INCITE

Journal of Undergraduate Scholarship
Cook-Cole College of Arts & Sciences
Longwood University

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

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

Dr. Charles Ross, Dean,
Cook-Cole College of Arts and Sciences

Introduction from the Dean

It is my pleasure to welcome you to the sixth edition of *Incite*. In this journal you will find wonderful examples of the undergraduate research and creative activity in the Cook-Cole College of Arts and Sciences at Longwood University. The faculty of the college and I are extremely pleased to be able share the work of our students with you.

Longwood University has a tradition of cultivating a stimulating and effective learning environment through the dedication of our faculty and the close personal attention they give each student. This tradition is amplified and enhanced by the scholarly and creative work of our faculty as they explore new ideas and techniques in their disciplines.

In *Incite* you will find some of the results of our efforts to give our students the opportunity to become scholars in their disciplines. In our college, we are making an effort to give as many students as possible the chance to experience the excitement of generating ideas and creative works that are not only new to the student involved but to the discipline as well. We feel that when a student has the chance to stretch his or her abilities by working closely with a faculty member on a rigorous project, it is the perfect complement to the college's excellent classroom instruction.

Our mission is to provide our students with both a solid liberal arts foundation and a deep understanding of their chosen discipline. I believe that *Incite* provides solid evidence that we are achieving our mission. We also hope that our students and faculty find a love of learning that lasts a lifetime and that the collaborations highlighted in these pages are just first of many such explorations to come for all involved.

Thank you for your interest in our students and for taking the time to investigate what they have created. In addition to thanking the student authors and artists, our faculty advisory board and our editors, I must express extreme gratitude to the students of the Design Lab who crafted and produced the beautiful work that you now hold in your hands.

Caught Between Folklore and the Cold War: The Americanization of Russian Children's Literature

Kristen Gaines

Dr. Jennifer Miskec, faculty advisor

The Wall: Growing Up Behind the Iron Curtain is Peter Sís's autobiographical account of his childhood in Soviet-occupied Czechoslovakia. Illustrated by Sís and marketed as a children's book, *The Wall* blends its simple surface narrative, which details the rise and fall of the U.S.S.R. chronologically across his boyhood, with historical facts, personal journal entries, and Sís's own photographs and drawings from his youth. While children are Sís's target audience, the book certainly resonates with adults equipped with the context to unpack Cold War-era terminology and references that today's children may be unfamiliar with. Producing a children's picture book that encapsulates the tenuous history of the Cold War and the very serious themes of censorship, oppression, and free expression demonstrates a profound trust in contemporary child readers to understand the literary and visual elements Sís utilizes in his work, albeit perhaps on different levels than their parents. However, the gap between contemporary American culture and Sís's Soviet-occupied Czechoslovakia is actually negligible. Ideologically, *The Wall* is much more easily navigated than it first appears, even by readers who were not alive during the Cold War, because it has been "Americanized."

It is through *The Wall*'s illustrations that Americanization can best be seen. The illustrations throughout are extremely artful and establish motifs that aid in the thematic statements of the piece. For instance, images of Soviet occupation and increased involvement throughout Czechoslovakia are presented through black, white, and red line drawings. These harsh images starkly contrast the bright, water-color depictions of Western culture, most notably during the Prague Spring of 1968 scenes. Here Sís uses a two-page spread to depict the beautifully overwhelming exposure to previously contraband hallmarks of the West such as the Beatles, Allen Ginsberg, the Harlem Globetrotters, and uncensored art and literature. This scene also asserts a sense of Western superiority in its standards of living on the other side of the iron curtain. As Sís depicts the rigid conformity and even familial distrust affecting Cold War Czechoslovakia, the reader is encouraged to villainize the Soviets and view Western culture, specifically American culture, as the glorious pallbearer of personal and artistic freedom and of moral and social uprightness. In response to the June 17, 1968 Beach Boys concert at Prague's Lucerna Hall, for example, young Sís exclaims, "America to the rescue!"[i] The Soviet Union's horrible oppression and manipulation of Czechoslovakia is highlighted throughout the book, yet all it takes is an American rock concert to set the nation's troubles on the back burner. While Sís is an insider to Czech culture, the inculcation of American individual-worship and all-consuming commitment to insert-any-freedom-here leaves the narrative feeling steeped in a Western superiority complex. For these reasons, it is not terribly surprising that *The Wall* won the coveted American award for illustration, the Caldecott Honor, for its "service to children."

It is no surprise that literature coming out during the Cold War demonstrates pro-Western sentiments. For instance, the American children's character Eloise goes to Moscow, ever-suspicious of the Reds, in *Eloise in Moscow* by Kay Thompson. Published in 1959, six years after the end of Stalin's tyrannical rule, *Eloise in Moscow* echoes strongly the anti-Communist

sentiments that swept America in the 1950s and continued throughout the 1960s. For instance, every illustration depicting Soviets portrays them as unsmiling and suspicious-looking. Repeatedly, Eloise voices the prejudices and negative opinions of the American people: "You have to be careful of what you do and say in Moscow otherwise they will swoop down and snip-snap at your wrists and send your radio to Copenhagen by rail" (Thompson 15). The irony of this projection of a fearful Soviet Union, which was undoubtedly true under Stalin's reign, is that the U.S. itself feared Communism and underwent witch hunts for Communists akin to those held under the Soviet Union's Stalinist regime to discover anti-Communists. Suspicion and invasion of privacy are widespread themes throughout the book. When portraying her experience at a Russian hotel, for instance, Eloise expresses extremely stereotypical American sentimentalities about the Soviets: "Everybody knows what everybody's doing every minute of the day in Moscow. Here's what you are never alone" (Thompson 20). *Eloise in Moscow* conveys a sense of American superiority representative of the context of its publication and condescends to the Soviet people by playing into Western and American anti-Communist prejudices.

While it is only to be expected that children's literature about Russia produced during the Cold War acted as a vessel for negative American political opinions toward the Soviet Union, our post-Cold War present still employs these modes of telling the Soviet narrative. For example, in Eugene Yelchin's *Breaking Stalin's Nose*, published in 2011, the Soviet Union is portrayed as a brainwashing machine. Similarly to *Eloise*, the ideas of intrusion, suspicion, and fear of the Russian people are emphasized. While there are no overt references to Western culture, Yelchin's story still belittles Soviet ideology and projects Western supremacy in that the protagonist, Sasha Zaichik, begins the novel extremely devoted to Communism, Stalin, and the Young Pioneers, only to realize the flaws in his country after his father, a "devoted Communist," is taken to prison by the secret police: "I take a last look at the [Young Pioneer] banner, turn away, and dash out the back door, down the stairs, and out of the school. I don't want to be a Pioneer" (Yelchin 141). By rejecting the symbol of Communist youth and embracing his independence through that rejection, Sasha represents the Western ideals of free will, hardly complicating the simplistic narratives of the past. For his story, Yelchin, like Sís, won a highly coveted American children's literature award, the 2012 Newbery Honor award.

The allegedly obvious negative qualities of Communism—especially under Stalin—is not surprisingly asserted in books like Sís's, Thompson's, and Yelchin's. It is worth noting, however, that the Bolshevik ideology that manifested itself in the first Five Year Plan was extremely well-received and fantasized over by Americans in the 1930s. *New Russia's Primer: The Story of the Five Year Plan* by Soviet engineer M. Il'in became a best seller in the United States in 1931. A Soviet schoolbook that was meant to inform Russia's youth about the five year plan, the NRP appealed most notably to progressive U.S. educators. They were enraptured by this text because of the agency it afforded their child readership. Throughout the text, children are continuously reminded that the part they play in the development of "New Russia" is just as large as, if not larger than,

the adult revolutionaries that set it in motion. Julia Mickenberg defines this fascination with the possibilities of "New Russia" as the "fantasy of collectivism" in her article "The New Generation and the New Russia: Modern Childhood as Collective Fantasy" (103). Mickenberg asserts that America fell in love with the hope-fused ideal of the industrial, equality-based utopia that the Five Year Plan and collectivism promised, but immediately turned against the mindset once the realities of that social model, when stretched to its extreme, reflected a way of life vastly different from our own, one that was inherently threatening. According to Mickenberg, "one theme of the NRP is the contrast between old and new; a key subtext is that Soviet Russia is new because it rejects the logic underpinning the West in general and the United States in particular" (104). While that newness initially enthralled forward thinkers, the downward trends that began revealing themselves through the actual implementation of the Five Year Plan left the U.S. avoiding the new in favor of the familiar. The possibilities presented by this revolution could not overcome the American fear of subversive thinking—especially in its children.

The expectations of the Soviet children Mickenberg discusses also represent an ideological disparity pertaining to how literature is presented to and representative of children. Where America fetishizes childhood and seeks to protect youthful innocence, the Soviet Union, at least in its infancy, regarded everyone, adults and children alike, as equal individuals with the capacity to effect change on their nation's future through hard work and intellect and addressed them as such in their literature. In fact, the Russian trend of involving children with real-world objects and situations in children's books reached America in an extremely iconic way: the early Little Golden Books such as Henry Lent's *Diggers and Builders* (1934) and Watty Piper's *The Little Engine That Could* (1930) dared to imagine the potential of children (113-14). This mindset enchanted American educators and terrified American parents; childhood functioned as a vessel for revolution in these books, instilling power within the minds and lives of children unprecedented in the modern world.

It is precisely the "uneasy tension between collectivity and individuality" (129) Mickenberg speaks of that made the early Soviet influence over U.S. progressive thinking so fleeting. These integral differences left Russia as a distant other, totally separate from the U.S. both culturally and ideologically. Inevitably, extensive censorship and the discrepancy between idealistic plans and harsh reality led to the complete reversal of American opinion toward the Soviet stance on education, industry, and socialism. The fantasy of collectivism gave way to the rustic fantasy of the past, which romanticized the toiling Russian peasant.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was a massive influx of Russian children's literature into the United States. The obvious reason for this was the U.S. attitude that authors were now "allowed" to portray Russian characters and Russian stories without seeming to support Communism. Despite this supposed "freedom," however, American authors still played it safe by sticking to the folktale narrative. Full of *babushkas*, farmhands, and fantastical speaking animals, Russian folktales were, and still are, at the forefront of

children's books depicting Russian life, the irony being that the images portrayed are far removed from the present reality of post-*Perestroika* Russia. Almost every Russian folktale picture book published in post-Cold War America tends to default to these infantilized folklore tropes in order to expose Russian culture to American children, resulting in the impartment of didactic morals upon Americanized Russian tales that generally possessed none in their original form.

For instance, the protagonist in the legend of Baba Yaga—the evil witch with iron teeth who dwells deep in the Russian forest, feasting on the bones of children and cackling in her cabin that dances on chicken legs—is across the board depicted as an evil hag in Russian lore, an evil hag that is often defeated not by ingenuity but by the mere transferal of goods, as in Rita Grauer's *Vasalisa and Her Magic Doll* (1994), Geraldine McCaughrean's *Grandma Chicken Legs* (2000), and Jane Yolen's *The Flying Witch* (2003). While *The Flying Witch* adapts the legend to focus more on the little-girl protagonist's quick wits than her purely feminine worth, the little girl knows she can defeat Baba Yaga because of her "two good feet, fine sense of direction, two strong arms, and clever mind," (12) whereas Grauer's Vasalisa symbolizes ultra-femininity, and both she and McCaughrean's Tatia only escape Baba Yaga with the help of their magical doll companions. Each of these versions sticks to the classic construct of the Baba Yaga folktale.

However, Patricia Polacco, known for her ornately romanticized interpretations of Russian folklore in children's picture books, presents a misunderstood Baba Yaga in *Babushka Baba Yaga* (1994). This incarnation of Baba Yaga actually *loves* children—there are no iron teeth or eaten children involved. Instead, this Baba Yaga dreams of one thing: becoming a *babushka*, which she does for a little boy with no grandmother. There are many problems with this retelling, primarily that it completely disregards the role of the oral tradition in Russian culture. While there is no purely didactic moral to the original tale, the underlying practical lesson is that woods are dangerous and children should not enter them alone—very important to remember in a country that is mostly forested. This lesson serves a physical, concrete purpose, not a moral one. Conversely, Polacco's Baba Yaga represents the very American concept of "not judging a book by its cover." This is problematized, however, by the fact that once Baba Yaga is discovered for what she truly is by the other *babushkas*, she can only regain her place amongst them by performing a heroic act of redemption: saving her little boy from a pack of wolves in the woods. Upon re-welcoming Baba Yaga into their circle, one babushka exclaims, "those who judge one another on what they hear or see, and not on what they know of them in their hearts, are fools indeed!" as across the room the mayor agrees with a hearty "hear, hear!" (31). In a tidy two pages, Polacco's Russian villagers gladly forgo decades of cultural conditioning and welcome the demon of the forest, Baba Yaga, into their households, around their children, and into their hearts.

Despite their differences, a commonality amongst all of these Baba Yaga stories is the depiction of the families as either peasant or merchant class. Even in picture books printed within the last decade, America does not tend to deviate from the romantic view of Russia as a mysterious land of

rustic farmhands. One of the most noteworthy examples of peasant lore is the fable of the turnip. This folktale tells of a peasant couple's extraordinary predicament involving a giant turnip that can only be removed by the collective effort of the entire farm, down to the lowliest field mouse. The first example, *The Turnip*, was pulled from a collection of traditional Russian oral folktales titled *Once Upon a Time* and re-illustrated for American publication in 1990. Openly drawing its roots from Russian folklore, illustrations in *The Turnip* depict the *dedoushka* and *baboushka* as typical Russian peasants in dress and speech—at one point the couple must "call Mashenka," their granddaughter, for help, for "she is young and strong" (12). All of the farm-animal characters are referred to by their Russian names—*geouchka* the dog, *keska* the cat—all but the humble hero, the field mouse, who is simply "field mouse."

While following the same basic plotline, Aleksi Tolstoy and Niamh Sharkey's *The Gigantic Turnip* (1998) shows no blatant placement in Russia through either text or illustration. The *dedushka* and *babushka* characters are portrayed as white American mom 'n' pop farmers. Both portly and snowy-haired, grandpa bespectacled and grandma aproned, the pair receives help from their milk cow, two pigs, three cats, four hens, five white geese, six yellow canaries and, of course, a field mouse, to remove their pesky turnip. All in all, that's a total of 22 additional turnip-yankers in comparison to *dedoushka*'s and *baboushka*'s four. This is significant in that it represents an exaggerated, almost mocking—and decidedly fantastic—collectivism. By displaying white characters who mock a collectivist solution, Tolstoy and Niamh discount the belief so integral to idealist socialism that a few working together can accomplish more than one working alone—the idea that initially caught America's wildest imagination. It is also a very American form of children's literature to involve the "count-along" interactivity within a picture book, shifting the focus of the turnip story from the possibilities of teamwork to the act of rote counting as the child reads or is read the book. This method also does a disservice to the folktale by limiting its cultural education.

Another function of the romanticized Russian peasant is a mythical connection with the land. Both Rafe Martin and Susan Gaber's *The Language of Birds* (2000) and Patricia Polacco's *Laba and the Wren* (1999) depict Russian children—one the son of a merchant and one the daughter of peasants, respectively—with the ability to communicate with birds. Yet again, Polacco's is the more problematic of the two—her dedication reads, "For children everywhere, who should be full of joy and free from care," which, in and of itself, discounts decades of intellectual agency instilled in Soviet children. In *Laba and the Wren*, Laba, whose mama and papa are peasants, saves a Wren from falling from a tree; as repayment, the Wren offers to grant her any wish "for her kindness" (4). Laba claims she is content and has no need for the Wren's generous offer and returns home. Her parents, of course, are infuriated and force her to return to the wren to request a larger house and more fertile land. This pattern continues as her greedy parents remain dissatisfied with their lot. They move higher and higher up the ranks of nobility until finally they ask to be turned into gods. The frustrated Wren tells Laba it has been done

and, lo and behold, upon returning home, her parents are peasants again. Polacco depicts the Russian peasant as a god.

Where Polacco constructs a didactic lesson through peasant-worship within the confines of a Russian folktale, Martin and Gaber's *The Language of Birds* follows Russian storytelling patterns much more respectfully. Brothers Ivan and Vasilii are tasked by their merchant father to prove their ability to hold their own in the real world. Each is sent off with ten gold coins to see what worth they can make from it. Vasilii spends all his gold on himself getting drunk at the fair, whereas Ivan, like Laba, rescues a young bird and is granted a wish for his kindness. Ivan wishes to "always understand the language of the birds," (4) and the bird agrees to teach him their language. This knowledge serves him well throughout his and Valisii's travels and finally, by ridding the *Czar*'s castle of some pesky crows, it earns him the hand of the *czarina*. In keeping with tradition, this lesson has a practical component. Ivan must learn a useful skill; it is not simply bestowed upon him in a wish. Though he does speak to the bird through the mystical enhancement of the power of kindness, it is his practical knowledge of being able to act as an interpreter for birds, a reader of signs, which earns him his happy end. Laba is left a poor peasant—or a god, as Polacco would have it.

This reliance on the folktale narrative is not entirely a result of American stubbornness or anti-Communist sentiment. In her article, "Russian Children's Literature Before and After Perestroika," Maria Nikolajeva explains that the prevalence of the Russian folktale in American children's literature today can be directly linked to its pervasiveness during the Soviet regime: "The cultural climate in the Soviet Union was far from favorable to the free expression of ideas, and for some authors a children's book, [...] or fantastic tale, appeared to be the best way to express beliefs that in strictly realistic prose might seem controversial or alien to the official ideology" (106). As much as American children's authors turn to folktales in an effort to tiptoe around the underlying anti-Communist censors still programmed into U.S. parents' brains, Russian children's authors during the Cold War sought to evade the physical censors of the Soviets by employing folktales as a means of telling stories that would not have passed muster otherwise. Similarly, in her article "The Politics of Innocence: Soviet and Post-Soviet Animation on Folklore Topics," Natalie Kononenko argues that folklore was able to evade most of the downfalls of censorship because it "drew on national heritage" and "had a timeless quality" that was "innocent of ideology and thus something that deals with the human rather than the political" (273). Of course, the opposite can be said of what was really achieved through the manipulation of folklore under the watchful eye of Soviet censorship, but Russian authors drew on the misguided concept of fairy tale innocence to trick the adult watchdogs; children knew better the importance of legend.

Jumping to the present context, Nikolajeva also explains why authors have not been able to establish children's narratives about modern-day Russia: "The rapidly changing social scene demands a keen eye, and today's sophisticated young readers will not be deceived by primitive slogans, adventure plots, and superficial characters. Russian orphans, street urchins,

war victims, drug addicts, and teenage mothers have not yet found a voice in literature for the young" (109). Much the same can be said of our own norms in children's literature. While children's books exist that span these topics, they generally exist on the fringes and serve very pointed, didactic purposes. The fact that Nikolajeva's article was published over 15 years ago yet still retains its relevance illustrates the gaps in Russian children's literature that still exist. While saddening, it is expected. The politics of publishing act in accordance with American anxieties about childhood innocence, which run counter to the common beliefs help about socialist leanings, and thus result in stores for children that follow the path worn by so many. Russia in literature for children is most palatable when it is folktale, unless it is decidedly anti-Communist.

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[i] Most Picture books are unpaginated

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poster showing the warning signs of head trauma

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

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

Prejudices in Swiss German Accents

Monika Gutierrez
Dr. Brett Martz, faculty advisor

Abstract

Current literature focuses on Swiss German phonetics as well as its commonalities with German. I wished to discover if there are any prejudices or preconceived notions among native speakers of Swiss German concerning the accents associated with different dialects of Swiss German. I used a survey that asked native speakers to rate some of the different accents and discuss the reasoning behind the score they assigned. This was a mixed methods study that included both numerical ranking and open-ended questions so that the participants could elaborate on their responses. Other sources concurred that the dialects are different in terms of pronunciation, and because of this, there would be some sort of judgment on the part of the listener, even if it is unconsciously made. These prejudices are similar to those about American dialects, where a speaker with a southern accent may be perceived by listeners as not being well educated. Of course, these prejudices are not true, yet they are widely believed among citizens. This study demonstrates that Swiss German speakers have similar prejudices against certain accents.

Introduction

I was raised in a bilingual household with English and Swiss German, and I go back to visit my family in Switzerland once a year. Through my visits to Switzerland, as well as the interaction with my mother's Swiss friends, I have noticed variations in their Swiss German accents. Through my research, I wish to discover whether there are any existing prejudices among speakers of Swiss German, and if so, I would like to identify them and discover the reasons behind them.

I conducted a survey with native Swiss German speakers. In the survey, I asked the participants to label seven accents in terms of the most phonetically pleasing to the least phonetically pleasing. I then asked them to explain their choices, as well as describe a personal experience in which either they themselves were judged by their accent or witnessed someone else being judged based on their accent.

Review of Literature

Background Information

Switzerland varies demographically and geographically; there are 23 Cantons, or states, the capital of which is Bern. There are four national languages: German, French, Italian, and Romansch (Moehle-Vieregge, 1999 p.166). However, it is the German language that tends to be most prominently used in Switzerland. According to Watts, "The German-speaking Swiss are in control of the industrial and financial centers of the country and are in the majority with regard to political representation" (Watts, 1988 p. 326). The University of Basel recorded and collected many different dialects around

Switzerland and compiled them all on one website, complete with an interactive map to show which dialects are located in each region of the country (Deutsches Seminar, 2012). This list of dialects was used to compile this survey.

Dialects

Curzan and Adams (2012) define *dialect* as "a variety of a language spoken by a group of people that is systematically different from other varieties of the language in terms of structural or lexical features" (p. 347). They then go on to say that geographic boundaries factor into the development of dialects and different varieties of language (p. 351). *American Tongues* specifies that there is no English dialect that is better than another, "but there *is* a type of English favored by actors and radio and TV announcers. It may lack something in personality, but everyone can understand it" (Alvarez & Kolker, 1987, n.p.). Dialects, whether American English or Swiss German, are all linguistically equal, but phonetically and culturally, one might be seen as more fitting than others. This study focuses on the phonological, the accent differences perceived by speakers.

Dialect Prejudice

There is already evidence that certain prejudices exist among Swiss German speakers. According to Curzan and Adams (2012), speakers strive to speak a certain way when they want to sound professional or wish to increase their social status. They said, "Language varieties with overt prestige are those that speakers use or aim for in order to gain status in the 'wider community'" (p. 351). Curzan and Adams also note, "Further up the socioeconomic ladder, all speakers tend to show a higher percentage of standard forms" (p. 361). Any speakers whose accents vary significantly from this "standard form" will be judged, even if the listener is unaware of doing so. "As soon as someone begins speaking, we make judgments about the person's origins, education, sexual orientation, and social affiliations—not to mention his or her personality" (Curzan and Adams, 2012, p. 368). According to Keech, "There is a 'tendency in most human societies for people to prefer their own kind and to stereotype ethnic out-groups, especially lower status ones, in a negative fashion'" (Keech, 1972, p. 390). These types of judgments are often based on how a speaker pronounces words or letters (Curzan and Adams, 2012, p. 368). In any language, there are certain accents that are considered more prestigious than others; there are also accents that are considered less desirable and have negative connotations attached to them. The field of "variationist sociolinguistics . . . take into account a speaker's age, gender, class, race, ethnicity, geographic location, and other factors such as group identities, usually we can explain why some speakers speak differently from others" (Curzan and Adams, 2012, p. 355). For this reason, scientists look at a participant's demographics when conducting experiments. Participants' age, gender, and geographic location can all affect how they speak and what they believe about other speakers.

