., 1978), 135.

[6]John Lindelow, Educational Vouchers: Concepts and Controversies, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1988), 3.

[7]Ibid., 4.

[8]Ibid., 5.

[9]John L. Puckett, "Education Vouchers: Rhetoric or Reality?," Educational Forum. 48 (Summer 1983): 10.

[10]Larry Picus, The Voucher Movement as a Freedom of Choice Issue, (Portland: Northwest Center for Educational Policy Studies, 1979) 10.

[11]Ibid., 6.

[12]Ibid., 11.

[13]Ibid., 10.

[14]Ibid., 12.

[15]William H. Clune, John E. Coons, and Stephen D. Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), vii.

[16]Ibid., viii.

[17]Benson, 162.

[18]Ibid., 162.

[19]Ibid., 162.

[20]Ibid., 163.

[21]Ibid., 164.

[22]Ibid., 164.

[23]Davis, 170.

[24]Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago: University Press, 1962), 85.

[25]Ibid., 7.

[26]Ibid., 7.

[27]Benson, 171.

[28]Ibid., 171.

[29]Ibid., 172.

[30]James S. Catterall, Education Vouchers, (Indiana: Phi Delta Kappan: 1984), 25.

[31]Ibid., 25.

[32]Ibid., 26.

[33]Gary R. Bridge, A Study of Alternatives in American Education, (Washington: National Institute of Education, 1978) 157.

[34]Ibid., 157.

[35]Ibid., 157.

[36]Ibid. 158.

[37]Puckett, 474.

[38]Gary R. Bridge, "Information Imperfections: The Archilles Heel of Entitlement Plans," School Review, 50 (May 1978) 12

[39]Ibid., 132.

[40]Ibid., 12.

[41]Ibid., 13.

[42]Ibid., 14.

[43]Ibid., 14.

[44]Bridge, Alternatives in American Education, 108.

[45]Ibid., 110.

[46]Ibid., 110.

[47]Ibid., 126.

[48]Ibid., 127.

[49]Ibid., 127.

[50]Ibid., 128.

[51]Ibid., 72.

[52]Ibid., 73.

[53]"The Jeffersonian Compact," The President's Education Summit with Governors, at University of Virginia, 27-28 September 1989, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989), 5.

[54]Ibid., 8.

[55]Ibid., 8.

[56]Stephen Goode, "Time May Be Right For Vouchers," Insight, 25 (December 1989) 40.

[57]Ibid., 41.

[58]Ibid., 41.

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