Although the documentary *American Tongues* deals with dialect prejudice in English, its findings can be applied to Swiss German as well. In the documentary, the producers asked people which group of American English speakers had the worst accent. Every accent they thought was bad was given this rating because it was not

easily understood (Alvarez & Kolker, 1987). The documentary goes on to say that "we size each other up" through our dialects. "There are many words and expressions used in one place that might as well be Greek to people from somewhere else" (Alvarez & Kolker, 1987). For example, the documentary explains that Rhode Islanders say *cabinet* when referring to a *milk shake*. Although this documentary deals with the English language, these prejudices can be applied to Swiss German, as well. For example, a speaker from Basel would say *Gückli* for "little bag" while a speaker from Bern would say *sd'Taschli*. The speaker from Bern would not be used to the word from Basel. Another prejudice speakers face is that listeners associate personality and values with the sound of a speaker's voice and how he or she talks. In the documentary, one person interviewed claimed, "There are certain consequences for not speaking a standard accent. For example, people may make fun of you, or you may have certain limitations in terms of the job market" (Alvarez & Kolker, 1987). Another form of prejudice, which may be unintentional by the listener, is that the listener focuses more on the way a speaker speaks rather than on what the person is saying. "Social and racial attitudes are mixed in with how we feel about peoples' accents" (Alvarez & Kolker, 1987).

Code Switching

There are two forms of Swiss German, what Charles A. Ferguson "called the superposed variety the 'High' variety and the regional accents the 'Low' varieties" (Keller, 1982, p. 71). "'High': *Sie konnten jenes Häuschen dort drüben nicht kaufen. Es war ihnen zu teuer*; 'Low': *Si händ säb Hüüsli deet äne nid chöne chauffe. S isch ene z tüür gsy*" (Keller, 1982, p. 79). The "High" Swiss German is much closer to standard German and is used in the following circumstances: "Sermons, personal letters, speech in Parliament, political speech, University lecture, News Broadcast, Newspaper editorial news story, caption on a picture, and poetry" (Keller, 1982, p. 87). The "Low" Swiss German is used more so in everyday life, such as in "Instruction to servants, waiters, workmen, clerks; Conversation with family, friends, and colleagues; Radio 'soap opera'; Caption on a political cartoon; and folk literature" (Keller, 1982, p. 87).

Search Terms: Swiss OR Switzerland, Accent*, Code switching, Regional Accent*, Attitudes, Switzerland, Regional Accents, Language Diversity, Swiss language prejudices

METHODOLOGY

Research Design

My main goal was to answer whether there are prejudices among speakers of Swiss German based on their different accents, and if so, I wished to identify and explain them. The research method utilized in this study was quantitative and qualitative; data was obtained through a survey consisting of ranking, open-ended questions, and demographics. I made two copies of my survey, one in German and one in English. A hard-copy survey was also the most efficient way to gather data with the chosen participants.

Participants

All of the participants are native Swiss German speakers, a convenience sampling of acquaintances of my mother and family. The participants were of various ages, as well as both genders. They are good

representatives because they all have various Swiss German accents. The participants were selected based on their ability to speak Swiss German and recognize the various accents.

Instruments

My research consisted of a paper survey that could be e-mailed to selected participants, as well as handed to them in hard copy. The survey consists of demographic questions and a chart in which participants numbered what they felt was the most pleasing accent and the least pleasing accent on a seven point scale and four open-ended questions that allowed them to elaborate on their ranking. There is also a question asking whether the participant has ever personally experienced or witnessed someone being judged because of their accent. One problem that I encountered dealt with clarity in the survey's directions. I intended for each participant to use each number once when rating the accents, but the participants ended up using the numbers more than once. The results are still usable, but had I been clearer, it would have allowed me to determine which accent was the absolute least desirable.

Procedures

Data collection

I sent the survey to my mother's friends as well as my relatives in Switzerland, who passed it on to a few of their friends. Participants printed out the survey and sent it back to me through the mail.

Data analysis

In order to analyze the results, I went through each survey and viewed any number higher than four on the accent hierarchy question as less desirable and any number lower than four as more desirable. The other questions were free response, so I categorized the answers in terms of whether the participants experienced prejudice, the reasons why they preferred certain accents to others, and the reasons they disliked certain accents.

Limitations

My findings limit what can be applied to other speakers in that they focus only on Swiss German. However, the ideas of what prejudice stems from could be helpful in identifying prejudice in other groups. The fact that my survey was not as clear as it should have been harms the reliability of my study. When I asked participants to label seven accents with numbers one through seven (one being the most phonetically pleasing, seven being the least phonetically pleasing), some participants used numbers more than once. Therefore, some participants had multiple number ones and no number sevens. Also, had I asked participants to elaborate and explain their experiences with prejudices, I may have gotten more than a simple "yes" answer. Some participants were not familiar with the two different Basel accents, which was a problem that could have been fixed by not including them in the survey. Had I been clearer in what I was asking, I may have gotten different and more detailed results. The validity of my study could have been improved by asking more specific questions and including questions about word use and pronunciation.

Research Findings

Overview

There were 25 participants who took part in this study. Of those, 48% (12 out of 25) disliked the Zürich accent; 28% (7 out of 25) disliked the St. Gallen accent; 8% (2 out of 25) disliked the accents Appezeller, Graubünden, Basel, and Valais. Thirteen out of 25 (52%) of participants liked the Bernese accent the best; 28% (7 out of 25) liked the Valais accent, while 16% (4 out of 25) liked the Basel and Graubünden accents, and only 4% (1 out of 25) liked the St. Gallen accent.

Least liked accent in Swiss German

According to my findings, 48% of participants found the Zürich accent from the Canton Zürich, or in English Zurich, to be the least pleasing accent. This accent is spoken in the Mid-northeastern part of Switzerland. The reasons given for the dislike of this accent were that speakers speak too fast, it is very harsh sounding, it sounds rough, it sounds arrogant, and that its speakers are unsympathetic. One participant said it sounds like a squeaky mouse, while another claimed it sounds like a sick person talking. One participant, a 49-year-old female, labeled it as "Hard on the ears, piercing sharp words. *Not* soft and full of melody."

St. Gallen is the second-least-liked accent of Swiss German (28%). This accent can be found in the far northeastern part of Switzerland. The reasons given for the dislike of this accent were that it has "squeaky sounding people," the accent hurts the speaker's ears, it is shrill sounding, and it is too flashy. One participant, a 42-year-old male, described it as having a "nasally tone, and lightly aggressive sounding." One participant said he never felt comfortable living there.

Most liked accent in Swiss German

The most-liked accent (52%) in Swiss German was the Bernese accent. The Bernese accent can be found in the canton of Bern, which is located in the mid-western region of Switzerland. Participants described the Bernese accent as nice sounding, soft tones, sounds loving, feels like home, slow, comfortable, quiet, peaceful, sympathetic, local, cheerful, nice, exciting to listen to, harmonious sounding, melodious, and real sounding. One participant, a 24-year-old female, also mentioned that "many Swiss musicians sing in this accent."

The second-most-liked Swiss German accent (28%) was the Valais accent. This accent can be found in the mid-southwestern region of Switzerland. Participants made these comments about this accent: many friends are from this Canton, like the Canton, rare, original, rustic, exotic sounding, sympathetic people, nice sounding, similar words to other accents, interesting words, and a nice spoken melody. A 32-year-old male describes it as a "traditional accent; a lot of expressions are hard to understand, but it has a certain charm to it."

Baselland or Basel-Stadt

I omitted these results because 28% (7 out of 25) of the participants were not familiar with the difference between the two accents.

Prejudice

Upon asking the participants if they had ever experienced or witnessed a form of prejudice, I received some interesting insight. A 51-year-old female who grew up with a mixed accent of Bernese and St. Gallen was "laughed at in Flawil (St. Gallen) for the Bernese in her accent." Another participant observed a cultural prejudice: "People

from Zürich are usually judged by their accent. They speak very fast with harsh sounding words." One 46-year-old male from Muotathal in Canton Schwyz said he is viewed as backwards and from the country for his accent. He also commented that the Zurich accent is viewed as arrogant while the accent from St. Gallen is viewed as lightly aggressive and snippy. A 52-year-old male from Lucerne is sometimes viewed as "snooty" or better than everyone else; he also mentioned that people with pronounced or audible accents are more likely to be judged. One 42-year-old participant claimed, "People with an audible Zurich accent are often rejected." People who have an eastern Swiss accent are judged as well as people with a mixed Swiss accent. Some participants said they had experienced prejudice or witnessed prejudice but did not elaborate on their answers. A 14-year-old female said that she gets teased for her St. Gallen accent. A 48-year-old female participant from Solothurn said that "people in Basel reacted negatively to my 'land' accent."

Discussion

The Cantons of Baselland and Basel-Stadt were once one Canton, but they split in the past due to a disagreement over taxes. Baselland is more of a country, suburban area, while Basel-Stadt is comprised of more of a city atmosphere. The Basel-Stadt accent is viewed as more formal, while the Baselland accent is viewed as more laid back. The Canton of Zürich is widely disliked for its desire to strip Bern of the title of the capital of Switzerland; this could be a reason for why this accent is so disliked: The demand is seen as an arrogant request and is then connected with the people and the Canton. One reason that the Bernese accent is so popular among Swiss German speakers could be because Bern is the capital of Switzerland. Many participants claimed that it sounds like home and that many musicians and actors use the Bernese accent, so it may be seen as the overt or covert prestige accent. Both the Bernese and the Valais accents are characteristic of the mid-west of Switzerland, with Valais just being a little south of Bern. The Zurich and St. Gallen accents are both found in the northeastern part of Switzerland. It seems clear that, although the participants spoke a range of accents from all over the Swiss German-speaking part of Switzerland, there appears to be a general consensus that northeastern and eastern accents are less desirable than other accents, while Western accents are more desirable.

Every language deals with language and accent prejudice. The best way of handling it is to try to not judge people by their accents and to try instead to really listen to what they have to say rather than how they are saying it. If speakers could get past or accept these differences in pronunciation and expression, then dialect prejudices might not be so widespread. The Swiss German speakers interviewed in this study are just a small sample, and this study would provide much more helpful insight on a larger scale. It would be interesting to conduct a study about accent and language prejudices among all Swiss speakers, including Swiss German, Swiss French, Swiss Italian, and Swiss Romansch.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: English Survey

Gender: _____ Age: _____

Where were you born? _____ Where did you grow up? _____

Which accent of Swiss German do you speak? _____

1. Have you ever personally felt judged because of your accent or have you ever witnessed someone being judged because of their accent in Switzerland?

Please order the Swiss German accents below in order from most pleasing phonetically (to the ear) to least pleasing.

1 = Most Pleasing 2 = Pleasing 3 = Somewhat Pleasing 4 = Neutral
5 = Somewhat Displeasing 6 = Displeasing 7 = Least Pleasing

Bärn Deutsch _____
Walliser Deutsch _____
Zürich Deutsch _____
Graubündner Deutsch _____
Appezahler Deutsch _____
St. Gallner Deutsch _____
Basel Deutsch _____

Please indicate which Basel accent you prefer out of the two: Baselland _____ Basel-Stadt _____

2. Please explain why you prefer the Basel accent you chose.

3. For the accent you found to be least pleasing, can you explain why you picked it and why you find it unpleasant?

4. For the accent you found to be most pleasing, can you explain why you picked it and why you find it pleasant?

Appendix B: German Version of the Survey

Was ist Ihre Geschlecht? _____ Wie alt sind Sie? _____

Wo sind Sie Geboren? _____ Wo sind Sie aufgewachsen? _____

Welches Dialekt von Schweizer Deutsch benutzen Sie?_____

1. Haben Sie jemals Personlich gefüllt als ob jemand Ihnen wegen Ihren Akzent beurteilt? Oder haben Sie jemals gesehen oder gehört wie jemand für seinen Akzent beurteilt worden ist?

Bitte ordnen Sie die Schweizer Deutschen Dialekten in die Reihenfolgen die Sie von Phonetischen Schönsten finden zu dennen die Sie am Phonetischen Schlechsten finden.

1 = Am schönsten 2 = Schön 3 = Ein bischen schön 4 = Neutral

5 = Ein bischen Schlecht 6 = Schlecht 7 = Am schlechtesten

Bärn Deutsch _____

Walliser Deutsch _____

Zürich Deutsch _____

Graubündner Deutsch _____

Appezahler Deutsch _____

St. Gallner Deutsch _____

Basel Deutsch _____

Bitte Identifizieren Sie welches Dialekt Ihnen besser gefällt: Baselland _____ Basel-Stadt _____

2. Bitte erklaren Sie wieso Sie dieser Basler Dialekt gewählt haben.
3. Für der Dialekt dem Sie am schlechtesten fand bitte erklaren Sie warum Sie es schlecht finden.
4. Für der Dialekt dem Sie am schönsten fand bitte erklaren Sie warum Sie es schön finden.

Photographer:

Cara O'Neal

"Memorials"
2013

This series documents roadside memorials on Virginia Route 20, named the "Constitution Route," a rural two-lane highway that stretches 90 miles through the central part of Virginia. These memorials are markers to commemorate those lost in fatal car accidents. Some claim that the memorials violate the separation of church and state, since most include a cross or other religious symbol. Others see the roadside memorials as dangers to the public. This is because many of them are elaborate, placed in the median along highways or just off the shoulder, and can pose as a distraction to motorists.

State laws concerning roadside memorials vary. In some they are illegal, in others a family must go through several requirements in order to erect a memorial. Despite the laws or political debates that surrounding them, families and friends in mourning will continue to commemorate their loved ones through roadside memorials. Attempts to take the memorials down usually result in them being replaced.

Photographer:

Sara Nelson

"Finding Stability"
2013

Four years ago I was diagnosed with Major Depression, and despite constant medication and talk therapy it is still a day-to-day struggle. Rather than let it prevent me from enjoying the things I love, I have used this project as a therapeutic process to help me move upwards from my most recent depressive episode. Through facial expressions and symbolic concepts in my self-portraiture, I am representing the different emotions and thought progressions of my mental state during my episodes. Since the face is one of the most expressive parts of the body, I chose to photograph solely my head and shoulders. My expressions are all genuine, which makes the images personal.

Edmund Tyrone's Long Journey Through Night

Sasha Silberman

Dr. Craig Challender, faculty advisor

Long Day's Journey into Night by Eugene O'Neill is a play about a family of four and their dysfunctional descent into oblivion. Mary is addicted to morphine, and the rest of the family alternates between pretending she isn't and attempting to forget that she is by consuming alcohol. By the play's end, every character is deep into a drugged haze. Each character is tormented by inner demons, and though they love each other, their treatment of each other is erratic, at best. Edmund, who is afflicted with tuberculosis, is the only one who is sinned against more than he sins himself. His father hates that he is an atheist, his mother never wanted to have him in the first place, and his brother envies him because he has shown him up to be a drunken bum. (Cronin 108) In a family fraught with denial, dishonesty, and refusal to listen to or acknowledge each other's personal struggles, Edmund sets himself apart from his family members because of his ability to accept blame, listen to others, and ultimately forgive.

Tyrone is ashamed of Mary's addiction, and he feels that having the support of him and their sons should have been enough of an incentive for her to have quit for good. Guilt over this makes him hate Edmund, whose birth was the reason Mary first acquired the drug. He therefore puts blame on Edmund for not only her addiction, but also the complex family problems that did not arise until after he was born. His constant need to put blame on other people is probably exacerbated by his own perceived lack of success in his acting career. His greatest achievement in life was receiving a note from his idol Edwin Booth, complimenting his role as Othello, and every moment since seems to have been far less gratifying, including those spent with his family.

Mary tries to be a doting mother to her children but is overcome with self-hatred because she cannot escape her addiction. She lives with the uncomfortable knowledge of what her addiction is doing to her family, but at the same time, she also blames them for it. She blames Tyrone because he hired a cheap, quack doctor, and she also blames Edmund because his birth led to her taking the drug. Mary similarly has regrets about her past, often resenting that she left the convent she grew up in to marry Tyrone. She is tormented by the fact that there is nothing she can do to help Edmund's sickness. She hides behind her addiction to avoid the blame of her family and her own guilt.

Jamie is Edmund's older brother. He dislikes himself because he feels he has not been successful with his life. He blames his father for his current life because Tyrone tried unsuccessfully to push Jamie into an acting career. He hates himself for not having amounted to more but seems oddly pleased with the fact that he let his father down. He blames Edmund for Mary's addiction, and he uses Mary's addiction as an excuse for his own to alcohol. He is also blamed by Mary and Tyrone for leading Edmund astray.

Edmund is the character that displays the most astute sense of self-loathing but the lowest degree of blaming others. He has a morbid obsession with death, probably in part because of the guilt that has been unwittingly placed on him by the rest of the family. Edmund is closer with his mother than the other family members are, but since Mary ultimately shuts out everyone, Edmund is the most "left out in the cold" (Manheim 179). Edmund is a self-proclaimed "stranger who never feels at home, who does not really want and is not really wanted, who can never belong, who must

always be a little in love with death" (O'Neill 157).

Edmund's position regarding blame is the first thing that sets him apart from the rest of his family. Where the others are eager to blame each other for their problems and mistakes, Edmund is far more willing to accept blame and internalize it because he is already accustomed to living with it and putting it on himself. He is the only one who seems to have been able to break through the family's vicious cycle of self-loathing and blaming, instead sinking deeply into only self-loathing and staying there.

A second trait that differentiates Edmund from the others is his willingness to listen to others. The other characters have a tendency to live in their own perception of things and refuse to hear of alternatives to their ways of thinking. This tendency is demonstrated most of all in Tyrone. In many ways Edmund is more emotionally evolved than his father. Edmund tries to put himself in his father's shoes, telling his father that he's "tried to be fair to you because I knew what you'd been up against as a kid" (O'Neill 148). Edmund is the only person who makes this effort to connect with Tyrone, but Tyrone does not recognize or appreciate these attempts at empathy.

Coming off the tail end of his story of his difficult childhood, it seems Tyrone wants his story of suffering to be the worst one. Edmund's experience of being homeless and broke in another land pales in comparison to Tyrone's own lived experience, and Tyrone will not let him forget it. He disguises Edmund's truths as "damn morbidness" and refuses to hear anyone but himself (O'Neill 150). Tyrone even minimizes Edmund's past suicide attempt, citing the fact that "no son of mine ever would" and that Edmund "wasn't in his right mind" even when Edmund asserts that he was sober (O'Neill 150). He refuses to believe his own story about his father eating rat poison, clinging again to the belief that no member of his family would ever go that way.

Edmund isn't afraid to confront Tyrone when he has done him wrong, but the difference between him and the others is that he is actually open to hearing his opponent's side. Edmund confronts Tyrone angrily about his sending him to a cheap state sanatorium instead of spending extra money for quality medical care for his son. In the end, Tyrone offers Edmund a stay at a second-rate sanatorium, a compromise that Edmund accepts with a laugh. Tyrone also shares with Edmund stories from his past that show how he became the stingy man of today. After James's confession to his son, Edmund is "*moved, stares at his father with understanding.* 'I'm glad you've told me this, Papa. I know you a lot better now'" (O'Neill 154).

Edmund's openness to listening paves the way for a ground-breaking interaction between the two of them, one where they each understand the other better than ever before. When this conversation took place between Jamie and Tyrone, they butted heads so much that no solution could be reached. Edmund listens as his father explains the origins of his frugality, and through his listening and appreciation for what his father is sharing with him, the root of the conflict that causes much of Edmund's confusion is revealed, and Edmund "begins to see the light" (Carpenter 156).

Partnered with Edmund's capacity to listen to other people is his talent for seeing through peoples' façades for what they really are. Edmund holds out hope for his mother longer than Jamie does, but

even he realizes how she seems to hide behind her addiction, to hide from the rest of them and herself. He exclaims, "You know something in her does it deliberately—to get beyond our reach, to be rid of us, to forget we're alive! It's as if, in spite of loving us, she hated us!" (O'Neill 142).

Edmund also demonstrates this ability by noticing equivalent behaviors between his two parents. Mary has a desperate, all-consuming desire to return to the past, a time when she was young and her life was full of promise. Although we learned from Tyrone that Mary's past was not as perfect and promising as she makes it out to have been, Mary would (and does) give everything to go back to that time. She associates these memories with her wedding dress, which she spends much of the play searching for, as she searches for her lost youth. She says, "Where is it now, I wonder? I used to take it out from time to time when I was lonely, but it always made me cry" (O'Neill 117).

Tyrone has similar regrets about his past, the career he might have had. The note he received from his idol in praise of his acting is his version of Mary's wedding dress: a symbol of past happiness and achievements and a bar against which their present unhappiness is measured. While Tyrone condemns Mary for her practice of living in the past, Edmund catches on to the fact that Tyrone has a habit of doing the exact same thing. Tyrone wonders aloud where the note could be, and Edmund suggests "with an ironical sadness" that it "might be in an old trunk in the attic, along with Mama's wedding dress," which she is upstairs searching for at that very moment (O'Neill 155).

Edmund's ability to see things as they are is a contrast to his family members, who seem to see things as they want to. Edmund's uncanny ability to see the truth in the behaviors of his parents puts him in a unique position of clarity, almost like that of a narrator. Interestingly, it turns out the play is quite autobiographical, and Edmund is a representation of a younger Eugene O'Neill himself. *Long Day's Journey into Night* is, in fact, O'Neill's attempt to grapple with his own family experience (Costello 1). Given as a gift to his then-wife Carlotta, he thanked her in the introduction for enabling him "to face my dead at last and write this play, write it with deep pity and understanding and forgiveness for all the four haunted Tyrones" (O'Neill 7).

This accounts for Edmund's seeming ability to see things more clearly than his family. O'Neill is telling a version of the story he witnessed with his own eyes from Edmund's viewpoint. O'Neill "wrote *Long Day's Journey* so that he could face his dead at last, and, after pitying them and understanding them, he was able to forgive his family. The play is O'Neill's act of contrition, but also his act of forgiveness" (Costello 5). The motive behind this and O'Neill's personal role in it explains Edmund's forgiving character.

Edmund's ability to forgive is what most sets him apart from his family. Forgiveness is evident in his relationship with Jamie. Edmund's sickness has taken all the concern, especially their mother's, away from Jamie, a fact that embitters Jamie. Jamie also blames Edmund for causing Mary's addiction, and he is resentful of the way their parents see him as a drunken failure in comparison to his brother. Jamie's bitterness toward Edmund regarding this is apparent by the way he mockingly refers to Edmund as "mama's baby, papa's pet" (O'Neill 169).

The last moment of illumination in the play occurs between Edmund and Jamie, in which Jamie makes the bold admission to Edmund that, because of his jealousy, a big part of him has always wanted to see Edmund fail, so he has intentionally led him astray in life. He says, "Never wanted you succeed and make me look even worse by comparison. Wanted you to fail. Always jealous of you" (O'Neill 169). He wants Edmund to be great, but he warns that he will do his best to make him fail.

Edmund has always looked up to Jamie as a hero, and Jamie to Edmund as his creation, his "Frankenstein" (O'Neill 167). Jamie's admission to Edmund was very brave because, as Jamie tells him, Edmund is all he has left. By telling him this, he is running the risk that Edmund will hate him. Jaime tells his brother, "I love you more than I hate you. My saying what I'm telling you now proves it ... Greater love hath no man than this, that he saveth his brother from himself" (O'Neill 169–70). What Jamie has done to his brother throughout the years is disappointing, but his bravery in confessing it to Edmund is a noble act of love and compassion, and for that reason, Edmund seems to forgive him.

Each character in *Long Day's Journey into Night* is battling an internal demon of some kind, but Edmund is the one who is most able to resist blaming others for his troubles. Throughout the play, Edmund is explicitly blamed by his family for being born. They say things such as, "It was your being born that started Mama on dope" (O'Neill 169). While the others are in a hurry to cast blame and admonish each other without looking internally for the causes of their strife, Edmund accepts (to a self-defeating fault) his role in his family's downward spiral. He is therefore more willing to accept the others for theirs, should they recognize it themselves.

This willingness to listen and attempt to understand his family members sets Edmund apart, and it allows him to make steps toward forgiveness. According to Carpenter, "Like the others, he also journeys through the fog and the night. But, unlike them, he has seen—and will again see—beyond the illusions which surround him" (Carpenter 158). Edmund's eventual forgiveness of his family was the motive behind O'Neill's writing of the play, and it gives Edmund the most promising future of his family.

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Photographer:

Jessica Beardsley

"Nails"
2013

There is a certain comfort about personal space that everyone I'm sure can relate to – but are they willing to let the public see it all? These photographs are a representation of who I am, at the age of 22 as a senior in college, living alone. I know that not everyone I encounter is going to look at, like, or even remember a glimpse of me. But through the medium of digital self portraiture, I am giving the viewer a look at who I am in my entirety and allowing them to decide if they like all they see. Each individual handles every task differently from something as simple as laundry or getting out of bed, to the more difficult and harder to explain stresses and anxieties. Whether it looks it or not, there is always a conscious decision to be capturing every image in the series: by use of a transmitted shutter release. And the choice to be interactive with the camera presents an unavoidable awkwardness to the viewer. Because I cannot put myself into words, I inserted myself into 20 images laid out as if being led through my apartment. Now I ask you to decide, do you like all you see?

Photographer:

Jamie Gardner

top: "Green Bay Elementary JG"
2013

bottom: photographed by Edward Peeples
"Green Bay Elementary EP"
1963

In 1963, civil rights activist and graduate student Edward Peeples photographed the closed schools of Prince Edward County in a documentary fashion as part of his masters thesis. I have rephotographed his images of the schools fifty years later. His thesis was based on the awareness of a civil rights injustice that was happening in the county and much the same, my project began with the realization that the county is still affected by the school closings. In the last fifty years some of the buildings have been repurposed, finding a new life, while others have been reclaimed by the land that they once stood upon. My rephotographing of these sites shows the effects of time and unseen events on these landscapes.

Photo by Dr. Edward H. Peeples, Jr., Image courtesy of VCU Libraries.

The Republican Razor: The Guillotine as a Symbol of Equality

Jamie Clift

Dr. James Munson, faculty advisor

Introduction

Equality was one of the cornerstones of French Revolutionary ideology; it was also one of the most important principles behind the development of the guillotine, which was adopted as the official means of execution by the Legislative Assembly in 1792. Despite its association with the Reign of Terror, the guillotine itself was never viewed by the common people of France in a negative way. Instead, it was symbolic of the equality that guided its creation.

The guillotine is named for Dr. Joseph-Ignace Guillotin, a member of the Third Estate who proposed his invention to the National Assembly in 1789.[1] Seeking to revolutionize France's penal system, Guillotin gave a speech to the National Assembly introducing reforms innovative for that time period. His proposal ensured, for instance, that the family of an accused man could not be punished for his crimes, and that all people who committed the same crime would be punished in the same way.[2] The introduction of a common method of execution was only a small fraction of the sweeping changes that Dr. Guillotin and others in the assembly sought to implement.

Article 6 of Guillotin's proposal to the Constituent Assembly makes the intention behind the guillotine's creation clear: "The method of punishment shall be the same for all persons on whom the law shall pronounce death, whatever the crime of which they are guilty. The criminal shall be decapitated. Decapitation is to be effected by a simple mechanism."[3] Guillotin and other reformers also hoped that this method would be painless, especially in comparison to the forms of execution that it replaced, like hanging, drawing and quartering, and breaking on the wheel. Through the implementation of a uniform means of execution, Guillotin and his contemporaries sought to make the process more equitable, rational, and above all, just. Truly, this was to be a machine of the Enlightenment. The guillotine would not discriminate between a person of noble blood and a common peasant. That everyone who committed a capital offense would die in the same way was a truly revolutionary idea in a world so fraught with social hierarchies.

Who Died on the Scaffold?

At least two aspects of Guillotin's proposal were successful. First, executions became more uniform after the construction and implementation of the guillotine; all classes of people who faced execution faced it in the same ritualized fashion. Second, the machine was, when used correctly, efficient. Victims of the guillotine met death quickly, seemingly painlessly, and all the while being afforded the dignity of a noble death. In these ways, the guillotine represented the leveling of society that the revolutionaries sought, in both life and death.

Victims of the guillotine during the Reign of Terror were as diverse as the citizens of France. Records of the time show that all levels of society were represented proportionally to the percentage of society that they constituted.[4] The King and Queen of France met their fates at the end of the guillotine's blade, as did former nobles, clergymen, tradesmen, and peasants.[5] However, something went wrong over the course of the revolution. The majority of those killed during the terror were political prisoners, not the common criminals that Guillotin

and other penal reformers had in mind in 1789.

During the Reign of Terror, the number of capital crimes increased dramatically. Anyone considered an enemy of the revolution was executed. The National Convention declared, for instance, that hoarding would be punished by death, a move celebrated by the sans-culottes. The people who died on the guillotine during this period may not have been the victims that Guillotin had intended. In fact, Guillotin narrowly escaped execution by his own invention, and his family was eventually driven to change their name due to the association with the machine and the Reign of Terror.

The first man to die by the guillotine was a common criminal named Nicolas Jacques Pelletier,[6] and he is remembered almost exclusively for this distinction. But within a year of his execution, the guillotine had been used to silence thousands of enemies of the revolution. Priests who refused to take oaths of allegiance to the republic, young women who wrote negative letters about the government to relatives, and many others died by the blade at the hands of the Revolutionary regime. Queen Marie Antoinette followed her husband to the guillotine not only for her treasonous crimes against her people, but also because she was a symbol of the monarchy and of the decadence of the old regime. Anyone could have easily become a victim of the Terror. Even Robespierre himself fell victim to "the sword of retribution".

The threat of execution by guillotine was effectively used by the government to control the public. For instance, a law was passed at the urging of the sans-culottes in Paris mandating that the hoarding of food be punished by death. Though harsh, enforcing the death penalty for this offense ensured that the French troops could be fed. By using a few select people as examples, those in power could scare the rest of the population into submission to protect the fragile government.

"The People's Axe"

Because of the public nature of execution, the guillotine became a cultural symbol of the times. The guillotine itself was associated with the ideology behind the revolution, representing equal treatment for all under the law, while the executions, which were popular public events, also inspired feelings of patriotism and equality. Members of society who were once marginalized were able to actively participate in the revolutionary movement by attending public executions. These people felt a close connection to the guillotine, and this is reflected in the language they used to describe it.

There were many terms of endearment for the guillotine popular with the common people of Paris. Albert Soboul writes, "The guillotine was popular because the sans-culottes regarded it as the avenging arm of the nation, accounting for such expressions as 'national hatchet', and 'the people's axe'; the guillotine was also 'the scythe of equality.'"[7] The guillotine promoted equality not only in that it executed criminals from all segments of society in the same way, but it also allowed those who were politically disenfranchised to have a feeling of close involvement with the revolution. It was a machine of the common people, the sans-culottes and the working-class men and women of Paris.

Often, the guillotine was personified by supporters of the revolution. In a pamphlet entitled

"Letter from the guillotine of erstwhile Lyon to her elder sister, the guillotine of Paris," one guillotine is literally portrayed as communicating with another:

> *Dear Sister, I read with wonder a report printed in Paris recounting your miraculous achievements, your admirable feats and the progress of your work. I was moved to emulate you and, though your junior, I pursued my work with new enthusiasm... How many heads in one bag, dear sister! But our work is not yet done. There are many enemies at the heart of the republic. It is our bounden duty to perform this last service for them, such a pleasant one to fulfil. Never have surgeons achieved such 'beautiful cures'.*[8]

By personifying the machine, attributing feelings of self-satisfaction and patriotism to an inanimate object, revolutionaries were perpetuating the idea of the guillotine as the mechanization of equality and a symbol of the revolution.

Women, especially, took an interest in the guillotine. While there is no historical evidence for the existence of the "knitters" that Charles Dickens describes in *A Tale of Two Cities*, it is certainly true that women attended executions in droves. Dominique Godineau explains that women were "fervent supporters of the Terror,"[9] because the guillotine was a very effective means of combating rising bread prices.

These women and other supporters of the terror gave the guillotine an almost cultlike following, often referring to it as "saint-guillotine." This canonization of the guillotine was a common theme in writings of the time and was a popular theme with the people of Paris:

> *The informer Pourvoyeur noted that on 13 Pluviôse year II (1 February 1794), "the people" said that "the guillotine has acted and performs more miracles than Saint Geneviève has ever done and has even performed more miracles than all the saints in the calendar, without including those still to come." On 26 Ventôse he wrote, "There is good reason to say that only this saint can save us."*[10]

The positive popular attitude toward the guillotine is apparent in the writings of the time. Jeremy Popkin describes the way that Jacques Hébert characterized execution by guillotine in his journal, *Le Père Duchêne*: "The dread machine was the 'vis à vis of Master Samson [the executioner]' and those who fell under it suffered a "raccourcissement" (shortening) or played "à la maine chaude" [a children's game whose name Hébert adapted to mean execution.]"[11] His use of popular language and crude metaphors appealed to the working-class men of Paris who were so taken with the guillotine and the spectacle of public execution.

"Don't Forget to Show My Head to the People": The Spectacle of Execution

Witnessing a guillotine execution in Reign of Terror Paris was a common sight. Despite the repetitious, or even boring, motions involved in operating the machine, there was a certain ceremonial glamour accompanying each execution that was fully appreciated by the public and fully exploited by the government. Guillotines often drew very large crowds to the city squares in which they were erected, and the graphic nature of executions inspired much fanfare. The amount of blood produced by decapitation was prodigious, but this did not deter the crowds.

No matter who was mounting the scaffold, there was bound to be a show. And the regime often used this to their advantage. Public executions were an excellent platform for controlling the public through propaganda. Thousands of people gathered in public squares to witness executions as a form of entertainment during the Terror. Events on the scaffold could be construed in a variety of ways and twisted by the press to give a more positive or negative impression of the deceased.

Perhaps the most important political usage of the guillotine occurred with the execution of Louis XVI. To die by beheading was a special privilege in the old regime, reserved solely for aristocrats; the guillotine changed that. When the king was executed in the same fashion as common criminals, he was reduced to their social level. When Louis lost his head, the republic gained legitimacy and the country became free. Through the guillotine, "the body of the king [was] made commonplace"[12] because the king was killed in the same way as common criminals. However, the equalizing effect of the guillotine was not only evident in the case of the royal family. It placed all individuals unfortunate enough to mount the scaffold on the same level.

Since all criminals were executed in the same fashion, they were given an equal opportunity to ensure that they each died what was perceived to be a good death. The way in which a person behaved on the scaffold was considered highly important. By conducting oneself in a calm and collected manner on the scaffold, the shame of a bad death could be avoided. Louis XVI, who is said to have conducted himself better as he walked to his death than he ever did while ruling France, is a prime example. The king was reportedly courteous and tried to deliver an eloquent final speech before being drowned out by the roll of drums.

Not everyone could be present for an execution, so writers often used their accounts of the executions to persuade the public to support their cause. While some writings, especially those of royalists or foreigners, attempted to rally sympathy for the deceased enemies of the Revolution, others celebrated the successful delivery of revolutionary justice. Written accounts or drawings of an execution reveal the political persuasion of the speaker. For instance, in their accounts of the Louis XVI's death, republicans were quick to note small signs of his weakness, like his objection to the cutting of his hair, or a change in his complexion. English accounts and artistic renderings of the execution of the King, on the other hand, attribute to him a more regal air, even portraying him as a martyr.[13] These English examples starkly contrast the much more grotesque French examples—a dissimilarity that points to the revolutionaries' desire to remove distinctions between symbols of monarchy and other victims of the guillotine.

Not everyone behaved as nobly as the king on the way to the scaffold. The execution of Jacques Hébert, or Père Duchesne, inspired the following song:

Père Duchesne has been condemned/To the guillotine, by God./How he blinds and swears and shouts/To see his head come off!/Oh dear, really,/He's not a happy man... [14]

Hébert's behavior on the scaffold made him seem hypocritical after speaking so harshly in favor of executing so many people. A man's undignified behavior on the scaffold could ruin his posthumous reputation. With so many supporters in life, the "Père Duchesne" had no one to protect him from death. Hébert's execution and the mockery

he suffered shows that the loyalty of the sans-culottes was to the guillotine itself, not to those who exalted it. Nobility in death was of the utmost importance.

In order to ensure a good death, and avoid the posthumous mockery faced by men like Hébert, maintaining one's honor in the face of execution was important. This meant remaining stoic at trial, after receiving one's sentence, and especially on the scaffold. This was reflected in the behavior of many of the condemned. When Madame Roland was condemned for her association with the Girondists, a less radical faction of the National Assembly that was persecuted by Robespierre and his followers, she thanked her judges for her sentence: "I thank you, gentlemen," she said, "for thinking me worthy of sharing the fate of the great men whom you have assassinated. I shall endeavor their firmness on the scaffold."[15]

Often, prisoners rehearsed their execution or planned speeches or last words before their execution took place in order to prepare themselves for a good and noble death. Georges Danton, a fiery radical speaker of the period and one of the key players of the early stages of the revolution, is famous for asking the executioner to show his head to the people. He also delivered the following poem on the scaffold:

We are led to our deaths
By villains; and this
Is a sorrow we cannot deny.
But the time will come
When they too shall succumb,
Which consoles us as we die.[16]

Speechmaking and other theatrics on the scaffold were by no means limited to men of noble birth like the king. In fact, it was relatively common for individuals of all social backgrounds to make speeches or recite prose on the scaffold.

Conclusion

This guillotine's role during the Reign of Terror was vital both politically and socially. Its threat to the French public deterred them from speaking out against the radical regime. Conversely, the guillotine also promoted the revolutionary ideas of equality and justice, rendering it a machine of the Enlightenment and a mechanism of barbarity simultaneously. What was created with the best of intentions was used by a group of people to do something truly horrible in the name of the ideals upon which the revolution and the guillotine were both founded. Dr. Guillotin did not create a monster; it was the society in which he lived that turned his creation into a monster.

The Reign of Terror is commonly said to have ended in 1794 with the death of Robespierre, who ironically perished by the republican razor just as he had guaranteed that so many of his contemporaries would. Severely wounded in the jaw from his attempted suicide, Robespierre screamed in pain until the blade fell.[17] The use of the guillotine did not die with him. This means of execution continued to be used in France until the 1970s, applauded for the quick and painless death that it brought to its victims. However, these more modern executions were not public affairs. The guillotine's continued use after the French Revolution reveals its significance, not only as a weapon of terror against the people, but as a means of execution reflecting the original intentions of the revolution, equality and justice for all French citizens.

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Genocide: The Lasting Effects of Gender Stratification in Rwanda

Tess Lione and Emily Wilkins

Dr. Phillip Cantrell, faculty advisor

Abstract

April 7, 1994 changed the lives of every Rwandan. That spring, the ethnic tensions between the Hutu and the Tutsi had escalated over the duration of the spring. The whole country was about to be embroiled in conflict, and, ethnic tensions having built to this point for centuries, there was no stopping it. However, for some women of Rwanda, the political unrest was distant; they simply wanted peace for their families. The Tutsis had oppressed their people and families, and they had supported the Belgian imperialist takeover. On that day in 1994, all Rwandan women found themselves divided by an ethnic war and were left with impossible choices to make: kill or be killed; see their children slaughtered or slaughter other women's children; and be raped or stand aside while other women got raped.

Many women have the same story as Violette Mutegwamaso, a Tutsi. She was the mother of two children, whom she had to defend after her husband was brutally murdered by Hutus. She and her children fled to a local church to seek shelter, but what they found was the opposite: Violette was forced to smear blood on her face and the faces of her children and pretend to be dead. They crouched down between pews and hid for hours as people were murdered and the number of corpses grew around them. "There was shooting going on, and people were falling and dying everywhere," Violette said as she recounted her experience for Women for Women International, a nonprofit organization helping women from suffering nations create businesses for themselves through sponsorship.[1] Although she and her family were lucky to have made it through the genocide alive, because of so much death, Violette took in another orphan whose parents were lost in the war. The child was representative of an entire generation orphaned because of the genocide. Violette's story, however, has a happy ending. Her farming business grew and became profitable and she and her family began the process of reconstructing their lives.

Pauline Nyiramasuhuko's story offers a different perspective. A prominent Hutu leader in the Rwandan government at the time of the genocide, she was born into a poor family. Despite her limited resources, she was very bright, becoming the Family Affairs and Women's Development minister in the

Rwandan Parliament. Nyiramasuhuko ordered the massacres in Butare, a town in which the most extensive slaughter of the genocide occurred. When the governor of that region refused to follow her orders, she had him removed from office and killed; militias from Kigali then carried out genocide. After the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) took control of Butare in July 1994, Nyiramasuhuko fled to refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ORC). Prior to taking flight, she told the BBC, "I couldn't even kill a chicken. If there is a person who says that a woman, a mother, could have killed, I'll tell you truly then I am ready to confront that person."[2] At the end of the genocide, she was made to stand trial, along with her son, Arsene Shalom Ntahobali. Presiding Judge William Sekule said that scores of ethnic Tutsis were killed after taking refuge in a local government office: "Hoping to find safety and security, they instead found themselves subject to abductions, rapes, and murder. The evidence... paints a clear picture of unfathomable depravity and sadism."[3]

Introduction

Women played a significant role in the Rwandan genocide, both committing and becoming the victims of atrocities characterized by violence and sex crimes. Eight hundred thousand people were killed in just three months. Many children were left without parents. Because women became the majority of the population in most cities, Rwandan society underwent substantial changes, the culmination of those changes being that more women currently serve in the Parliament of Rwanda than any other Western nation. In pre-genocide Rwanda, however, society was primarily paternalistic.[4] Women were absent from the political scene in Rwanda, though several women—Agathe Kanziga, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, and Agnes Ntamabyaliro— played key roles in Rwandan politics and were later charged with inciting rebellion by the International Court of Justice.

The major questions this paper seeks to answer are why the Rwandan Genocide happened and why the role of women in the genocide is historically significant. What cultural elements existed to contribute to the perfect storm of the Rwandan Genocide? What were the claims of the Hutus against the Tutsis? What is Rwanda doing to rebuild after the genocide? Is the role of women different than before the genocide? Are there solutions to the ethnic and regional animosities that sparked the genocide and continue to this day?

To answer these questions, the events of Rwanda's history must be analyzed. Within this history contains an example of what can happen when a foreign power intervenes with no prior understanding of the culture or foresight into the implications of its actions. They created

ethnic differences that did not exist before their arrival but continued into the next century. With flare-ups of ethnic strife throughout the history, no time was tenser than the 1950s and '60s, when most of Africa was in one conflict or another. Finally, in 1994, tensions boiled over and one of the worst atrocities of our time occurred. This paper explores what was learned from the genocide in an attempt to prevent a disaster of this scale from happening again.

History

The roots of the Rwandan genocide lie in the nation's history. Long before 1994, numerous but often overlooked factors, including European players, must be considered. However, the three main inhabitants of Rwanda—the Twa, the Hutu, and the Tutsicrossed paths when the Tutsi migrated into Hutu and Twa lands in the twelfth century. The three ethnic groups coexisted peacefully for hundreds of years, but during the fifteenth century, the Tutsi King Ruganzu Ndori took control of innermost Rwanda. By the end of the seventeenth century, Tutsi King Kigeri Rwabugiri had declared a unified state reinforced by a centralized military. The area remained under African control and the Tutsi, Twa, and Hutu tribes remained [cooperative/peaceful] until European intervention in 1890, when Rwanda became part of German East Africa.

A turning point came in 1919, when Belgium began its occupation of Rwanda. The Belgians governed Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda) through the Tutsi kings. Embracing the Tutsis as the ruling class because they appeared more regal, were lighter-skinned, and had more Caucasian features. These features may be attributed to the fact that the Tutsis were a pastoral people who tended cattle and were thus taller and stronger. As their pastoral lifestyle suggests, the Tutsis were a migratory people. They eventually settled in Rwanda but did not originate there, leading the Belgians to believe that the Tutsis were the sons of Ham, the son of Noah who is said to have populated Africa, according to the Bible. Consequently, the Tutsi were believed to be a lost tribe of Israel, not Rwandan. As a result, the Tutsis and the Belgians found common ground: neither the Belgians nor the Tutsis were African the Hamitic hypothesis. The Hutus, on the other hand, were an agricultural people and thus viewed as African. The Tutsis had been the ruling class prior to the arrival of the Belgians; however, there was relative peace between the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa peoples. When the Belgians decided to rule indirectly through the Tutsis in 1919, they instilled more power in the Tutsis and created a divide that was not previously there. The Belgians instilled a sense of superiority in the Tutsis and required that they live in separate areas and attend different schools. Both Hutus and Tutsis were brought up to believe that the Tutsi were not Africans. The rift between the two groups further widened when the Belgians became confused by the intermarrying and mixed-ethnicity children resulting from Tutsi-Hutu unions; maintaining a divide between the two ethnic groups became problematic as their distinguishing features blended. In response, the Belgians outlawed intermarrying and required that Tutsis live in gated communities. To avoid confusion, the Belgians also required that each individual carry an identification card at all times that labeled the respective individual as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. Doing so deepened

the divide and intensified segregation in Rwanda.

In the late 1950s, there was a shift in power. The Hutus had grown tired of oppression and demanded that their voice be heard. In 1959, the Hutus came to power after a rebellion that killed nearly 50,000 Tutsis. The Tutsi King Kigeli V and thousands of other Tutsis were forced into neighboring Uganda as exiles. Because both Hutus and Tutsis had maintained that Tutsis were not Rwandan, the Hutus had no trouble pushing them out—after all, both ethnicities had been brought up to believe that Rwanda was not the Tutsis' home. In 1961, Rwanda declared itself a republic and Hutu Grégoire Kayibanda was elected its first president. Naturally, many more Tutsis left the country.

In 1978, Juvénal Habyarimana became the third president of Rwanda, and a new constitution was ratified. Rwandan society became more unstable over the course of Habyarimana's presidency, especially at the start of the 1990s, when Tutsi rebel forces from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda from Uganda. Although the RPF and Rwanda attempted to create a multi-party constitution and various agreements for peace were in the works in 1991, the Hutu community was not interested in peace. They wanted control over and revenge against the Tutsi. The Hutu had the upper hand and were uninterested in relinquishing it to their ethnic rival. Politicians knew that in order for Rwanda to remain a stable republic, peace had to be maintained, but the majority could not be suppressed. In 1993, President Habyarimana signed a power-sharing agreement with the Tutsis in Arusha, a small town in Tanzani where the Tutsis had been operating. This power-sharing agreement, known as the Arusha Peace Accords, was meant to bring peace to Rwanda and end the civil war, but it had the opposite effect.

Genocide

The bloodiest four months in Rwandan history began on April 6, 1994, when President Habyarimana's plane was shot down near the capital of Kigali, and lasted until July: "an estimated 5–10 per cent of Rwanda's population was then killed 'between the second week of April and the third week of May' 1994."[5] It is believed that Hutu radicals were to blame because the power-sharing agreement with the Tutsis that was signed in 1993, known as the Arusha Peace Accords, was to be implemented soon. The Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and Hutu militia, also known as the Interahamwe, were the two primary participants in the mass killings. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) was not allowed to intervene and thus stood by as systematic killings of Tutsis and Hutus alike took place. On April 8, the RPF attempted to pull its troops out of Kigali. From that point on, all other rescue missions were conducted only to evacuate European or Western citizens stranded in Rwanda. No international intervention attempt was made on behalf of Rwandans.

On April 21, the U.N. Security Council voted to withdraw most of the UNAMIR troops. The force was cut from 2,500 to 270 soldiers. Nine days later, on the 30th, the U.N. released a statement condemning the killings; however, it was not legally obligated to do anything about it because it did not classify the killings as genocide. Hundreds of thousands of people continued to flee to neighboring countries. It is estimated that as many as 250,000 Rwandans crossed the border into Tanzania in one day. By mid-May, approximately

500,000 Rwandans had been killed. On June 22, Operation Turquoise began, in which French forces entered South-west Rwanda in order to create a safe area. By mid-July, RPF forces captured the capital of Kigali; the Hutu government fled, followed by thousands of refugees; and the French forces were replaced by Ethiopian U.N. troops. The RPF set up an interim government in Kigali, and 800,000 Rwandans had been killed within the first hundred days of genocide.

Analysis

How did things escalate so quickly, and why was there no one to help? When change began to arise, the Tutsis looked to the Belgians for help, but they were nowhere to be found. The Belgians realized that they no longer needed Rwanda. The colonial scramble for Africa having ended, Rwanda had nothing to offer them; it had become more of a burden to the Belgians than anything else. Involving themselves in Rwandan politics would only complicate their already tenuous situation, so Belgium abandoned the country without reassembling it. The Tutsis suddenly found themselves with no protection in an ethnically hostile environment. Unable to suppress the Hutus, the Tutsi reign in Rwanda was over and their only remaining option was exile. With a divided government, Hutus and Tutsis alike had been going in and out of exile in the neighboring countries of Burundi and Uganda. Things were bound to reach a critical point, and when that happened, it was going to be bloody:

> *The genocide evolved out of a past history of conflict and violence. A long history of dominance by the minority Tutsis (about 14% of the population) over the majority Hutus (about 85%) greatly intensified under the colonial rule of the Belgians. The Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda live next to each other and share the same language and religion, primarily Catholic. They may have been originally different ethnic groups, but the primary differences over time became those of occupation, class, power, and social identities.*[6]

Rwanda was steered inevitably toward a bloody civil war and genocide when Belgium began occupation of Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa territory. As with the Belgium-Tutsi relationship, "ethnic identities are often magnified, if not manufactured, by occupying forces or national elites during the colonial period. Once independence has been obtained, ethnic identities are often internally enhanced for the political purposes of the new ruling regime."[7] Other than being the ruling class, there were no intrinsic differences between the Tutsis and the Hutus and Twas over whom they ruled. No physical distinctions had been made between them until the Belgians instilled in each ethnic group the idea that the Tutsis were more regal and looked more similar to Europeans than the other Africans did.

By leaving Rwanda and ruling instead through the Tutsis, the Belgians destabilized the country's political environment. The conditions created by the Belgians

> *contribute to the instability felt throughout postcolonial environments. The new regimes monopolize existing resources, leaving subordinate populations in socioeconomic conditions analogous to (or worse than) those characterizing colonial rule. Widespread inequities of access to social, political, and economic capital are perpetuated by these new social arrangements. The histories of postcolonial states frequently*

degenerate into civil wars or other internecine conflicts that undermine the fragile forms of social organization built out of the anomic social rubble of colonial decampment. In the most extreme cases, such as Rwanda, genocides arise.[8]

While it is plausible that by fleeing Rwanda the Tutsi could have saved themselves from slaughter, nothing portended genocide to convince them to leave their homeland. The 1960s were a dangerous period in Rwandan history, but eighteen years had passed with relatively peaceful relations between the Hutus and the Tutsis:

Covert actions were an important dimension of the Rwandan regime's close political control and were especially effective in a highly stratified society, where power differentials had long been taken for granted...when the genocide actually started; it took most outsiders, and many Rwandans, by complete surprise. Bald statements of intent were rare; and rumors which circulated of planned genocide simply served to further disarm the Tutsi population, by appearing to 'cry wolf'"[9]

Because of this relative confusion, there was no real reason to be suspicious or to suspect that a full-blown genocide would take place.

Another reason that the genocide was allowed to go on for so long was because of the global policing forces' reluctance to use the term "genocide." Genocide is defined as "acts committed with the intent to destroy in part or in whole a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such."[10] The U.N. never declared the killings in Rwanda as genocide. If the U.N. had done so, it would have been obligated to intervene. Since this was not the case, the killings were allowed to go on without international resistance. The U.S. could have also taken steps to stop the genocide, but the Clinton administration "produced an inventive new reading of the Genocide Convention. Instead of obliging signatory states to prevent genocide, the White House determined, the Convention merely 'enables' such preventive action... by neutering the word 'genocide' the new spin allowed American officials to use it without anxiety."[11]

Rwanda was essentially a perfect storm of factors in which genocide was the outcome. Political instability, the centralization of power, difficult living conditions, ethnic conflict, devaluation, and past victimization of a certain group of people are all major instigators of genocide. All of these issues were present in Rwanda.

Rwandan Women's Participation in the Genocide

Empowered women are important to the economic prosperity of any country. The coffee industry, one of Rwanda's chief sources of capital, was severely damaged during the genocide because of damage sustained to coffee plantations. Women have assumed a prominent role in rebuilding those plantations and learning new ways of growing coffee. According to Agnes Matilda Kalibata, [Rwanda's] Minister of State in Charge of Agriculture:

Rwanda's economy has risen up from the genocide and prospered greatly on the backs of our women. Bringing women out of the home and fields has been essential to our rebuilding. In that process, Rwanda has changed forever... We are becoming a nation that understands that there are huge financial benefits to equality.[12]

With that being said, is it difficult for some people to believe that women could have had a significant role in the genocide—positive, negative, or otherwise. One of the few people charged by the International Court of Justice for the genocide was a woman, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, who was charged with inciting genocide. Beyond that, there is still speculation regarding how involved women actually were in carrying out the genocide. Some claimed that women didn't even play a role: "No women were involved in the killings... they were mad people; no women were involved. All women were in their homes," claimed a female genocide suspect from Miyove prison.[13] However, others claim that women played a more insidious role. They say that women may not have been directly involved in the physical violence of the genocide, but they did play a subversive role by informing Hutu extremists where Tutsi families were located or hiding.

Rwanda's stratified society during and leading up to the genocide applied not only to ethnicity but also to regional background and gender. Northerners perceived themselves to be superior to southerners, and vice versa. Gender has always played a more specific role in importance of an individual and place in society; however, closer to the genocide, race began to transcend even gender. It is possible that gender differences would have lessened over time and all women would have found equality; however, the evidence shows that even though women were the target of horrible sexual violence and mutilation, their standing in society was furthered by the genocide.

In post-genocide Rwanda, Rwandan women are more empowered than they have ever been before. They have leadership positions within the Parliament. They are the facilitators of economic expansion. They are creating and owning businesses. Because the genocide reduced men to a mere 20% of the population,[14] women have had to assume the roles that men can no longer fill.

Rwandan Women Pre-genocide

There has long been a gender divide in Rwandan culture. Women have historically been subordinate to men in Rwanda: "A woman's value and status depended first on her fertility and second on her cooperativeness, initiative, and ability to work. A man was judged in terms of his courage and even capacity for aggression, his ability with words, and his physical prowess."[15] A woman was made to cook for the men, clean, raise the children, and keep herself occupied among the other women of the community. While this has been the status quo for most societies, limited not just to Africa but to the world, the complexity of Rwanda's social structure is unique:

> *ruling class of herding Tutsi dominated a lower class of Hutu farmers, Tutsi noblewomen supervised the Hutus' work, and Hutu women worked hard at agricultural subsistence while the labor of their husbands in their fields or at war was monopolized by the aristocracy. Yet a Hutu man, despite his miserable position, remained no less a patriarch within his own family, where his wife had to kneel to offer him beer."*[16] *Even though women had different social standings in society in its larger sense, when it came to each household, a woman's place was the same, no matter her ethnicity.*

As time went on, all Rwandan women occupied a similar societal role with similar expectations. The genocide, however, rekindled

the issue of social distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi women. As the genocide continued, it became apparent that women were characterized not only by ethnicity, but also by regional affiliation. The way a woman dressed could automatically define her as either a Hutu or a Tutsi regardless of her actual ethnicity. Depending on what part of the country one was in, the distinction between what clothing identified a woman as Hutu or Tutsi differed: "the peasants in this part of the country, which was far from the urban centers, were not used to seeing young women in pants, shorts, miniskirts, or braided hair. For these peasants, a young girl who dressed that way had to be Tutsi. According to them, young Hutu girls were too well brought up to dress like whores."[17]

Propaganda played a major role in pre-genocide Rwanda. Tutsi women might have been portrayed as more attractive than Hutu women, but they were also portrayed as "vixens, temptresses and spies who had to be eliminated,"[18] *Kangura*, an anti-Tutsi periodical, published as part of a leaflet of commandments regarding Tutsi women. The first commandment asserts that:

> *Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, whoever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who: Marries a Tutsi woman, befriends a Tutsi woman, and employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or a concubine.*[19]

The *Kangura* urged Hutu women to "be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason."[20] Other forms of propaganda called Tutsis "cockroaches" that needed to be eliminated. Valérie Bemeriki was a female journalist during this time who was an announcer on the RTLM, an extremist anti-Tutsi radio station. She was famous for reading the names of Tutsis who needed to be killed and where to find them.[21]

Women During the Genocide

Women took on different roles during the genocide. Hutu women at the head of Tutsi extremist circles rarely experienced any bloodshed. Fueled by hate and the memory of the suffering their people experienced, some Hutu women lashed out violently. Genevieve Mukarutesi, a Tutsi survivor, recounted her experience during the genocide:

> *On this date the situation deteriorated sharply in our sector. Hutu wanted to exterminate the Tutsis. My husband was Tutsi and we had four children..... Like other Tutsi families, we went to Kabuye hill where there were a lot of us, about 50,000. At least 40,000 perished on this hill. The first attack was led by Hutus from our district directed by a pregnant Hutu woman who was armed with a gun and a lot of grenades. She is Felicitee Semakuba, a former gendarme....During this attack, I, myself, saw Mme. Semakuba with a gun and grenades. She was on her knees shooting into the crowd of refugees all the while giving out orders to her team. She would often get up to throw grenades.*[22]

Many stories like Mukaruteski's tell of how ordinary women were driven to violence. Whatever drove her to take part in the violence, Semakuba participated willingly. Clearly Mukarutesi knew this woman because she knew the woman's name. If they were from the same area, they may have grown up around each other. This sort of brutality is brought on not by one element, but by many.

Ethnicity was a major aspect, but there were other factors.

When the genocide ended eight hundred thousand deaths later, the remaining Rwandans were left to rebuild their country and salvage their culture. The remaining survivors now had to learn to heal and to forgive others for the deaths of their families. Whether or not this healing could occur and society would be able to return to some semblance of normalcy, remained to be seen.

Post-Genocide Rwanda

A society cannot go back to what it was before, nor should it. Norms likes extreme patriarchal social structure and ethnic tensions instilled in Rwandan citizens prevented them from becoming economically advanced. Internal divisions and a rigid societal structure impeded humanitarian advancement.

Ethnic tensions contributed to Rwanda's stagnation, but the rigid social structure to which women were subjected also imposed limitations on the country. When a nation handicaps over half of the population by starving them of education and basic human rights, its ability to prosper is doomed. This changed in the 1990s, when women began to attend school; however, rigid social structures still remained.

After the genocide, certain institutions were slow to recover. To this day, fewer children attend school [than before the genocide]. Courts are slow to bring to justice many leaders of the genocide. Conflict still lingers on the borders of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Nevertheless, Rwanda has moved in a promising direction.

Seventy-two women presently serve in Parliament, holding fifty-six percent of its seats. Women have jobs and can own property, which had previously been illegal. Women have assumed positions of power and experienced a general empowerment because, as a result of the genocide's devastating effect on Rwanda, they had no choice. Without women, Rwanda would not have survived. "The job of rebuilding Rwanda fell to us," says MP Faith Mukakalisa. "We've been shouting about women's empowerment ever since." Staying a housewife, she says, was never an option. There were businesses to run, fields to sow, important decisions to make.[23]

In the years since the genocide, the majority of Rwandans are no longer poverty-stricken; however, some Rwandans still make only $1 a day. Domestic violence still routinely occurs, but now little girls are allowed to dream of being more than a housewife. A journalist for the BBC asked Aimee Umugeni, who runs a women's center, what she looks forward to in the new Rwanda. Her answer sums up the hope that most women now have in their post-genocide world:

'What is it you hope for most for your daughter, Marie Aimee?' the journalist asked.
'That Rwanda continues to succeed,' she says. 'That my baby has a good education. Perhaps she'll grow up to be a politician, a teacher or an engineer... it's not like when I was young. Nothing will stop her. She'll be able to do whatever she wants."

Conclusion: Reconciliation

Twenty years after the Rwandan genocide, the Rwandan people are focusing on understanding the causes behind such an atrocity, and seeking to learn from the mistakes made during this time. Among Rwanda's ethnic groups, reconciliation is still underway: "Reconciliation means that victims and perpetrators, or members of hostile groups, do not see the past as defining the future, as simply a continuation of the past. It means that they come to see the humanity

of one another, accept each other, and see the possibility of a constructive relationship."[24] The Rwandan government now has more women in positions of power than any other African government. Surprisingly, the issue of women's role in the genocide has been largely ignored. The role of women pre- and post-genocide must now be melded into one. Their role must be redefined, and Rwandan society as a whole must become acclimated to the diminishment of gender stratification.

End Notes

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Photographer:

Kelsey Holt

"7 Eleven"
2013

These photographs catalogue twenty-four hour stores, documenting the places we go to in the middle of the night for various goods and services. The lights act as a beacon, drawing in consumers to buy products with the glow of the neon lights. By artificially isolating the building, I'm emphasizing the isolation of night and commenting on the consumer culture.

Photographer:

Jessica Page

"Pseudaris crucifer 2"
2013

Biologists and artists alike judge the world by visual cues to some extent. How they use these cues is very different. Artists will interpret and appreciate. Scientists will identify and measure. Regardless of these differences, it is the details of the subject that make all the difference. Color, texture, pattern, and shape: these are all things we use to identify the world around us, and also the things that make different creatures superficially unique.

In my project I wanted to get close to my subject, no matter how tiny, to show the complexity of each animal. In studying the creatures students must get up close and personal with each temporary capture. Students are used to digging through the muck and grime for a chance to hold and measure each specimen; all the while being extremely gentle to not push or squeeze too tightly. Fieldwork becomes an art of intrigue and careful handedness as students work.

Morocco and the 20 February Movement

Charles Vancampen, Gilbert Hall, Jenny Nehrt, Kasey Dye,
Amanda Tharp, Jamie Leeuwrik, & Ashley McGee
Dr. Steven Isaac, faculty advisor

Introduction

Morocco is a changing country. Over the course of the last two years, there has been a plethora of change and reforms that have substantially altered the political, economic, and social landscape of Morocco. The roots of this reform are based in the 20 February Movement, which was a series of protests that took place across Morocco and gained the attention of those in power, especially King Mohammed VI, who on 9 March 2011, only a few weeks after the initial protests, stated that massive governmental reforms would be undertaken, including the creation of a new parliament.[1]

Our Study Abroad Experience in May 2012 offered a unique opportunity to observe the changes that came with a new constitution and a drastically reformed government. All the authors of this paper studied abroad in Morocco, conducted research and interviews, and observed daily life in the country to compile this paper. To make sure we covered all segments of Moroccan society, each member of our group looked at different facets of Moroccan society. Thus, this paper covers the police, economy, women, media, education system, and role of the monarchy. By covering such different topics, we were able to get an accurate picture of how Moroccan society has changed in the time since the reforms were made—if indeed, it has—and how various institutions have been affected by the reform.

In addition to focusing on the general reforms, we also looked at the indigenous people of Morocco, the Berbers, for a more focused impact. While a number of different groups participated in the movement, the Berbers are important because they are the original Moroccans and their standing in society somewhat disenfranchises them. Because they are mainly located in rural, isolated areas, it is difficult to improve their standing in society or even bring attention to their struggles.[2] Their main struggle has primarily been for recognition of their culture and language in society as well as improving their economic standing, which can be difficult given the situation the Berbers find themselves in.[3]

The above issues are all addressed and interwoven in the following sections, where we address the effectiveness of the reform, the manner in which it was brought about, and how the government, media, police, and citizens of Morocco reacted.

Methodology

First, let us begin by saying that this is by no means a scientific study, meaning there was no scientific sample and the interviews were conducted with whomever we felt we could speak comfortably about potentially sensitive subjects. This is because the issues that we addressed were potentially sensitive topics that needed to be treated with care. The majority of the interviewees were guides, hotel workers, or others in the tourist industry who have experience interacting with foreign visitors. Because of this, there may well be some inaccuracies in the information provided because of the fact that in talking with foreign nationals—even though they had English language skills ranging from good to excellent—there may have been miscommunications or misinterpretations in the interview process. It is also important to factor in the possibility that the interviewees told selective truths, sugar-coated some facts, or outright lied to make their country look better in the eyes of tourists.

One of the reasons why the majority of the interviewees worked in tourism is because politics in Morocco is a potentially sensitive subject, and in order to get to the subjects addressed in this research, we had to navigate conversations in certain ways to get to a point where we could ask the questions that we wanted. This often required a great deal of time to build up a level of trust that allowed them to talk to us openly, something we did not have the opportunity to do with the average passer-by. Another reason is the language barrier we encountered. Because most random people on the street would not have been able to speak enough English to converse with us, we were limited to interviews with the English speakers available to us, thus individuals working in the tourist industry.

Because of this, our sample size was a small convenience sample and is not generalizable to the whole of Morocco, as we only sampled one section of society: tourist workers. While our interviews involved mainly these individuals, we were able to sample individuals from all over the country and vastly different areas. During our time, we traveled from south to north and stayed in Berber cities and Arab cities. Our sample was thus split between the two main ethnic groups in the country, the Berbers and Arabs, providing some diversity in our sample.

The majority of us went about our research by striking up conversations with individuals, usually not mentioning our goal of talking about the 20 February Movement or the politics of the country. For example, one member of our group struck up a conversation about the fairness of policing in Morocco by observing a scooter weaving in and out of pedestrians in the *medina* (the old city) and asking if that was legal. We almost never mentioned that we were doing research and just talked and felt out certain individuals to see if they would be a good source of information. If an individual felt uncomfortable talking to a person, he or she would stop; however, if the person was willing to talk, we carried on, only going as deep as seemed safe for the interviewee.

While talking, we never had our notebooks present. So, as soon as we ended the conversation (or whenever we were able), we went to write down the information that we had just learned from that conversation. This time span ranged anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours, depending on the situation. When we returned to the United States, we compiled our data to write our respective sections and compared our interview data and in-country experiences to news and scholarly articles. Since each section was written by a different person, the style may vary from section to section. While some relied on interview data, others relied on research mixed with interviews when writing their sections.

It is also worth noting that to give us some background information on the political and cultural history of Morocco, we held four pre-departure meetings and read materials pertaining to our itinerant research. These readings included materials by noted Berber expert Michael Peyron and readings selected by our professor, Dr. Steven Isaac, from both primary and secondary literature. In addition to this, we watched a few short pre-departure videos mainly focusing on the 20 February Movement, with an emphasis on its organization and the people behind it.

Roles of the Monarchy: An Analysis of the Monarchy and the Economy

King Mohammed V negotiated the country's independence from France in 1955, marking the first time the monarchy held full control over the country since the beginning of the twentieth century. Following King Mohammed V's death in 1961, Hassan II took the throne and established a new constitution that created a bicameral legislature as well as an independent judiciary, both of which were widely accepted by referendum in December 1962.[4] This newly developed government was threatened by political upheaval, and Hassan II seized power and ruled with no checks until 1970, when another legislature was created. Despite this move, the government was rife with corruption, and the people of Morocco were in strong opposition to the men in power. These men have had a strong influence on governmental procedure since Hassan II's reign and are often called *Makhzen*, a term that goes back centuries in Moroccan history. Due to international concerns as well as poor domestic management, Morocco was stricken with a weak economy as well as a disheartened society. These factors lent to the political unrest that had been brewing since the 1970s but was ultimately repressed by Hassan II's powerful regime.[5]

Nearing the end of his life, Hassan II embarked on a series of political and economic reforms in the late 1990s that reflected an understanding of the dire situation that the country was in, but changes were not truly evident until Mohammed VI took the throne in 1999 upon Hassan II's death. Mohammed VI initiated many reforms that had been demanded by the Moroccan people for decades—a relaxation of press censorship, investigation into the atrocities committed by his father's regime, and the amendment of the *Moudawana* (Family Law) to better protect women's rights.[6] These efforts represented a distinct movement toward liberalizing and improving Moroccan society, but many people viewed the reforms as being too slow and too few. Apart from the establishment of a free trade agreement between the United States and Morocco, economic reform was relatively absent from the king's agenda, and the issue of government corruption was still being left unaddressed. Because of an official unemployment rate of ten percent (with estimates of the unofficial rate being much higher) in early 2011, as well as a strong desire to see the government enact more democratic reforms, many young Moroccan adults worked together to organize a demonstration that began on February 20, 2011 and put over 37,000 people in the streets of twelve major cities, protesting corruption within the government and calling for economic and social reform.[7]

Within the 20 February Movement were a number of different groups with similar problems and many goals. The Berber people native to Morocco have traditionally been rural villagers, many of whom practiced pottery, weaving, or agriculture. It is difficult for them to reach cultural centers to sell their goods because their homes are distant and isolated and because the roads in Morocco are in poor condition—many roads are simply dirt and gravel, particularly along the Atlas Mountains and other areas with less dense populations.[8] This presents many issues with navigating the roads (especially during rain or other inclement weather), making it incredibly difficult for the Berber people to improve their social

standing and accumulate more wealth. Furthermore, the Berber people have expressed a strong desire to see their culture and language recognized and respected by the Moroccan government, a struggle that has been going on since the 1980 demonstration in Kabila when a professor and renowned poet who had been presenting a lecture on Berber culture was denied access to a university.[9]

Alongside the Berbers were modern Moroccan youths who actively sought economic reforms to aid them in their search for jobs. Having been born at the end of Hassan II's repressive regime, the youngest members of the Moroccan population grew up in a time period that saw increasing liberalization but poor economic opportunity, two influences that motivated the youth to actively protest the conditions they faced at the time of their transition into adulthood. Together, these two groups have developed a movement that shocked the government and the monarchy into action.

The 20 February Movement earned a major victory on 9 March 2011, when Mohammed VI agreed to create a committee to draft a new constitution and develop a new parliament. The constitution was enacted in the following months, and elections for the new parliament were held in November. Further victories included the recognition of Tamazight (the Berber language) as an official language and the promised implementation of it in primary schooling.[10] Because of these results, as well as the promise of further reforms by Mohammed VI, the 20 February Movement saw a notable decline in public numbers. The group continued to mount protests throughout the rest of 2011 but saw a sharp decline in its support base. Some Moroccans claimed that the movement was beginning to push too hard, an action that could result in either a move by the monarchy to repress the public and withdraw the many concessions that had been earned up to this point or else a radical call for total revolution similar to the events happening in Egypt and Libya as a result of the Arab Spring. Both possibilities would mean the end of political and social stability within Morocco, as well as an end to the many liberal and democratic freedoms that have been secured up to this point—two outcomes that most Moroccans wish to avoid.[11]

Despite the fears that many Moroccans have in regard to continued protests, the 20 February Movement and other organizations see reasons to continue their demonstrations. While legislation was passed by the government to incorporate the instruction of Tamazight into the Moroccan educational system, the actual implementation of this law has yielded varying results, leading some Moroccans to question the commitment of the government to real actions. While the new economic reforms that Mohammed VI established have generated more capital, the Ministry of Education has refused to allocate further additional funding to the implementation of Tamazight—an action that many Berbers see as "a sign that the Arab-dominated government hasn't fully accepted the initiative."[12]

Among those that we interviewed, most stated that they were happy with the work that the king was putting into passing reforms and generally improving the country's economy and infrastructure. While the approval rating for the king was high, the distaste held for the rest of the government was of equal intensity. The people of Morocco draw a distinction between the king and the rest of the government, specifically the Makhzen and

the Parliament. While the king is seen as a beneficial force for change in Morocco, the corruption rooted in the government has been perceived to be concentrated solely in the Makhzen (the bureaucratic functionaries) since Hassan II's regime, and has essentially turned society against its political leaders.[13]

The corruption that permeates much of the Moroccan government has been a point of contention for decades. With the establishment of the Central Authority for the Prevention of Corruption (ICPC), the government appeared to be addressing the Moroccan people's concerns. Appearances proved to be deceiving, as both the Party of Authenticity and Modernity as well as the civil organization Transparency Maroc have made claims that the ICPC has made no concrete progress. The deputy secretary-general of Transparency Maroc has researched several organizations where corruption persists, stating that "if, for example, someone becomes aware of a corrupt act within their institution and reports it, they risk losing their job on the grounds of breach of professional secrecy."[14] The Moroccan government's (as well as Mohammed VI's) public image depreciates as more and more cases of corruption elude the ICPC, leading to the question of whether the ICPC is even trying to make a difference.

Although the political atmosphere of Morocco remains turbulent, the economy of Morocco has greatly improved under the rule of Mohammed VI, and as a result of the 20 February Movement, the king has taken a much more active role in stimulating domestic growth, a move which may end up contributing to the issue of corruption. In 2010 the GDP growth of Morocco sat close to 3.7 percent due to the economic decline in the world economy. By 2011, Morocco's GDP had grown by 4.6 percent, an astounding increase, despite the market conditions the country was forced to deal with. Morocco's GDP can be broken down into three main areas: agriculture (16.6 percent), industry (32.3 percent), and services (51.1 percent).[15] The economy is in a stage of major development but is at a competitive disadvantage because of the strong influence of European businesses within the country; thus, domestic industry has struggled to reach favorable levels of exports. Meanwhile, cheap European imports have contributed to the growing problems of unemployment and poverty. Over fourteen percent of the population falls under the category of absolute poverty, with seventy percent of that poverty in rural areas, and unemployment has settled around nine percent since 2010.[16]

Mohammed VI's government has taken a number of actions as a means of combating the poverty, unemployment, and stagnancy that threaten the country's economy and people. Efforts to improve the infrastructure have been incredibly successful, with many roads being built and improved to make transportation of goods to local markets much easier. This has been exceptionally beneficial to the rural communities. Not only are the residents capable of bringing their livestock, crops, and other goods to be sold in the cities, but members of these villages are also able to reach the cities to find jobs and steady incomes to funnel back home to their families.[17] In spite of the impressive growth that the country had been seeing, the government has struggled to increase the number of jobs available to Moroccans. In response to the growing number of protests and demonstrations regarding the lack of job opportunities, the Islamist government led by Prime Minister

Abdelilah Benkirane intends to create a large number of training programs and government jobs to provide employment for graduate students, while at the same time diverting money from past subsidy plans and investing it instead into the private sector to diversify products, increase competition, and create new jobs.[18]

Despite high poverty and unemployment rates, the future appears to be promising for Morocco. With a robust rate of GDP growth as well as a set of extensive reform programs designed to improve the socioeconomic standings of the Moroccan people, it seems that the Moroccan government and Mohammed VI are listening to the demands of protesters and making new strides toward improving the country through different reform efforts. Nonetheless, the question still remains whether the corruption within the government will, or can, be rooted out, since the reforms fall far short of threatening the power base of either the king or the Makhzen.

Constitutional Monarchy in Morocco

Before the in-country experience, we read articles about the Moroccan government, history, colonization, and even the original Islamization of the "Maghreb," or the African West.[19] All the reading in the world could never have prepared us for the experience that awaited us, though. While studying in Morocco, we became directly acquainted with many elements of an Islamic society. The interplay between Islam and the Moroccan government became easily apparent, as well.

During all of our interviews with tour guides, restaurant workers, and other Moroccan citizens, criticism was quite common of the "government" or the "prime minister" (the actual, elected "Head of Government" under Morocco's new constitution).[20] One of the first people that we interviewed was a woman who repeatedly extolled the virtues of tolerance and acceptance in Morocco, a "very liberal country," in her words.[21] According to Maati Monjib and James Liddell of the Brookings Institute, Morocco's administration is a very progressive one with greater freedoms for women, a successful free press, and an improving mandatory education system.[22] When viewed through American eyes, these successes can seem minute. These freedoms and rights seem so fundamental, and there are others that are yet "lacking" within the Moroccan constitution. There were a few people we encountered who seemed cautious about discussing politics or government. They kept their comments or answers very general, but they never seemed bitter or irate with the monarchy. In one of the later interviews, we were told, "The situation in general is getting better, and of course it needs some time."[23]

Protests against the government have garnered lots of attention in the last two years. The government's responses vary from immediate reversals of action to complete ignorance of the ensuing protest.[24] Citizens have not been arrested for demonstrations against government employees or actions, only for the damages and injuries their protests caused. Tolerance of the 20 February Movement's public demonstrations was harder to find, in some instances, and far-reaching in others.[25] Because of Morocco's liberal, tolerant position, it was surprising at first that not one interviewee expressed willingness to criticize his/her king, Mohammed VI.

Of course, the king's presence in the sociopolitical scene usually

leaves a positive impression of the king on his subjects. The king visits and worships with citizens at the Hassan II mosque in Casablanca; the building itself was specially designed with a royal entrance for Mohammed VI. This type of treatment may appear overly lavish to American observers, but the Moroccan citizens revere the king's position. His religious recognition stems from one of his royal titles, "Commander of the Faithful," which allows him to be recognized as the country's spiritual leader.[26] The abovementioned female interviewee further elaborated on the title, saying that the king's authority extends to all god-fearing people in Morocco who practice any religion(s).[27] However, it is very important to note that this religious recognition stems from the king being a descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. While Mohammed VI's liberal stance is obvious, so is the establishment of his firm faith. His position as "Commander of the Faithful" showcases his belief that he serves one true, all-powerful god. This position also creates a sense of social unity between the different religious communities in Morocco.

Our Berber acquaintances in Morocco all shared a common belief about the king that can be summed up in one man's simple words: "I like the king; he does a good job. He is a very smart man."[28] These sentiments were echoed frequently, despite obvious discomfort with the government's recent actions. Morocco's government is a constitutional monarchy that operates under a modified version of Islamic *Shari'ah*.[29] While the king's authority is far from the absolute rule of his father, Mohammed VI still enjoys many royal privileges. Within the boundaries of Moroccan law, the king may make royal decrees at any time, call for reelections, or "terminate" any government employee at any time.[30] Despite these obvious monarchal privileges, his subjects still have a lot of reverence for their reigning king.

All of the *Amazigh* guides, plus the acquaintances we made, were hospitable, genuine people. We were inclined to believe that their positive words about Mohammed VI were their honest opinions. Most of them seemed equally frustrated with both the government and the recent protesters, including those involved in the 20 February Movement. While some people liked the ideas behind the movement, they found the protests excessive or unnecessary. One interviewee, who was a hotel employee, asked why all of his fellow citizens were so unsatisfied with their lives. He could not relate to their overly emotional reactions to hardship, and he compared them openly to the Arab Spring protesters in the Middle East.[31]

Common complaints about the government focus on unemployment and other problems of the economy. One source states that nearly half of Moroccans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-nine are currently not attending school nor working full-time.[32] Other sources set the number somewhere closer to thirty percent; that still signals that nearly one in three young, degree-holding citizens have no steady employment, nor little hope for the future.[33] Despite these discouraging numbers, none of the interviewees pointed to the king as the root of their country's problems. It is not uncommon to hear American citizens insult their presidents relentlessly, as if they were kings or dictators, singlehandedly controlling everything. American presidents tend to be held answerable to everyone, responsible to all, and publicly dissected. In Morocco, there is far more leeway for the king

to be at fault, at least partially, but this hardly affects his power. A royal decree from Mohammed VI can enact almost anything at a moment's notice.

Commenting on the government's administration, one protest-sympathetic citizen described the recent 2011 reforms as important, but "last minute."[34] He seemed to have echoed the "reform or fall" sentiments in *The Economist*: "The king's constitutional initiative may lead to the institutional breakthrough many hoped for at the start of his reign in 1999. But if it stalls, a wave of even angrier protest may well erupt."[35] The government, and by some accounts the king himself, was accused of changing paths only when forced to do so. Some reform groups have gone so far as to blame Mohammed VI's administration for acting only to ensure the mere political survival of the monarchy.[36]

This accusation and many more have a visible presence through an anti-monarchy activist group called simply the *Anti-Monarchistes*, the only one of its kind. The group maintained a Facebook page for two months immediately following the 20 February demonstrations. They posted graphic pictures calling for the overthrow of the king, even comparing him to the previous leaders of Tunisia and Libya that had just been overthrown. Despite its important niche, the group had less than fifty online supporters, with input ending less than two months after the initial demonstrations.[37] They were rivaled by three pro-monarchy groups, and there were even three "Anti-February 20 Movement" groups, as well. Inasmuch as social media is a trustworthy barometer of anything, it indicates that overthrowing the king is not a popular idea, nor was it the original intention of organized demonstrators.[38]

Average Moroccans seem to have few problems with the monarchy's overwhelming authority. Two Moroccan men proudly claimed, "Our king is not like the queen of England, just for decoration. He has power!"[39] They actually seemed happy with his assertion of sociopolitical might, stretching his sphere of influence with their verbiage. To be fair, one middle-aged interviewee had remarked to the contrary earlier, "Our king is like the queen of England now. He must answer to the Prime Minister and Parliament."[40] The people bend his restricted powers to suit their preferences, but all the Moroccans interviewed had "respect for the person of the king."[41] Despite their dissatisfaction with his administration's actions, they continue to give Mohammed VI the respect due to the king in their society.[42] Their cultural experience dictates that the ruler receives this deep respect, primarily because he is of royal lineage, but also because he is a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad.

To Western eyes, it may seem that the Moroccan people are being duped. However, one must remember that until 2011, their nation's constitution defined the king as "sacred."[43] This was a major drawback for the youth protesters; the revised constitution contains a change in the language so that it now reads "inviolable."[44] This wording has proved even more problematic as it implies that no one can legally oppose the king. Their response was unprecedented with demonstrators screaming "His Majesty is God Almighty" outside the capital in Rabat.[45] The Westernized problem with this type of language (e.g., *sacred* or *inviolable*) is that it clashes with democracy and individual freedom as we know it. While the most liberal university students in Morocco seem to agree, the average man or woman has little issue with

it. The heritage of Moroccan culture has long rested on authority being passed from God, to his prophet, and then to secular leaders in an Islamic context. That dignity and power now rest with the current civil ruler, Mohammed VI.

Observations and Perceptions Regarding the Moroccan Police

Before our group went to Morocco, the country had been described to us as a police state, which begs the question: What is a police state? The term *police state* is derived from the German term *polizeistaat*, which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a technical term used to classify implied views about authority, duty, responsibilities and rights that were not in line with the liberal thinkers of the time. It is also important to note that, in the beginning, the term *police state* did not refer to a state that grossly abused its power.[46] According to Brian Chapman in his article "The Police-State," such a state has been redefined since its original meaning; the original purpose of the police state was not to repress its citizens, but to create an "orderly and predictable government designed to bring about economic growth, as well as political expansion."[47] With this definition, pretty much any modern state might be considered a police state.

Over time, however, the term *police state* has had its meaning transformed until it took on the negative connotation that it has today. Probably one of the reasons why police state has the meaning it does today is because of Hitler's Third Reich, in which a police state got out of control. One of the ways this happens is when the powers of the police, which previously were balanced, assume the role of one of the main state authorities and are no longer subordinate.[48] Because of these developments, the term police state has been redefined from the relatively benign meaning it held in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Chapman states that when the term police state was coined, it had a different, positive meaning. Today, as Chapman states, "Webster's Third International Dictionary stigmatizes the Police State as follows: 'A political unit (as a nation) characterized by repressive governmental control ... usually by the arbitrary use of power by the police and especially the secret police in place of the regular operation administration and judicial organs....'"[49] Chapman continues by saying that while the original police state may have been found oppressive by some, the oppression was not intentional and the government was constrained by laws and regulation.[50] The old and new definitions of a police state are immensely different, and this study will focus on the current definition.

After personal observations and interviews with Moroccan residents, it has to be said that the modern definition of *police state* does not define present-day Morocco; however, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century definition may. The common thread among the majority of the interviews that we conducted is that the police operate fairly and the residents have great confidence and trust in the police. In interviews, Moroccans provided evidence that the modern police state label does not apply to Morocco.

When deciding whether Morocco is a police state, it is important to know how the Moroccan police force is set up. Unlike police forces in the United States, where the main law enforcement is carried out on the local or state level, in Morocco, law enforcement is carried out by a national police force that

is divided into two main divisions: the *Direction Genérale de la Sûreté Nationale* (DGSN), which is the national civilian police force and is divided into thirty-seven local districts, and the *Gendarmerie Royale*, which is a paramilitary force and mainly services the rural areas of Morocco. Meanwhile, the DGSN mainly serves the urban areas.[51] Through interviews and observations, we also learned that there is a third branch which is known as the Tourist Police, which deals specifically with tourists and the problems encountered by tourists, such as scams and pick-pocketing.[52]

One of the hallmarks and cornerstones of any police force is how much trust citizens have in them and the job they do. To begin any analysis of the Moroccan police, one must begin with how the citizens feel about the police. Throughout the interviews conducted with Moroccan citizens, they indicated high levels of confidence and trust in the police force. The common motif between the interviews was that the police were effective and fair. One of our interviewees in the city of Fes stated that even though there are places in the *medina* (the old city) that he did not visit at night, the police still do a good job and keep the city very safe.[53] In addition to this, during our tour of Marrakech, a citizen stated that the police were fair and strict in the enforcement of the law.[54] Our interviewee in Fes alluded to this, as well.

The fact that the police act fairly and justly was a reoccurring motif in almost all the interviews and continued to appear during an interview in the Atlas Mountains. This interview, however, did not deal with the police in general, but rather, it ended up focusing specifically on the 20 February Movement. The interviewee stated that Moroccans were happy with how the police responded and, when asked if excessive or unnecessary force was used, he stated that the police reacted reasonably. When asked if the police abused any of the protesters, he stated that the police allowed the peaceful protesters to demonstrate. There was a group, however, that he referred to as the "window-breakers" whom the police did not allow to demonstrate because they became violent and started to damage property. However, residents were happy that the police stopped and arrested these protesters as they were not acting peacefully.[55]

One of the more interesting findings that we came across in our interviews dealt with the issue of trust between officers and citizens. This issue presented itself when a member of our group was interviewing an individual while sitting outside a Berber market in the Atlas Mountains. The line of questioning started off with how the rural residents interact with the police officers who generally come in from the city a few times a week, circumstances in which one might assume there would be some level of distrust. The interviewee, however, said that there is a large amount of trust between all citizens no matter where they come from or how they live. He stated that this is because of the fact that Islam is the only religion in Morocco, and the trust between all residents rests on the fact that virtually all Moroccans are Muslims. Upon further questioning, he stated that if there was a Christian or Jewish public servant, they would not be trusted because of the fact that they were not Muslims.[56] To back up this finding, an interviewee in the Rif Mountains, when questioned about distrust and discrimination, stated that there was very little if any such problem because of the fact that

Islam unifies the whole of Morocco and "all" Moroccans are Muslims.[57]

This was an interesting finding because, during a tour of the Hasan II Mosque, it was said that the three balls on one of the chandeliers hanging from the ceiling represented the three main religions in Morocco: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. An interviewee stated that these three balls represented the tolerance that Morocco is known for.[58] What the two other interviewees in the Rif and Atlas Mountains said, though, contradicts this. They said that the only reason Morocco functions as it does, especially in regard to the police and their relationship with the public, is because Islam is pretty much the sole religion in Morocco. The fact that we were told by two other individuals that the public would distrust any police officer that is not a Muslim contradicts what our group was told in the Hasan II Mosque. One explanation for this may be in the difference between a high-tourist area and the more isolated areas we visited in the country's mountainous regions.

Through a discussion with an individual employed by the tourism industry, we learned that there were female police officers, which was surprising considering our presumptions about Morocco's Islamic culture. Through questioning, the interviewee stated that there were female officers and even went on to say that there were a large number of them. The number of female officers, however, was later refuted by another source. Since we had not seen any female officers working the streets, we asked where the majority of them work, and the individual answered, stating that they were mostly undercover officers.[59] To better understand the situation that female officers face in Morocco, we questioned a woman in the Rif Mountains. She stated that there were some instances of disrespect by citizens but that generally they are respected. When asked if internal discrimination toward females is prevalent in the Moroccan police force, she stated that she did not know. She did say, however, that she knew of a female police officer in Chefchaouen who had quit the force, but she did not know the reasons why.[60]

In addition to interviewing Moroccan citizens, we also had the opportunity to interview several foreign nationals who reside in Morocco. The interesting thing about these interviews is that they contradicted many things that we were told by the Moroccan citizens. The first foreign national spoke solely on the subject of the use of force by the police in his interview. He stated that the police all too often, and most of the time too quickly, resort to the use of violent force. When asked about the 20 February Movement, he stated that police did in fact use force against peaceful protesters, which contradicted what we had been told by another source. He also stated that this was not the only instance in which the police prematurely resorted to force and the reason the Moroccans told us what they did was because they either did not want to tell us the truth and speak out or because it was just normal for them.[61] Another foreign national, this one residing in Fes, spoke about corruption in the Moroccan police force. He told us that a coffee shop that we had visited doubles as a hash bar. It is owned by five brothers, two of whom are police officers. The fact that two of the brothers are police officers might be irrelevant. In this case, however, it is a well-known fact that alcohol and drugs are used and dealt fairly openly at this particular location. Because of this, the brothers who are police officers

protect the brothers who operate the coffee shop and ensure that no one bothers it. The foreign national in Fes also provided us with some stories about police being lenient on drugs, plus tales of police officers who were bought or bribed by smugglers.[62] This is not to suggest that all Moroccan police are corrupt or for sale, but just to provide another person's observations and commentary on the Moroccan police, one that Moroccans might not have been willing to provide.

The differences in opinions between foreign nationals and Moroccan citizens regarding the police can be attributed to many different factors. The first could be that the Moroccans fear the police and will not speak ill of them in any circumstances. The second could be that what a person from a western first world would consider corruption or brutality could be considered normal for Moroccans. Another option is that the citizens that we talked to mostly worked in the tourism industry and would not talk badly or complain about their country to tourists. All of these are just speculation about the inconsistencies between the two groups that were interviewed, and to draw firmer conclusions would require more research.

Combining these interviews with our firsthand experience in Morocco, it was found that the country does not fit the criteria to be considered a police state. The citizens did not indicate that they were oppressed by the police or government and were very positive about the direction in which their country, including their justice system, was heading. Even though the foreign nationals did not have very positive things to say about the police, they did not say that the police went out of their way to oppress anyone, just that there was corruption and brutality, both of which exist in the West, albeit to a lesser extent. Further evidence that Morocco should not be considered a police state, by the modern definition, is the fact that it is a fairly reform-minded society. As a result of the 20 February Movement and subsequent protests, the Moroccan government drafted a new constitution which the citizens then passed later that year.[63] Further proving that Morocco is not a police state in the direst sense of the term is the fact that the government allowed the protesters to demonstrate without problems. While people like the "window-breakers" (to which one interviewee referred) were arrested, the peaceful protesters were allowed to demonstrate even though plain-clothed officers were mixed in with the crowd.[64]

What offsets the seeming tolerance of the Moroccan authorities, however, are incidents with people such as Mouad Belghouat, who was jailed and sentenced to a year in prison for criticizing the police.[65] While the country is becoming more understanding of free speech protections, it still does not tolerate things such as Belghouat's rap song which speaks to police corruption and speaks out against the authorities.[66] In addition to being a rapper, Belghouat was a member of the 20 February Movement and has become a voice for the movement. Other evidence that points to Morocco having police state characteristics is the fact that it intervened violently in some cases with the 20 February Movement to disperse the protesters.[67] However, if one were to prioritize the reports of ordinary citizens of Morocco over international organizations, they would hear that the police did not act improperly or use excessive violence in such protests.

Morocco is defined by many as a police state. If one goes strictly by the definition of a police state, it might meet some of the criteria, but based on firsthand experience, Morocco does not earn the title. While it is true that the country has stumbled (such as the arrest of Belghouat for criticizing the police), the residents have trust and respect in the police and the job they do. The interviewed Moroccan citizens did not feel as though the police overstepped their bounds and were very trusting and placed much faith in the way the police did their job. It seems that the only people who are critical of the police and the way they operate are foreigners living in and observing Morocco. Through research, interviews, and observations regarding the Moroccan criminal justice system, it is evident that there are some characteristics of a police state present but, ultimately, by modern standards, Morocco cannot be considered a police state. However, by the original definition, one could consider it a *polizeistaat*.

Role of the Media

The tagline in an *Al-Jazeera* article reads that "[i]n the absence of reliable and impartial mainstream media, citizen journalism steps in to fill the void."[68] Moroccans are not guaranteed complete freedom of the press, and government censorship limits what information gets out to citizens as well as the world. The internet, which is a protected source of free speech, allows for the "citizen journalists," like the 20 February group, to post their beliefs and any information they see as being important for Moroccans to know about. However, blogs and paper publications have been shut down or censured by the government, some websites have been blocked, and some journalists and bloggers have been "blacklisted" or arrested for violating what the *Al-Jazeera* article calls the "three red lines: Islam, the Western Sahara, and the monarchy."[69] What the article is referencing is the Press Law, which was established in 1958 to prevent the newspapers from defaming the king.[70]

Moroccans' identities revolve around language, as it is a vital part of their culture, but under the monarchy, language-related debate has been stifled. Because of this, freedom of speech and freedom of the press were two of the many demands from the 20 February Movement.[71] In an attempt to appease the protestors, Morocco's King Mohammed VI addressed the issue of language in his speech about the proposed constitution, stating, "... the draft Constitution provides for the promotion of all linguistic and cultural expressions in Morocco..."[72]

While the new Constitution does acknowledge the right to media freedom, ultimately it is still the king who makes the decision on what information is allowed to be published or broadcasted. This discretionary power exists despite Article 28 of the Constitution of Morocco, which reads:

> *The freedom of the press is guaranteed and may not be limited by any form of prior censure. All have the right to express and to disseminate freely and within the sole limits expressly provided by the law, information, ideas and opinion.*[73]

Also, in Article 165, the king has the power to designate "The High Authority of Broadcasting [*Haute autorité de la communication audiovisuelle*]" to "see to the respect for pluralist expression of the currents of opinion and of thought and of the right to information, within the domain of broadcasting and this, within respect for the fundamental values of civilization and for the

laws of the Kingdom."[74] This means that the amount of information given to the Moroccan people is up to the authorities, not the journalists. This may be one explanation as to why the Press Law is still powerful today.

According to a profile done on Moroccan media, the government has a vested interest in Radio-Television Marocaine (RTM) and 2M, the two major television networks in the country. Both are nationally owned, and RTM, as the name implies, also controls one of the country's radio stations. All other radio and television networks are privately owned, as are the majority of the newspapers. *Le Matin* is the only newspaper that is owned by the government, and that is made quite obvious in the first section online called "A la une."[75] This section displays a slideshow of events where all but one slide showed images and stories regarding King Mohammed VI.[76] If any of those articles had been negatively referring to the king, they would have been edited or removed. The government, however, recently went one step further, invoking criminal law rather than media law against a man for writing about political corruption in Morocco's government. Rachid Nini, editor of the newspaper *Al Massae*, was jailed in 2011 for one year. Prior to that, two weekly newspapers were forced to shut down because of what they chose to publish.[77] This is why, in the past couple of years, groups involved in the 20 February Movement and former Moroccan journalists have utilized Facebook, YouTube, and various blogs to ensure that their uncensored writings might be seen by as many people as possible.[78/79]

Although King Mohammed VI has made constitutional changes that should ease the government's grip on the media, not everyone is mollified, including journalists, the protestors from the 20 February Movement, and especially the Berber people. In a recent article on hespress.com, the Royal Institute of Cultural Alomazagh (IRCAM) was calling the government to task for not following through with Chapter V of the 2011 Constitution.[80] This article in the constitution stated that Tamazight would be integrated into all aspects of the public sector, including such institutions as the justice system and healthcare. IRCAM was also unhappy with the rate that Tamazight is being integrated into the media.[81] For example, the radio currently has allotted times for each of the three Berber dialects on the air, but not for more than half an hour each.[82]

It was in the 1960s that Arab-speakers started their modern repression of the Berber culture across North Africa by reducing the Berber radio station to four hours a day, banning the use of Berber names for children, and stopping many of the festivals and music performances.[83] According to Brett and Fentress, their actions caused a "destabilization of the national sentiment," which, until then, had been "strong" among the Berbers.[84] The final straw for the *Amazigh* came in 1980, when the University of Algiers cancelled a Berber poetry reading by Mouloud Mammeri. This evoked one of the first Berber Springs. The Amazigh Movement spread from Algeria to Morocco and Libya, and it helped to prompt more Berber literature and poetry.[85] In the mid-nineties, a group of men published an *Amazigh* journal called *Tifinagh*, while another group outside of the capital, Rabat, began publishing Tifawt, or "Morning Light." Both journals aimed to revive the Berber language among the general public since Berber was a forgotten

language outside of the *Amazigh* communities. The publication of these journals, however, was eventually shut down.[86]

This was one of the many reasons why, in 2011, Morocco's Berbers took to the streets protesting their cultural repression and continued near-invisibility to the government. They wanted economic stability, recognition as equals to the Arabs in the country, and for their language to be recognized as a national language alongside Arabic. This would be a step toward adding to press freedom and equality of information since many Berbers do not read, speak, or write in Arabic.[87]

While the Moroccan media is actually willing to broadcast information on potentially touchy or liberal subjects, including the Berber Movement and the Arab Spring, true freedom of the press is still not a reality. The Berbers are still unrepresented in the media, and the government has a monopoly on the content of all state- and privately owned media. Though only time will tell, the Internet may be the future of Morocco's media for those who wish to escape the king and his Press Law.

Women and Morocco

Women's rights and gender equality are hot-button issues in many of today's western countries and are gaining some recognition in Islamic countries, as well. Morocco has undergone much reform through the Berber and Arab Springs of recent years.[88] A topic under discussion during these events, which was not very well known by the rest of the world, was improving women's rights.[89] There have been few attempts for Moroccan women to organize support to gain more rights, but before turning to that, it is important to consider just what "women's rights" can (and cannot) mean for a Muslim woman.

It is a common stereotype that Muslim women are typically seen as inferior to men. This is true for Morocco, even as it is rightfully considered much more liberal than other countries such as Saudi Arabia and Algeria. In numerous Islamic countries, women have less access to rights such as owning property.[90] Focus especially falls on women without the right to choose whom they want to marry. There is a concern that along with arranged marriages, there is a chance of becoming stuck in an abusive relationship.[91] The greatest concern for women in Morocco has been gaining the ability to initiate a divorce rather than that right being reserved exclusively for men. A man in Morocco can initiate a divorce in a much simpler manner than women are able to.[92] A man is able to divorce his wife on the grounds that she was not able to produce a male child, but women are required to give a more legitimate reason.[93]

While conducting an interview with one Moroccan woman, we learned about some of the happenings within the country concerning women's rights. She told us that Morocco has made a lot of improvements for women's rights and is providing more opportunities for women. Some of the rights women have gained include the rights to get a divorce, to work outside of the home, and to pursue higher education.[94] Typically, girls do not attend school after finishing primary school, but in more urban areas this is changing. Many women are venturing out and attending institutions of higher education so that they can have more opportunities in their lives.[95]

There is a huge concern about domestic violence in Morocco, and

this is especially true in more recent times. In one story, a young woman was raped and was then forced to marry her rapist because she was considered to be impure since she lost her virginity before marriage.[96] A Moroccan court issued an order for 16-year old Amina Filali to marry the man that violated her. She ended up committing suicide over the situation, and her attacker denied having done anything wrong.[97] This caused a major uproar among the female population of the country and around the world. Additionally, much scrutiny has come upon marriages in Morocco, and it has been found that, in 2010 alone, over 41,000 marriages involved a minor.[98] Due to this information becoming public, the attention has turned to an old French/Moroccan Clause in the country's criminal code. Clause 475 states that a man is allowed to marry a minor only if he is her abductor and she has agreed to run away with him.[99] This clause is enacted to save the honor of the girl and her family and is known as the rapist's escape clause. It is viewed as a trap clause in the Moroccan penal code because it values the word of the rapist over that of the victim in regard to consent, all prosecution of the rapist is avoided, and the victim gets married.[100]

Virginity is highly valued among Muslim women because it is considered desirable for marriage. Muslim men want to marry a woman who is thereby considered "pure," and there is even an entire purification ritual that women in Morocco have to undergo before their wedding ceremony.[101] This desirable attribute for marriage essentially means that if a woman is no longer a virgin, then she is no longer eligible for marriage. Not being able to get married would make a woman unable to live on her own. In the case of Filali, she was raped and then forced to marry her attacker because he took her virginity, so he was the only man that she was allowed to marry.[102] Her suicide was a great cause for concern in Morocco because it brought a lot of attention from the media on the issues that women within Morocco face.

Many women also face instances of domestic violence in their marriages and have no way to leave. They are completely dependent on their husbands, so they are unable to get out. Unfortunately, there has not been much progress made within the realm of domestic violence against women since 1957.[103] In 2004, a reform was made concerning rape, but the burden of proof for the victim is that she has to prove there was an attack or she will be charged with debauchery herself.[104] The laws in Morocco are considered very outdated and very much against the recent Moroccan ideal of change and progress that came with the governmental reform of the 20 February Movement.

The 20 February Movement really was the stepping-stone that women's rights groups needed to bring public attention to their issues. Women in Morocco have very different ideas of what rights they would like to gain when compared to western women. The biggest concerns for women in Morocco are related to marriage or dealing with gaining rights for married women.[105] Many married women are not allowed to work after they get married, so they become responsible for household duties such as cooking, cleaning, and raising children.[106] It may seem strange to Western women that it is not a priority in Morocco for women to gain the right to vote along with other such rights, but this is not what is important to Muslim women. It is possible that one day Moroccan women will be

fighting for those rights, but for now the focus is on gaining more recognition by the government to have their local issues be heard.

Because of the recent events in Morocco, there has been a serious call for reforms in many aspects of life, but none so needed as women's rights. The women of Morocco have begun to stand up to the oppressive nature of the law and want the attitude toward women within the country to reach better standards.[107] Filali was not the first woman to commit suicide rather than marry her rapist, and the fear is that she will not be the last until something is done to change the law. Riding on the coattails of the 20 February Movement has seemed to give women's rights advocates the push that they so desperately needed to gain more national and international attention about the severity of what really goes on behind closed doors. The biggest concern now seems to be the resistance that may come from the now Islamist-led government of Morocco. There have been reports saying that clause 475 will not be repealed just because of international attention and public opinion.[108] This may come as a shock to many Western people because in societies like the United States, most reforms pass due to public opinion. This is not the way that Morocco is run, but it seems as though the present king may be attempting to change that. Time can only tell if he will be successful and if conditions for women will get any better.

Moroccan Education

While traveling in Morocco, we noticed how many people appreciate and value schools and education. Children walk for miles to go to school, where they often learn two or three languages. It was only in 2007 that the nine-year basic education program became mandatory. Before this national dictate was issued, many children received little or no schooling, perhaps the reason for only a fifty-six percent literacy rate.[109] In a country with such a high illiteracy rate, education is very important. At least two of our guides were children before the education mandate was issued. It was not uncommon for them to miss a few days out of the week during the planting or harvest season to assist their parents in the fields or manage the home, which is one reason why it is difficult for children in rural communities to obtain an education as good as those received by children in the cities. Many parents often have to choose between risking starvation and supporting their children's education. Imminent survival depending on a good harvest is more important than an education, even though it often leads to a less successful future. One interviewee stated that while their teachers understood, it was still difficult to catch up on what they missed. However, he did not seem to mind this, attributing it to just the way life goes and the fact that it is necessary for their families' survival.[110]

Mandatory schooling is not welcomed by all; many parents disapprove and do not understand why school is necessary. They believe that their children will be farmers like them and do not view education, which most of them had not received themselves, as valuable. To them, it is more useful for them to learn trade skills, which are considered more practical. Without proper encouragement, their children will not believe that their education is important and will not devote time and resources to it. This attitude toward education could affect many generations and lead to a continuous cycle of poverty

and illiteracy. For example, we visited a Berber family who sustain themselves by selling ceramics and by small-scale farming. Pottery was a matriarchal skill that was passed down through generations. It is currently being taught to the granddaughters, who are about six and nine years old. Though we visited in the middle of the day, the eldest was not in school, presumably taken out to assist and charm our visiting group while we tried our hand at making pots. This is not an uncommon practice throughout Morocco and is widely accepted. Morocco has one of the highest child labor rates in the Middle East and North Africa. Government statistics suggest that at least eleven percent of children age seven to fourteen are involved in economic activity, which diverts their attention away from academic pursuits.[111]

Unfortunately, circumstances for children can be much worse than working alongside their family. Between 10,000 and 14,000 children, both Berber and Arab, live on the city streets, having left their families because of abusive parents or unavailable financial support. The only education they have is the little they received before they left their homes. Without any practical skills or basic schooling, they do menial labor or are reduced to begging. Though many claim to be happier on the streets than they were in their prior lives, they face many hardships. They commonly fall into bad habits, such as smoking or sniffing glue and sleeping on benches in public gardens or in the streets. Politicians, rather than advocating their cause, exploit them in their political campaigns. The government has initiated a number of projects to address the issue, but the projects have a low success rate because of insufficient money and trained staff, a common tendency for children's developmental aid.[112]

One solution for child labor in Morocco is improving education and giving children more opportunities to learn. The United States Department of Labor funded the Combating Child Labor through Education in Morocco (Dima-Adros) Project from September 2007 to October 2010. The United States gave three million dollars to the project, and "the goal of Dima-Adros was to reduce the incidence of exploitive child labor in Morocco by withdrawing or preventing 8,000 children from engaging in exploitive child labor and providing them with educational opportunities."[113] The project was implemented mainly in northern Morocco and involved tutoring, providing transportation to school, and vocational training. By October 2010, Dima-Adros exceeded its goal by withdrawing and preventing a total of 8,274 children from child labor.[114] More than half of those children were girls, and the project helped to change some of the attitudes toward child labor among parents. The Combating Child Labor through Education in Morocco Project was successful in its ambitions, but Morocco still has many children who lack an education and work in dangerous conditions.

In some rural areas, such as the Zawiya Ahansal region of the Central High Atlas Mountains, the education system is nearly nonexistent. Due to the remoteness of the area, very little developmental aid has been given by the government.[115] The few schools available are in a deplorable state, and nearly one-hundred percent of women are illiterate, preventing them from participating within the modern market. Unfortunately, "many children—particularly girls in rural areas—do not attend school, and most of those who do, drop out after

elementary school." An elementary school education does not often lead to a successful and promising life. In the past, rural children were educated in the mosque, where the *fqih* focused on religious instruction and rudimentary mathematics, which were thought to be necessary for village life. However, it has become apparent that there will not be enough land to support the upcoming generation. Many will have to move to the cities to seek employment and will require new skills to join the urban workforce.[116]

Today, the country schools are constructed by the local men of the village, but the children struggle to learn due to multiple factors. The government sends basic school supplies and a teacher to each schoolhouse. However, a disconnect between the needs of the village and the plans of the government often appears. It is very difficult for Berber children, who oftentimes are taught by a teacher who only speaks Arabic and French, and the teacher is often completely unintelligible to the children and their parents. Many teachers' "attempts to conduct class were hampered by an absolute inability of most of the students to understand anything" they were saying. The teacher usually finds it very difficult to teach the children Arabic script, especially with the books that the government provides, which are designed for urban children and show pictures of things that the children cannot identify, such as stoplights and refrigerators. This becomes frustrating for both parties, resulting in a high truancy rate and the schoolteacher cancelling or shortening the school day.[117] Examples like this are typical across the countryside. One Moroccan man experienced something similar to this in first grade. His teacher was monolingual and ineffective at teaching him Arabic or any other basic curriculum. The schoolbooks he was given were confusing and ineffective. Without much hope of learning, he and his peers would entertain themselves throughout the day by making fun of the teacher in Tamazight, which she could not understand. Perhaps realizing the fruitlessness of her efforts, the schoolteacher quit and went back to the city, and he and the other students were without a teacher for a few months.[118]

With the country filled with diverse tongues, Tamazight is still a barrier between some Berbers and Arabs, as shown with the schoolchildren and the teacher. After the 20 February Movement, the king "included a constitutional amendment to make the Berber language, Tamazight, an official language alongside Arabic." However, when Rayssa Fatima Tabaamrant asked the Minister of National Education, Mohammed al Wafa, a question in her native Berber tongue, the minister was baffled, unable to understand her language. Perhaps embarrassed, he later countered that the government has devoted many resources and infrastructures to teach Tamazight throughout the country.[119]

Morocco promised to allow the Berbers the freedom to use Tamazight in schools in 1994. However, it was not until September 15, 2003 that the language was introduced to 317 primary schools across the country on a trial basis with the promise that it would be a part of the curriculum in all schools by 2013.[120] There has, in fact, been a significant effort on behalf of the government. Over 454,000 students were taught a dialect of Berber in 4,000 schools, a total of fifteen percent of students. They are taught by 14,000 teachers, who are, in turn, monitored by 300 inspectors.[121] Multiple Moroccan Berbers stated

that the Berber language and writing was now being taught in schools, which should be very helpful for Berber students and for people who want to learn about the Berbers. Now that Tamazight is being taught, there could be more teachers in the future who speak and understand it, and Berber children could be taught in their first language.[122]

Although this gives Moroccans hope, the call for educational reform has not been completely answered. Out of the fourteen countries in the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa), Morocco is ranked eleventh, spending an average of $525 per student per year. Comparatively, Tunisia spends $700 and has found that improving the education system over the past twenty years has been worth the investment, both socially and economically. Proper schooling for the population expands the middle class, which currently comprises of only fifty-three percent of Moroccans, and shrinks the lower class, which is thirty-four percent of the remaining population.[123] Further evidence of the governmental intervention has been challenging to find. Though the Moroccan government has become progressively more liberal since Mohammed VI ascended the throne, especially in comparison to other Islamic countries, the lack of available documentation makes it difficult to tell how many resources have been devoted to educational reform.

On the other hand, the private sector has begun to follow the king's initiative. The Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur (BMCE Bank) Foundation, led by Othman Benjelloun, chairman and CEO, established the Medersat.com Project in 2000. The charity establishes schools in remote villages across the country, supplying each with power, water, and teachers. Each teacher is professionally trained and speaks the local language, whether Arabic or Tamazight, in addition to French. These schools are also instrumental to community development. After classes, the classrooms are teeming with local villagers. The schools offer a meeting place for village meetings and businesses, as well as adult education and training, in an attempt to address Morocco's high illiteracy rate.[124] Local villages are vital to the life of any school. The actual school is typically built by local laborers on donated village land in the center of the town. The building uses the customary architectural style and building materials, echoing local traditions. The foundation is attempting to integrate education into the villagers' lives by incorporating their voices and heritage in decisions. According to a BMCE Bank Foundation representative, the goal is to "finish the work and give [them] the keys, because these are [their] walls, [their] land, and [their] children." As of 2004, five local management committees have been established.[125] By 2004, the foundation had committed $15 million for rural schools and their communities, starting fifty-five schools are spread over thirty of Morocco's provinces. There were 6,539 primary and preschool students enrolled, and over 5,000 adults had taken advantage of the offered literacy training.[126] The quality of education has improved, in part because of the introduction of teachers who speak the regional language or dialect. Two students from Medersat.com schools won first and third place in the National Tifinagh 2012 Olympics. The effort of the private sector has given rural Moroccans hope. These new endeavors are especially encouraging for the Berbers, whose culture has been repressed in the past, but now, as expressed by Leila Mezian Benjelloun, former

member of the Board of Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture, "Now we can all congratulate ourselves for having finally found the path that will lead to a better future. Now, all Moroccans can learn the Amazigh language as they learn the Arabic language, and appropriate history, civilization, and culture Amazight."[127]

Conclusion

The 20 February Movement was Morocco's version of the Arab Spring, and through careful organization and a motivated youth, the country pulled off one of the more peaceful of the Arab Springs in a troubled region. The outcome of such a monumental event affected the country in many ways: economically, politically, and through education and women's rights. Media played a major role in organizing the event, and the Moroccan police, unlike other countries' police and military, allowed the citizens to protest and air some of their grievances. However, through both our research and our short time in the country, we know that Morocco is still a long way from being everything the Moroccan youth, or the Berber participants, want it to be.

Our time in Morocco changed many of the preconceived notions of what we believed we would find in a country with economic issues, a new constitution, and a group fighting for recognition within the country. Where we may have expected to find disdain for the king, we found only praise for the monarch and what he tried to do. Many of those we talked to were satisfied with the changes that had been made to the country and had hope for a better future. Some even worried at the pace of change, thinking it was already too rapid. Even though our purpose was to collect information regarding the 20 February Movement, we came away with so much more in terms of the history between the Berbers and Arabs, their current feelings towards one another, the divide of opinions between the older generations and the younger generations in Morocco, and how the country is handling change.

End Notes

[1] Person E, individual discussion with Gilbert Hall. May 20, 2012.

[2] Person D, individual discussion with Gilbert Hall, May 17, 2012.

[3] Emma Schwartz, "Morocco's Berbers Reclaim their Language and their Indigenous Culture" USNews (2008); available from http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/03/13/moroccos-berbers-reclaim-their-language-and-their-indigenous-culture-?page=2; accessed November 19, 2012.

[4] U.S., Library of Congress, *Country Profile: Morocco*, Federal Research Division (2006); available from http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Morocco.pdf; accessed 8 June 2012.

[5] *Ibid.*, accessed 8 June 2012.

[6] Lisa Abend, "Reforming Morocco: Taking Apart the King's Speech" *Time World* (March 2011); http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2058141,00.html; accessed 8 June 2012.

[7] *Ibid.*, accessed 8 June 2012.

[8] Person D, individual discussion with Gilbert Hall, May 16, 2012.

[9] Michael Peyron Ph.D, individual discussion with Gilbert Hall, May 21, 2012.

[10] "Morocco," *New York Times*, last modified December 10, 2012; available from http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/morocco/index.html; accessed June 8, 2012.

[11] Person D, individual discussion with Gilbert Hall, May 17, 2012. Confirmed in some of the articles amassed by HIST 483 students..

[12] Schwartz, "Morocco's Berbers Reclaim their Language and their Indigenous Culture"

[13] Person E, individual discussion with Gilbert Hall. May 20, 2012

[14] Siham Ali, "Morocco Faces Criticism Over Anti-Corruption Efforts" *All Africa* (2012); available from http://allafrica.com/stories/201211070956.html; accessed November 19, 2012.

[15] Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook: Morocco* (2012); available from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html; accessed June 9, 2012.

[16] The World Bank, "Morocco: Country Brief" (April 2012); available from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/morocco/overview; accessed June 9, 2012.

[17] Person J, individual discussion with Gilbert Hall, May 19, 2012.

[18] *Al Jazeera*, "Moroccans Burn Selves in Unemployment Protest," January 20, 2012; available from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/01/20121192320413900.html; accessed June 9, 2012.

[19] David Crawford, "How 'Berber' Matters in the Middle of Nowhere," in *The Amazigh Studies Reader* (Ifrane: al-Akhawayn University, 2006), 285-297. Crawford gives a full account of the continuing Arabic influence on native Moroccan Berbers since their Islamization. Berbers, or "Maghrebi" have endured some isolation because of their inability to read and write Arabic in the past.

[20] *Al Jazeera*, "Mass anti-government protest in Morocco," May 28, 2012; available from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/05/20125282530957495.html; accessed June 7, 2012. This article detailed a very recent protest against the Moroccan government. Angered citizens (mostly young people aged 18-29) continue to petition their government for change, even sixteen months after their initial "20 February Movement." Many young people boycotted voting in the last election, but that still does not stop them from demanding new government officials.

[21] Person F, individual discussion with Ashley McGee, May 2012.

[22] Maati Monjib and James Liddell, "Morocco's King Mohammed VI: 10 Years and Counting," *Brookings*, last modified August 5, 2009; available from http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/08/05-morocco-monjib; accessed June 7, 2012. Monjib and Liddell praise Mohammed VI for his work at expanding the free press and guaranteeing Moroccans the freedom of association. Thanks to the king's dedication to personal liberties, Morocco is much closer to being an open, democratically ruled and prosperous society.

[23] Person B, individual discussion with Ashley McGee, October 2012.

[24] *The Economist*, "Morocco's Monarchy: Reform or Fall," April 20, 2011; available from http://www.economist.com/node/18587225. The king discussed better reforms at first, but within weeks he had changed his mind. He agreed to a much more radical change of the government's structure, and much more recognition for Berbers as Moroccan citizens.

[25] *Ibid.*, The attitudes between leaders and protesters have evolved over time. The two groups are more apt to suspect one another, with prosecutions taking place on some occasions.

[26] U.S. Department of State, "*Background Note: Morocco*," Bureau of Near East Affairs (2012); available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.html; accessed May 9, 2012. This customary title for Morocco's king places the king as a spiritual leader over all his constituents, or subjects. He is considered a religious authority as royalty; he is also highly honored as a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad as well.

[27] Person F, individual discussion with Ashley McGee, May 2012.

[28] Person A, individual discussion with Ashley McGee, May 2012.

[29] Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook: Morocco.* Shariah law is the Islamic family code of law. While Morocco abides by shariah law, they interpret it very moderately. They also use elements of French civil law to fill in the cultural and generational gaps in the religious law.

[30] U.S. Department of State, "*Background Note: Morocco*." These 'absolutist' powers are still enjoyed by Morocco's King Mohammed VI. His royal decree can bring about whatever course of action he desires, if he so chooses to enact it. Many government officials that were formerly chosen by royal appointment are now elected by popular vote, but the king still has the ultimate say over who stays in his service and who is let go.

[31] Person H, individual discussion with Ashley McGee, May 2012

[32] "Mass anti-government protest in Morocco." This "nearly fifty percent" statistic is likely exaggerated, but there are certainly young people leaving universities that have no job opportunities. Obviously, these educated men and women feel cheated of the standard of living they worked to earn.

[33] "Moroccans burn selves in unemployment protest," (Accessed May 11, 2012). This statistic of thirty percent unemployment among young adults is much more plausible than "nearly half."

[34] Person D, individual discussion with Ashley McGee, May 2012.

[35] "Morocco's Monarchy: Reform or Fall." *The Economist* warns of the possibly impending doom if demonstrators' anger continues to mount in Rabat. The most freedom hungry citizens have not been pacified by any reforms carried out by the king, his administration, or the elected members of Parliament.

[36] Fouad Oujani, "The sacred king," *Emaj Magazine*, March 14, 2012; available from http://emajmagazine.com/2012/03/14/the-sacred-king/; accessed June 8, 2012. Mohammed VI was accused of making hasty reforms to "buy time" and continue to preserve his dynasty.

[37] "How Many #Feb20 Movements Are There Morocco? We've got a list," *Moroccans For Change*, March 31, 2011; available from http://moroccansforchange.com/2011/03/31/how-many-feb20-movements-are-there-morocco-weve-got-a-list/; accessed June 7, 2012. This site's creators encouraged all their fellow countrymen and women to stand up for their freedom. They encouraged opposing groups to continue on their opposing paths, as long as they were challenging the government's longstanding opposition of individual liberties.

[38] Jamal Elabiad, "What Will Happen if Moroccans Take to the Streets?" *Talk Morocco*, accessed June 9, 2012, http://www.talkmorocco.net/articles/2011/02/what-will-happen-if-moroccans-take-to-the-streets/. Elabiad correctly predicted that the Moroccan administration in Rabat would have to plan strategically to stay alive in the political scene.

[39] Person C, individual discussion with Ashley McGee, May 2012

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] "Morocco's Monarchy: Reform or Fall." This held true with every person encountered in Morocco, whether young or old, male or female. Demographics did not seem to matter. The Moroccan people simply respect the persona of their monarch.

[42] Oujani, "The sacred king." It seems to be the societal consensus that a right ruling monarch is deserving of honor and respect. His prophetic heritage always continues to play a leading role, as well.

[43] BBC News, "Q&A: Morocco's referendum on reform," last modified June 29, 2011; available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13964550. Referring to the monarch as sacred infuriated activists; it elevated his social status so high above his subjects'. I am not speaking of material things when I say he was formerly a golden calf, untouchable by law or statute.

[44] *Ibid.,* While this language might seem like an improvement on the surface, it does not change the legality of the matter. The king remains technically above the law, because no one can actually legally oppose his wishes or commands.

[45] Oujani, "The sacred king." This was not just a revolt against flowery language describing the king; it was religiously and socially charged as well. Obviously, no one is truly sacred or inviolable within Islam save for god and his prophet, Muhammad. This gave the people even more moral grounds to object to the king's privileged status.

[46] Brian Chapman, "The Police-State." *Government and Opposition*, 3, No. 4 (1968), 428-440.

[47] *Ibid.,* 431.

[48] *Ibid.*, 438-439.

[49] Chapman, "The Police-State," 431.

[50] *Ibid.*, 431-32.

[51] U.S., Library of Congress, *Country Profile: Morocco*, accessed 8 June 2012.

[52] Person A, individual discussion with Charles Vancampen, 16 May 2012

[53] Person C, individual discussion with Charles Vancampen, 22 May 2012.

[54] Person C, individual discussion with Charles Vancampen, 15 May 2012.

[55] Person C, individual discussion with Charles Vancampen, 26 May 2012.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] Person E, individual discussion with Charles Vancampen, 24 May 2012.

[58] Person E, individual discussion with Charles Vancampen, 13 May 2012.

[59] Person E, individual discussion with Charles Vancampen, 19 May 2012.

[60] Person E, individual discussion with Charles Vancampen, 24 May 2012.

[61] Michael Peyron, Ph.D, individual discussion with Charles Vancampen, 21 May 2012.

[62] Person G, individual discussion with Charles Vancampen, 22 May 2012.

[63] U.S. Department of State. *"Background Note: Morocco,"* September 11, 2012, available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5431.htm (Accessed May 9, 2012).

[64] "Morocco: Reform on the way?" *Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural*, 48, no. 2 (2011).

[65] "Morocco: Prison for Rapper Who Criticized Police," *Human Rights Watch*, last modified May 22 2012, http://www.hrw9.org /news/ 2012/05/12/ morocco-prison-rapper-who-criticized-police (Accessed June 9, 2012)

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *Ibid.*

[68] Jillian C. York, "Morocco's uphill struggle for media reform: In the absence of reliable and impartial mainstream media, citizen journalism steps in to fill the void," *Al Jazeera*, 5 June 2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ opinion/2011/05/201152614181025273 4.html (Accessed 7 June 2012).

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] Safi Naciri, "Media law in Morocco discussed at MDI Round Table Debate," *Media Diversity Institute*, 2 March 2012. http://www.media-diversity.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2165:media-law-in-morocco-discussed-at-mdi-roundtable-debate&catid=15:mdi-news&Itemid=33 (Accessed 1 November 2012).

[71] Kristen McTighe, "Moroccan Youth Demands Action, Not Words," *The New York Times*, 2011; http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/world/middleeast/12iht-M12-MOROCCO-MOVEMENT.html?pagewanted=all; Internet; accessed 8 May 2012.

[72] "King Mohammed VI Speech on Proposed Constitution 6/17/11 (full text)," *Moroccans for Change*, June 17, 20122; http://moroccansforchange.com/2011/06/17/king-mohammed-vi-speech-on-proposed -constitution-61711-full-text-feb20-khitab (Accessed 1 November 2012).

[73] *Draft of Moroccan Constitution*, Jefri J. Ruchti, trans., 10 William S. Hein & Co., Inc.; www.ancl-radc.org.za/sites/default/files/ morocco_eng.pdf (Accessed 7 June 2012).

[74] *Ibid.*, 38.

[75] "Morocco Profile," *BBC News*, 22 August 2012. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14123019 (Accessed 1 November 2012).

[76] *Le Matin*, http://www.lematin.ma (Accessed 12 November 2012).

[77] "Freed Moroccan journalist remains defiant," *Al Jazeera*, 28 April 2012. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/ 20124281889790655.html (Accessed 1 November 2012).

[78] McTighe, "Moroccan Youth."

[79] Hasna Ankal, "Aboubakr Jamai: 'Morocco is a country worth following,'" *Emaj Magazine*, 25 July 2012. http://emajmagazine.com/2012/07/25/aboubakr-jamai-morocco-is-a-country-worth-following (Accessed 1 November 2012).

[80] "IRCAM Corresponds with the Government on a vision for the institutionalization of the Amazigh," *Hespress*, 2012; http://hespress.com/tamazight/55855.html (Accessed 7 June 2012), trans. by Google Translate.

[81] *Ibid.*

[82] Michael Peyron, Ph.D., individual discussion without Amanda Tharp, May 21, 2012.

[83] *Ibid.*

[84] Michael Brett & Elizabeth Fentress, *The Berbers* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1997), 274.

[85] *Ibid.*, 1.

[86] Michael Peyron, Ph.D., individual discussion without Amanda Tharp, May 21, 2012.

[87] Paul Schemm, "A year on, Morocco's democracy movement founders," *The Guardian,* 2012; http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/ 10100697 (Accessed 8 May 2012).

[88] Paul Schemm, "North Africa's Berbers get boost from Arab Spring," *Fox News*, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/05/05/north-africa-berbers-get-boost-from-arab-spring (Accessed 22 December 2012).

[89] Kerry Hill, "Moroccan pioneer in women's rights to speak on aftermath of Arab Spring," *University of Wisconsin-Madison*, http://www.news.wisc.edu/21193 (Accessed 22 December 2012).

[90] Harold D. Nelson, *Morocco: A Country Study* (Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1985), 75.

[91] Fatima Outaleb, "Women's Rights in Morocco: from private to public sphere," *Common Ground News Service*, http://www.commongroundnews.org/article.php?id=30636%26lan=en; Internet; accessed 26 December 2012.

[92] Nelson, *Morocco*, 75.

[93] *Ibid.*, 76.

[94] Person E, individual discussion with Jamie Leeuwrik, 24 May 2012.

[95] *Ibid.*

[96] Delia Lloyd, "Marrying Your Rapist: a new low in women's rights in Morocco," *The Washington Post*, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/ she-the-people/post/marrying-your-rapist-a-new-low-in-womens-rights-in-morocco/2012/03/19/gIQAEC27RS_blog.html (Accessed 27 December 2012.

[97] Afua Hirsch, "Moroccan Teenager's Death Puts Focus on Women's Rights," *The Guardian*, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/03/ moroccan-teenager-death-women-rights (Accessed 19 February 2013).

[98] *Ibid.*

[99] *Ibid.*

[100] *Ibid.*

[101] Nelson, *Morocco*, 75.

[102] Lloyd, "Marrying your rapist."

[103] Outaleb, "Women's Rights in Morocco."

[104] Lloyd, "Marrying your rapist."

[105] Driss Benmhend, "Women's Rights in Morocco," *Wafin: Moroccan Connections in America*, http://www.wafin.com/benmhend2.phtml (Accessed 28 December 2012).

[106] Nelson, *Morocco*, 75.

[107] Hirsch, "Moroccan Teenager's Death Puts Focus on Women's Rights."

[108] *Ibid.*

[109] "UNESCO Institute for Lifelong Learning," Innovative Literacy and Post-literacy Project: Means of Socio-economic Empowerment and Integration for Women in Morocco," last modified 30 June 2011, http://www.unesco.org/ uil/litbase/?menu=4&programme=68; (Accessed 11 November 2012).

[110] Person B, individual discussion with Kasey Dye, 20 May 2012.

[111] "What Changes?," *Moroccans For Change*, http://moroccansforchange.com/ current-protests/ (Accessed 8 June 2012).

[112] "Nobody's Constituency," Al Jazeera English, last modified 9 September 2007, http://www.aljazeera.com/cfocus/moroccoelections2007/ 2007/09/200852518465270 4902.html (Accessed 9 June 2012).

[113] "Independent Final Evaluation of Combating Child Labor Through Education in Morocco (Project Dima-Adros)," *The United States Department of Labor*, 11.

[114] *Ibid.*

[115] Erickson Creative Group, "Library for 10,000 Moroccans," *Global Giving*, last modified 2007, http://www.globalgiving.org/projects/help-rebuild-library-in-morocco/ (Accessed 8 June 2012).

[116] David Crawford, "How 'Berber' Matters in the Middle of Nowhere," *The Amazigh Studies Reader*, ed. Michael Peyron (Ifrane: al-Akhawayn University, 2006), 290.

[117] *Ibid.*

[118] Person B, individual discussion with Jenny Nehrt, 19 May 2012.

[119] *Ibid.*

[120] "Tamazight (Berber) Online Resources," Temehu, *Berber Education: Tamazight Universities, Schools, Courses & Online Resources,* last modified 2012, http://www.temehu.com/ima zighen/education.htm (Accessed 7 November 2012).

[121] Loubna Flah, "Morocco: MP Addresses Minister of National Education in Tamazight During Parliamentary Session," Morocco World News, last modified 4 May 2012, http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2012/05/38050/morocco-mp-addresses-minister-of-national-education-in-berber-during-parliamentary-session/ (Accessed 8 June 2012).

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[123] The Moroccan Educational System and the Middle Classes," *Institut Amadeus*, last modified 3 June 2012, http://www.amadeusonline.org/en/publications/the-moroccan-middle-class/89-le-systeme-educatif-marocain-et-les-classes-moyennes.html (Accessed 8 June 2012).

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[125] *Ibid.*

[126] *Ibid.*

[127] Jihane Gattioui, "L'IRCAM décerne son grand prix du mérite à Leïla Mezian Benjelloun," *La Matin*, 15 November 2012, http://www.lematin.ma/journal/Promotion-de-la-culture-amazighe_L-IRCAM-decerne-son-grand-prix-du-merite--a-Leila-Mezian-Benjelloun/174121.html (Accessed 27 November 2012).

Photographer:

Emily Poulin

"1501 North 22nd Street"
2013

Like many neighborhoods within cities in America, Union Hill of Richmond was built quickly with many homes of the same style. Each home was built primarily with the same standardized materials to ensure affordability for the average middle class families that were hoping to settle in a prosperous capitalist town. The series depicts a catalogue of the once thriving community in its current state of 37% vacant residential properties., while also representing other areas across the country, that suffer from the same economic issue of vacant properties. These properties become not only an eyesore for the community, but also detrimental to the economy.

Photographer:

Michael Kropf

"1959-1964 Farmville Baptist Church"
2013

My work is about connecting the present to the past by documenting places that would seem ordinary, but have played an important role in history. Both African American and white children were affected by the Prince Edward County School Board's decision to close down its schools in 1959. These children were forced to spend the next five years learning in "Training Schools" and makeshift classrooms in the basements of churches, recreational centers and in some cases their own homes. While some of the students claim they were unaffected by this deficiency in their education others wonder in what direction their lives could have gone had they received a proper education. By photographing these locations I am giving the viewer a chance to experience an otherwise mundane space in a way that will convey an understanding of its historical significance.

Improving Performance of Arbitrary Precision Arithmetic Using SIMD Assembly Code Instructions

Nick Pastore

Dr. Robert Marmorstein, faculty advisor

Introduction

Most processors are designed to work best with numbers of a fixed size. This size is known as the word size of the computer, which is typically 32 or 64 bits on modern systems. This is perfectly reasonable for most applications because of the constraints of an average person's computer usage. a typical web page will not have more than two million characters. It is unlikely that a user would have more than two million e-mails in his or her account. For some applications, however, the word size is a serious limiting factor. This is especially true in scientific research, which often requires more than 64 bits of precision. In simulations of chaotic systems, even a tiny rounding error can have drastic consequences. Word size can also be important for more practical applications. For example, the public key cryptography algorithms used to secure nearly all shopping and banking websites involve manipulating integers with thousands of digits.

For these applications, it is important to have algorithms that efficiently implement arbitrary precision arithmetic. Calculations involving large numbers must be reduced to word-sized chunks that the computer can handle. One naïve approach is to use the simple techniques taught in grade school (called "schoolboy algorithms"). This works, but it has less than ideal performance. Schoolboy multiplication, for example, is an $O(n^2)$-time algorithm. As a result, finding newer, more efficient ways to perform these arbitrary precision calculations is an ongoing area of research. In this project, we introduce a set of improved algorithms for performing arbitrary precision arithmetic using a special class of assembly instructions known as Single Input, Multiple Data (SIMD) instructions.

Background

There has been a significant amount of work in the area of making arbitrary precision arithmetic as fast as possible. For example, the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP) is a mature, open-source programming library used by software packages such as Maple [1] and Mathematica [2] for its extremely efficient arbitrary precision arithmetic.

GMP obtains its efficiency in two ways. The first is by using advanced algorithms [3]. The schoolboy algorithms taught in elementary school work, but they are very simple. GMP uses more complex algorithms that are more efficient, especially for very large numbers. For example, GMP uses the Karatsuba, Toom-Cook, and Schönhage–Strassen algorithms[4] for multiplication, which improves the time complexity from $O(n^2)$ to $O(n \log n \log \log n)$ in the best case. Furthermore, it uses the size of the operands to select the most appropriate algorithm. The other way GMP gains efficiency is by using highly optimized code. The GMP code has been written to compile into as few assembly code instructions as possible. In fact, many of the base functions that the rest of GMP is built on are written in hand-optimized assembly code, which makes them very fast.

A complementary approach to speeding up arithmetic algorithms is to use SIMD instructions. SIMD instructions allow the computer to perform one operation on several sets of operands simultaneously. Intel's implementation of SIMD instructions are known as MMX and SSE. SSE works by "packing" the operands into 128-bit CPU registers reserved for these calculations and then operating on these registers. For example, four 32-bit integers

may be packed into one register and four into another. The 32-bit packed addition can be performed on the two 128-bit registers, and the results of the four individual additions are packed into the destination register. MMX works similarly, but it only uses 64-bit registers.

In theory, these instructions should be very useful for arbitrary precision arithmetic. Addition, for example, consists of doing a native addition for each word of the source operands. Adding several words simultaneously should be able to provide a speedup. However, at the moment, the GMP library does not make heavy use of SIMD.

Implementation

An ideal solution to this problem would be to add SIMD instructions to the existing GMP routines. GMP is open-source, so it is easy to submit patches to the project and have them incorporated into the code. Since GMP is widely used, these improvements would be immediately useful to the scientific and development communities.

Unfortunately, GMP is already highly optimized, and working with the code base requires an extremely intimate knowledge of the algorithms and practices used in its design. Therefore, we instead approached the problem by modifying a simpler arithmetic library developed as a course project. Internally, the library worked by storing integers of any size in a C++ vector of unsigned basic integers. It was capable of adding, subtracting, and multiplying these integers, and it used the schoolboy algorithms to do this.

The first was a simple library created for another class during the previous semester. This library was capable of basic arbitrary precision integer operations such as addition and multiplication. We rewrote the functions in this library to use SSE instructions to add or multiply two pairs of words at a time. While it is actually possible to add more than two pairs at once using SSE, it is not possible to perform multiplication of more than two pairs. Therefore, for consistency, we designed both algorithms to operate on two pairs.

We first implemented the functions in C++. After this was completed and thoroughly tested, we rewrote each C++ function in assembly language and introduced SSE instructions.

During this process, we encountered two problems. The first was that Intel's SSE instructions continue silently when overflow occurs in addition or subtraction, so there is no way to detect whether carrying or borrowing should be performed. To solve this problem, we introduced a workaround in which we used the most significant bit of every word as a "carry bit" which could be used for overflow detection. This solved the problem, but it reduced the efficiency of the algorithm because we had to operate on a slightly smaller number of bits at a time.

The other issue encountered was that the SSE instructions do not support borrowing. To solve this, we designed the library to perform borrowing manually. However, because the carry from the first operation must be calculated before the second operation can use it, this requires subtraction operations to be sequential and introduces an enormous performance hit.

Pseudocode for the addition operation is shown in Figure 1 below:

Move source operands into SSE register/Add incoming carry to first source register/Add source to destination (still in memory)/Move carry

bit from low to high word/Add carry bit to high word
Get outgoing carry bit from high word/Mask out carry bits from result/Store result back in memory

Figure 1. Addition using SSE instructions

Pseudocode for multiplication is given in Figure 2:

Zero out the registers to be used/ Move the source operands into SSE register/Move the destination operands into register/Move incoming carry into SSE register/Rearrange values within source register/ Rearrange values within destination register/Multiply values/Add incoming carry to low word/Get resulting carry and add it to high word/Store the outgoing carry/Store the result back in memory

Figure 2. Multiplication using SSE instructions

Results

To evaluate the performance improvement of our SSE library, we compared the runtime of a suite of benchmark programs using the SSE-optimized program, which used the original C++ library without SSE-optimization; and a program that used GMP version 5.0.1.

Our benchmarks included routines for calculating the factorial function and Ackermann's function. Performance on the factorial function is a good indicator of how efficiently the library implements multiplication, while Ackermann's function gives a good measure of how well the addition function performs. We performed thirty trials with select inputs for the functions. We found that the data varied very little (only by approximately 1.2 percent). To test whether the inputs had a significant impact on performance, we also conducted a single trial using a wide range of inputs for the functions.

The results are shown in Figures 3 and 4.





Conclusion

For Ackermann's function, the use of SSE instructions appears to give almost no speedup. Indeed, the speedup averages out to be approximately 1.00. For the factorial function, performance is actually worse. The library with SSE instructions was significantly slower, with an average speedup of approximately 0.63.

Overall, the use of SIMD instructions does not seem to provide significant speedup. The overhead from moving the data into SSE registers and implementing carrying and borrowing by hand outweighs the benefits of multiplying and adding multiple pairs of operands simultaneously. However, it is possible that a more efficient implementation of the borrowing and carrying operations could provide a speedup.

In future work, we would like to determine whether performance of the addition function can be improved by rewriting it to use the full four additions possible at once instead of only two. Doing four additions at once may actually provide enough of a speedup to outweigh the cost of sequential carries and setting up the SSE registers.

We would also like to examine ways to minimize the number of carries that must be done sequentially. When doing the multiplication, several words of one operand must all be multiplied by the same word of the other operand according to the distributive law. For this research, multiple words from the first operand were multiplied by one word of the second simultaneously because that required the least modification of the existing code. However, it is possible to multiply one word of the first operand by many of the second in each SSE instruction, and this would cause less overhead from sequential carrying because each word of the result would end up on a different line of the addition to follow the distributive multiplication of the operand, which could improve these results.

Another possible area of improvement would be to use SIMD instructions with recursive algorithms instead of iterative ones. Because recursive calls can be made independent of each other, there would be no sequential feedback from one result to the next, which would eliminate the problems with carrying. These algorithms are much more complex than the schoolboy algorithms we examined but have the potential for a much larger speedup. GMP uses many recursive algorithms, so integrating SSE instructions into the existing GMP code might be an excellent place to start.

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Artists:

Austin Polasky
Morgan Glasco

Paper and Letterpress Collaborative
Dard Hunter International Papermaking Organization
Keepsake Folders

This undergraduate research project involved Printmaking/Book Arts concentration students Austin Polasky and Morgan Glasco, who worked corroboratively with designer Zina Castenuela, and papermaker Andrea Peterson to complete Keepsake Folders for the National Conference, *Papers! Please!*, held from October 17 – 19, 2013, at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri.



Artist:

Laura L. Kahler

"Thread"

Letterpress, drum leaf binding

Edition of five

I created an edition of 5 hand-bound artist books using the concept of pressure printing and "the secret law" of historical canon page layout. The plates were wrapped around the drum of the Vandercook no.4 printing press and printed. My research investigated the canons of traditional page proportion used in traditional book design. I incorporated the page proportion, margins, and image area devised by Villard de Honnecourt's 13th Century, "Villard's Figure". My page design––dividing a straight line into logical and harmonious thirds, fourths, fifths, and so on; was coupled with inventive, sustainable pressure printing plates. My work, "Thread", melds classical design with innovative materials, resulting in a contemporary artist book.

The Effects of the Neutral Response Option on the Extremeness of Participant Responses

Melinda L. Edwards and Brandon C. Smith

Dr. Sarai Blincoe, faculty advisor

Abstract

Previous research suggests that when presented with a neutral response option, people will be more likely to select that option than report their actual opinion. The current study examined the extremeness of participant responses to sensitive statements as affected by the availability of a neutral response option on a Likert Scale. Contrary to past research, participants who reported their attitudes to sensitive topics on a five-point scale (neutral response option present) had more extreme responses than those who reported on a six-point scale. These findings suggest that the removal of a neutral response option may not always result in participants taking extreme stances on sensitive issues.

Keywords: Likert scale, sensitive topics, neutral option, response extremeness

Psychologists commonly use Likert scale questionnaires to collect opinion data. Since Renis Likert first introduced the Likert scale in 1932, the formatting of the Likert scale has been a source of dispute in regard to reliability and validity. Several topics within this dispute include the number of response options, the labeling of points, and the necessity of a neutral response option (Johns, 2005; Lozano, Garcia-Cueto, & Muniz, 2008).

Although Likert advocated for the use of the five-point scale, researchers have since argued for more points to increase the reliability and validity of the scale. Weijters, Cabooter, and Schillewaert (2010) found that more options decreased the occurrence of extreme response styles, and Lozano, Garcia-Cueto, & Muniz (2008) suggested that reliability increases when there are more points. These findings substantiate the argument for including more points on a Likert scale, but the issue is ongoing.

Another question that has been raised in regard to formatting of the Likert scale is the labeling of points. Research has found three significant consequences of labeling points. First, respondents tend to be attracted to labeled points; thus, labeling only end points may result in a bias toward extreme answers (Weijters et al., 2010). Second, labeling all points can lower extremeness of response due to the attractiveness of the intermediate options. Finally, labeling all points increases levels of positivity bias, the tendency to respond with a positive answer (i.e., agree or strongly agree) to a question regardless of what the question is asking, among participants (Krosnick, 1991). Therefore, there are negative sides to both labeling only end points and labeling all points on a scale.

The neutral response option is the biggest source of dispute surrounding the Likert scale. Originally offered in an effort to avoid false responses (Bishop, 1987), the neutral response option enabled people who were ignorant about or indifferent to a subject to select no opinion or neutral instead of being forced to choose a response that did not reflect their true beliefs (Johns, 2005; Krosnick et al., 2002). Although designed with the intention of reducing instances of false responses, studies show that the inclusion of a neutral or "no opinion" option significantly increases the number of people stating they have no opinion when they actually do (Bishop, 1987; Johns, 2005; Kalton, Roberts, & Holt, 1980; Krosnick et al., 2002; Nowlis, Kahn, & Dhar, 2002). Three factors likely influence a participant's decision to falsely report via the neutral option: cognitive effort, ambivalence, and social desirability.

Reasons People Choose the Neutral Response Option

People have a tendency to satisfice, or avoid the cognitive effort required to pick a satisfactory answer when providing attitude reports (Krosnick et al., 2002). For each item on a questionnaire, participants must interpret the question, recall related facts and memories, interpret the information to form an opinion, and then apply this opinion to the relevant Likert point (Johns, 2005). Particularly when unmotivated, participants may satisfice and choose a neutral option (Garland, 1991; Johns, 2005).

People also pick neutral options because of ambivalence. Bishop (1987) showed that people's responses in public opinion polls tend to gravitate toward neutral because they want to avoid the negative feelings associated with their conflicting feelings on an issue. Additionally, picking a neutral option allows people to avoid the cognitive effort needed to choose between their positive and negative feelings on an issue (Nowlis et al., 2008).

Social desirability is a third factor that influences the choice of a neutral option. Krosnick et al. (2002) suggested that participants choose a neutral option when they are reluctant to voice a socially undesirable opinion; however, Stocke (2007) has shown that people tend to be more honest on a self-report survey than with an interviewer when the topic pertains to issues such as racial attitudes.

As a result of the research on satisficing, ambivalence, and social desirability, some researchers suggest doing away with the neutral option on Likert scales for several reasons (Garland, 1991; Krosnick et al., 2002; Kalton et al., 1980). First, the removal of the neutral option forces people to use cognitive effort, thus countering participant tendencies to satisfice (Krosnick et al., 2002). Secondly, removing a neutral option forces ambivalent persons to exert cognitive effort and use what they perceive to be the most important point of an argument to make a decision (Weijters et al., 2010; Nowlis et al., 2002). People with higher ambivalence will lean toward more extreme options (Nowlis et al., 2002). Finally, Garland (1991) argued that with the removal of the neutral option, people are forced to use cognitive effort to think about their true feelings on the subject. This negates the effect of social desirability bias without changing the participants' opinions, decreasing instances of social desirability.

The Current Experiment

The current experiment examines whether the removal of a neutral response option increases the likelihood of a person taking a more extreme stance on a sensitive topic. Based on the Nowlis et al. (2002) findings that people with higher ambivalence are more likely to pick an extreme option when no neutral response option is given, we expect to find that participants will take more extreme stances on sensitive topics when the neutral option is removed. The assumption is that participants will have higher ambivalence for sensitive topics. This assumption is based on previous research conducted by Tourangeau and Yan (2007), which concluded that a question is sensitive when it is intrusive (asks about a taboo or controversial subject), when a person perceives their anonymity to be threatened, or when the question has a socially undesirable response. Boysen, Vogel, & Madon (2006) found that people are more likely to give their true opinion when a measure is given privately rather than publicly because their anonymity is protected, which supports the findings of Tourangeau and Yan (2007).

Krosnick (1991) suggested that the more experienced a person is at thinking about a topic, the easier it is to retrieve information for questions. Sensitive topics are discussed frequently in popular media because they pertain to so many people. Participants in our study will therefore likely have already formed opinions on the subjects and will be able to easily recall information on the subjects. The ease of recall (which decreases task difficulty for our participants), the increase in motivation (due to people wanting to express their opinions), and the increase in ability from participants with higher education all decrease the likelihood of satisficing occurring. Of the two main components one should look at in a Likert scale, we are focusing on extremeness rather than direction of response (Peabody, 1962) because it is not pertinent to our study to know in which direction people lean on sensitive topics. We are solely interested in the effects removing the neutral option from a Likert scale has on extremeness of response. In addition, this study is expected to provide further evidence for Garland's (1991) suggestion that the removal of a neutral stimulus reduces social desirability.

Method

Participants

A sample of 99 college students (88 females, 11 males, age range: 18–23 years) volunteered to participate in the study in exchange for extra credit in undergraduate-level psychology courses. The majority of participants were underclassmen (n = 69).

Materials and Procedure

All participants read a set of 12 items about four controversial topics: homosexuality, abortion, obesity, and gun control (see Appendices A and B for questionnaires). Examples of items included "homosexuality is a choice" and "abortion is murder." Items were grouped based on their topics and tested for reliability (see Table 1). All composites had sufficiently high reliability with the exception of the obesity composites; therefore, obesity was not included in the analyses.

The control group responded to each item on a five-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*) that contained a neutral response option (3, unlabeled). The experimental group answered items on a

six-point Likert scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 6 = *strongly agree*) that did not contain a neutral response option. Participants completed the experiment in a classroom setting. After providing consent, participants completed a randomly assigned version of the questionnaire. The experimenters debriefed participants at the conclusion of the study.

Results

One participant's data was excluded from the analysis due to failure to understand questionnaire. Prior to conducting this analysis, several measures had to be taken to ensure the viability of the data. First, any reversed items on the questionnaire had to be recoded. Following this step, a reliability analysis was run on the topics.

Because the items were rated on different scales (five vs. six points), *z*-scores were created so that the scores would be comparable. Due to the controversial nature of the questionnaire items, participants could easily score at either end of the scale. For example, one participant could have an extreme *z*-score of -3 (indicating disagreement with an item), whereas another participant could have an extreme *z*-score of +3 (indicating agreement). Because these scores would cancel each other out, all *z*-scores were squared, resulting in data reflecting only extremeness, not direction. Finally, topical composites were created by taking the mean of the squared z-scores for all items relevant to a given topic.

A Mixed Model ANOVA was conducted to test the effects of scale type (between-subjects) and topic (within-subjects) on response extremeness. There was a significant main effect of scale type, $F\ (1, 97) = 5.12, p = .026$. Participants answering items on the five-point scale ($M = 1.28, SD = .72$) scored significantly more extreme than those answering items on the six-point scale ($M = .98, SD = 1.11$), which did not support the hypothesis. Results of within-subjects' effects were also found to be significant, $F\ (2, 194) = 8.92, p < .001$. Further exploration of the topics showed that the abortion topic ($M = 1.45, SD = 1.10$) elicited significantly more extreme responses than gun control ($M = .98, SD = .72$), $p < .001$ and homosexuality ($M = .98, SD = 1.13$), $p = .001$. The analysis of differences between homosexuality and gun control yielded no significant results, p = .997. The results suggest that certain topics may be more sensitive than others.

Discussion

Previous research has suggested that the presence of a neutral response option or a nonresponse option increases the likelihood of participants selecting this option (Kalton, Roberts, & Holt, 1980; Krosnick et al., 2002; Nowlis, Kahn, & Dhar, 2002; Bishop, 1987; Johns, 2005). Numerous explanations for this effect have been posed such as satisficing, ambivalence, and social desirability bias. However, the findings of the current study suggest the opposite. Participants who answered the sensitive items on a five-point scale had significantly more extreme responses than participants who responded to the same items on a six-point scale. These findings suggest that further research is necessary to analyze the relationship between the number of options on a scale and participants' responses to sensitive topics.

The number of options given to participants may explain the results. Weijters, Cabooter, & Schillewaert (2010) found that the more

options one has, the less extreme their responses. This theory was supported in our study, with people who answered on the five-point Likert scale having more extreme responses than those who answered on the six-point Likert scale. Future research could examine the relationship between a four-point and a five-point scale.

Although we did not hypothesize an effect of topic on response extremeness, we found that the abortion topic had significantly more extreme responses than gun control and homosexuality, while homosexuality and gun control did not differ. The significant difference between topics suggests that the topic itself affects how participants respond to items. The lack of an interaction between topic and presence or absence of a neutral response point suggests that responses to topics are consistent regardless of whether the participants answered on a five-point or six-point Likert scale. The data suggests that people have stronger views on abortion than they do on gun control and homosexuality. These findings may be due to the emphasis social media places on these topics.

Mean response extremity served as the dependent variable in this experiment. Future studies on this subject could look at response variability, how widely the scores are distributed from the mean. Future studies should also make use of a preexisting attitude questionnaire with demonstrated reliability.

The topic of Likert scale types and participant responses is a field that needs further research. This research shows that there is a difference between scale types when used to test the extremeness of participant responses. This is contrary to previous findings by Krosnick et al. (2002), suggesting that further research is necessary to determine the relationship between scale types and sensitive topics. These results are important because they show that Likert scale type has an effect on participant responses when sensitive topics are being surveyed. Further research is necessary to determine the nature of this effect.

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Appendix A

Questionnaire used in Experimental Group of Study

For the following questions please write the number from the scale above that best reflects your opinion.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

1. ____ Homosexuality is a choice.
2. ____ Obesity can be helped.
3. ____ A woman should have the right to choose if she wants an abortion.
4. ____ Obese people should be required to exercise.
5. ____ People have the right to bear arms.
6. ____ Gun control is infringing on the 2nd amendment.
7. ____ Abortion should be illegal.
8. ____ Homosexuality is morally wrong.
9. ____ Banning guns would save lives.
10. ____ Homosexuals should have the right to be married.
11. ____ Abortion is murder.
12. ____ Obesity is a disease.

Please answer the following questions:

Age: ____

Gender: M F

Class: Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior

Appendix B

Questionnaire Used in Control Group of Study

For the following questions please write the number from the scale above that best reflects your opinion.

1 2 3 4 5 6

Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree

1. ____ Homosexuality is a choice.
2. ____ Obesity can be helped.
3. ____ A woman should have the right to choose if she wants an abortion.
4. ____ Obese people should be required to exercise.
5. ____ People have the right to bear arms.
6. ____ Gun control is infringing on the 2nd amendment.
7. ____ Abortion should be illegal.
8. ____ Homosexuality is morally wrong.
9. ____ Banning guns would save lives.
10. ____ Homosexuals should have the right to be married.
11. ____ Abortion is murder.
12. ____ Obesity is a disease.

Please answer the following questions:

Age: ____

Gender: M F

Class: Freshman Sophomore Junior Senior

Table 1

Composite Reliability Analyses

Scale	Homosexuality	Obesity	Abortion	Gun Control
Five-Point	0.75	0.06	0.84	0.71
Six-Point	0.61	-0.03	0.67	0.68

Designer:

Mariah Asbell

poster for a band tour

2013



Designer:

Cabell Edmunds

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2013

College Bullying: An Exploratory Analysis

Amelia D. Perry

Dr. Sarai Blincoe, faculty advisor

Abstract

Most research on bullying focuses on the K–12 education system or the workplace, and few studies focus on higher education. Most colleges combine hazing, harassment, and bullying into one category, which makes a primary focus on bullying difficult. Researchers have identified four main types of bullying: physical, verbal, social, and cyber. For this study, bullying was operationally defined as occurring when someone uses their power, repeatedly (such as strength, popularity, social status, computer skills, etc.), to injure, threaten, harass, or embarrass another person on purpose. The purpose of the current mixed-methods study is an exploratory analysis that examines the prevalence and characteristics of bullying at a small state university in the mid-Atlantic. A total of 171 students completed the survey asking questions about being a target, perpetrator, and/or victim of bullying and the characteristics of those experiences. A group of questions focused on reporting bullying, and on knowledge about the current bullying policy. Also, an open-ended question asked participants to write about a real incident in which they were a witness or a victim of bullying. The results indicate that a majority (64.3%) of participants have witnessed bullying in some capacity since coming to college; only (28.7%) reported being the victim of bullying since coming to college. Participants reported verbal bullying the most, followed by social bullying. Approximately two-thirds of participants knew of the university's existing bullying policy. The participants wrote narratives that varied between generic specific stories about bullying, and they discussed all four types of bullying, with verbal bullying being the most discussed. The current mixed-methods study sheds light on the fact that bullying at the university level does, in fact, occur, and that more research needs to be done in order to understand the ways in which universities and colleges deal with this problem.

Keywords: college bullying, types of bullying, locations of bullying

Although an increasing amount of research addresses bullying, most of the current research focuses on K–12 education and workplace bullying; there remains a gap in the research concerning college bullying (Chapell et al., 2004; Duncan 2010). In one exception, Chapell et al.'s (2004) study focuses on the prevalence of traditional bullying, and found that around 60% of students surveyed had witnessed bullying at college. However, this study did not focus on the specific types of bullying, and it was conducted almost ten years ago. Most of the current studies discussing college bullying either address bullying very broadly or focus on a particular type such as cyber bullying (Dilmac, 2009; Schenk & Fremouw, 2012), which has increased with the rise of technology and social media. Universities and colleges face a problem; most polices that prohibit such behavior combine bullying, harassment, and hazing into one category, which makes primary focus on bullying difficult. The current exploratory study aims to reveal the prevalence of bullying, types of bullying, and characteristics of bullying at a small state university in the mid-Atlantic region. The current study also researches knowledge pertaining to bullying policy and reporting bullying. This mixed-methods study addresses the gaps in literature by differentiating the types of bullying, updating the literature on prevalence of bullying, and investigating information about policy.

Definitions of bullying vary greatly; however, most researchers have come to accept Olweus's (1999) definition with three components: (1) intentional and violent harm, (2) repeatedly occurring, and (3) there must be a power imbalance between the individuals or groups involved. Bullying is also broken down into four different types: physical, verbal, social, and cyber (Bullying, n.d.; Cornell, 2012). Physical bullying involves doing some type of physical bodily harm, such as kicking, punching, shoving, or harm to possessions—for instance stealing or breaking. Verbal bullying involves name-calling, taunting, threatening, teasing, and/or insulting someone on purpose. Indirect bullying, also known as social or relational bullying, involves social aspects such as exclusion, spreading rumors, ignoring, or embarrassing a person or group on purpose (Bullying, n.d.; Cornell, 2012). Lastly, cyber bullying is the use of technology such as e-mail, cell phones, or social media to inflict harm on someone whether it be through teasing, spreading rumors, name calling, or insults (Schenk & Fremouw, 2012; Cornell, 2012).

Defining bullying becomes even more complicated in college because colleges often combine hazing, bullying, harassment, and incivility to one category (American Education Research Association [AERA], 2013). Placing all these terms under one umbrella is problematic because they are not interchangeable. For example, hazing is based on inclusion, while bullying is based on exclusion. Specifically, people haze other people to make them earn their position in a group, whereas bullying occurs to make people feel excluded and alone (Hazing, n.d.). Most universities have strict policies against hazing, and 44 states have hazing laws that allow universities and colleges to take legal action against those who haze (State, n.d.). However, there are no state laws against bullying in higher education, which makes it hard for universities and colleges to address bullying because they often have no legal standing (AERA, 2013; Duncan, 2010). Also, most

universities require the victim to have documented threats of violence or proof that the bullying actually occurred, which many victims have difficulty obtaining (AERA, 2013).

Few research studies investigate the prevalence rates of the "traditional" (physical, verbal, and indirect/social) types of bullying. In a sample of 1,025 college students, Chapell et al. (2004) found that 60.9% of them have witnessed some type of bullying and 24.6% had been victims of bullying at college. Chapell et al. (2004) investigated status relationships of the perpetrators and victims of bullying. They found that 44.1% of students they surveyed witnessed a faculty member bully a student, and 19.2% have experienced being bullied by a faculty member. Lastly, Chapell et al. (2004) found that 18.5% of students admitted to bullying another student in college. The results of this study indicate that bullying does occur in college. Chapell et al.'s (2006) study focused on the continuity of bullying, asking current college students about their experiences in elementary school, high school, and college. This study indicates that bullying declines with age; however, it never fully ceases. Chapell et al. (2006) found that the roles of bullies and victims stayed fairly consistent throughout time. Three-fourths of those who stated they were bullied in elementary school also reported being bullied in high school and college.

While there remains a large gap in literature addressing bullying in college, cyber bullying in college is currently getting some attention due to the increased use and availability of technology. Schenk and Fremouw (2012) questioned 799 college students and found that approximately 8.6% were victims of cyber bullying, providing evidence for the existence of cyber bullying at the college level. Schenk and Fremouw (2012) also investigated the negative effects of cyber bullying; victims of cyber bullying were more likely to report suicide ideation and attempted suicide than those who reported not being cyber bullied. A study of Turkish university students identified gender differences in bullying; more females than males were victims of cyber bullying, but males engage in more cyber bullying than females (Dilmac, 2009).

The studies discussed in the current paper all indicate that bullying does occur, and that it may even be fairly common (Chapell et. al, 2004; Chapell et. al, 2006; Schenk & Fremouw, 2012). Schenk and Fremouw (2012) and Dilmac (2009) focus on cyber bullying, because it has become increasingly more popular with the rise in technology use. Bullying in college remains a problem that has yet to be systematically and nationally studied (AERA, 2013). The current study adds to previous research by further addressing not only the rates at which bullying occurs in college, but the types of bullying through self-reported data. The current research examines characteristics of bullying such as the perpetrator of bullying and the locations in which bullying occurs. Also, this research investigates students' knowledge on current policy, as well as students' experiences of bullying at college. No other studies, to the researcher's knowledge, look directly at the experiences of bullying at the higher education level. This is a mixed-methods exploratory analysis of bullying in college.

Method

Participants

A total of 171 students (freshmen = 50, sophomores = 22, juniors = 30, seniors = 64, others = 5) voluntarily

participated in this research at a small state university in the mid-Atlantic. This sample consisted of 74.9% female ($N = 124$), 24.6% male ($N = 42$) participants. The gender distribution closely represents the distribution at the university (male = 31%, female = 69%). Eighty-one percent were white ($N = 139$), 5.8% were Black / African American ($N = 10$), 3.5 % were Asian ($N = 6$), 4.7 % were Hispanic ($N = 8$), and 4.1% were other ($N = 7$). This racial distribution also closely represents the 15% minority distribution at the university. Out of the 171 participants, 94.7% identified themselves as heterosexual.

Materials and Procedures

Parts of the survey were adapted from several previously used bullying surveys, including the *School Climate Bullying Survey* (Cornell, 2012), School Bullying Survey (Reed, n.d.), and Anonymous School Bullying Survey (School, n.d.). The questionnaire started with basic demographic questions such as gender, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, and year in school followed by both closed-ended and open-ended questions about bullying.

Participants then answered questions about the prevalence of seeing bullying and/or being bullied. These questions provided the overall prevalence of bullying and the prevalence of the different types of bullying. Bullying was operationally defined as "when someone uses their power (such as strength, popularity, social status, computer skills, etc.) to injure, threaten, harass, or embarrass another person on purpose. Bullying happens repeatedly (not just one time) to one person or a group of persons." The four types of bullying were operationally defined as follows: (1) Physical bullying involves causing bodily harm or possession damage to another person or group. This could involve hitting, kicking, punching, stealing possessions, or damaging one's possessions. (2) Verbal bullying involves repeated insults, threatening somebody, teasing, making fun of others, and calling someone derogatory names. (3) Social bullying occurs when people intentionally try to damage someone's reputation or social standing. It can include ignoring or leaving someone out on purpose; encouraging others to ignore, chastise, or threaten someone; or spreading rumors about a person around school. (4) Cyber bullying occurs when people are teased, taunted, or threatened repeatedly through the use of e-mail, phone, text messaging, social media, or other electronic methods.

Each definition of bullying was followed by questions about whether or not the participant has seen bullying and/or been bullied since coming to college. The participant responded with either "yes" or "no." If a participant responded "yes," they he or she rated the frequency of seeing bullying and/or being bullied (1–2x a semester, several times a semester, 1–2x a week, several times a week, daily).

Next, participants answered questions about reporting bullying and bullying policies. One question asked whether or not the participant would report bullying if he or she saw it. If a participant responded "yes," the participant was asked to list to whom he or she would report. The researcher coded these questions. Examples included police, faculty, and resident advisors. Additional questions asked participants if the university had a policy regarding bullying (yes/no), and whether colleges and universities should have polices against bullying (1 = strongly disagree through 7 = strongly agree). One question asked the participants

Table 1
Results of Those Who Have Witnessed Bullying and/or Been Bullied Since Coming to College

	Witness Bullying	Been Bullied
Type of Bullying	*N* (%)	*N* (%)
Overall Bullying	49 (28.7)	110 (64.3)
Physical Bullying	46 (26.9)	7 (4.1)
Verbal Bullying	125 (73.1)	59 (34.5)
Social Bullying	113 (66.1)	44 (25.7)
Cyber Bullying	75 (43.9	23 (13.5)

Note: $N = 171$

Figure 1



to rate whether bullying was a problem at the university on a Likert scale of 1 (strongly disagree) through 7 (strongly agree). Questions regarding characteristics of bullying, such as location and perpetrator of the said bullying, were also asked. Participants were allowed to give multiple answers to these questions. Lastly, at the end of the survey, participants wrote about a real incident in which they witnessed or were victims of bullying since coming to college.

Procedure

The researcher recruited participants in three different ways. Most of the participants completed the survey online through Survey Monkey. Some of these participants signed up through an online sign-up system within the psychology department ($N = 99$) and had the opportunity to receive one extra-credit point toward a psychology class of their choice. Other participants who used Survey Monkey were recruited through Sociology and English classes ($N = 41$) at the university, in which the instructor e-mailed the students a link to the Survey Monkey questionnaire. Lastly, one English instructor allowed the researcher to visit their regularly scheduled classes and hand out paper surveys to their students ($N = 31$). All students were required to sign a consent form (either online on Survey Monkey or in paper form) and read or listen to a debriefing statement.

Results

Quantitative

In the overall sample ($N = 171$), 64.3% ($N = 110$) of students have witnessed bullying while in college.

Frequency of Witnessing and Being Bullied Since Coming to College

Table 2

Type of Bullying	WITNESS BULLYING 1-2 times a semester	Several times a semester	1-2 times per week	Several times per week	Daily	TOTAL
Overall Bullying	39	47	16	6	3	111
Physical Bullying	35	6	3	2	0	46
Verbal Bullying	35	40	13	25	10	123
Social Bullying	34	45	14	13	8	113
Cyber Bullying	26	25	10	6	7	74

Note: $N = 171$

Type of Bullying	WITNESS BULLYING 1-2 times a semester	Several times a semester	1-2 times per week	Several times per week	Daily	TOTAL
Overall Bullying	29	13	4	2	0	48
Physical Bullying	6	0	0	0	0	6
Verbal Bullying	29	18	6	4	2	59
Social Bullying	25	15	2	3	0	45
Cyber Bullying	16	3	2	1	0	22

Note: $N = 171$



Figure 2

Of those students, most (42.3%) witness bullying several times a semester; see Table 2 for all frequency data. Fewer participants report having been bullied since coming to college. Results show that only 28.7% stated that they have been bullied, with most (60.4%) being bullied 1–2 times a semester (see Table 2). The data indicates that students witness bullying more than they are victims of bullying themselves.

Of the types of bullying, participants witnessed verbal bullying the most, followed by social bullying, cyber bullying, and lastly physical bullying. See Table 1 for all data regarding having witnessed bullying and been bullied, and see Table 2 for all frequency data. Participants reported the residence hall as the most common location of bullying, followed by off-campus and the dining hall. See Figure 1 for the complete list of locations. The most common perpetrator of

bullying was a fellow student (not friend or significant other), followed by a friend, and then followed by a roommate. See Figure 2 for a complete list of perpetrators.

A chi-squared test indicated a significant relationship, X^2 (3, N=158) = 11.47, p <.009, between year in school and knowledge about whether the university has policies on bullying. The university does, in fact, have a vague policy regarding bullying. This test indicates that freshmen have more knowledge than seniors about the current policy at the university. When asked whether or not students would report bullying, a total of 60.8% said they would report it. The researcher coded the open-ended question that followed, asking to whom they would report it. Most of the participants said they would report bullying to faculty (N=42), followed by other / non-specified (N=32), police (N=28), RA/ REC /Dean of students (N=24).

A one-way analysis of variance was conducted to see if a student's year in school held any effect on whether or not they thought bullying was a problem at the school. This test showed a significant effect (F (3, 160) = 4.31, p < .006) of year in school on the levels of which students think bullying is a problem at the university. A Tukey Post-hoc test indicated that all upperclassmen (sophomores (M=3.90, p = .048), juniors (M =3.93, p = .018), and seniors (M = 3.71, p = .030)) were significantly different from freshmen (M = 2.98). However, it is worthy to note that a 4 on the Likert scale indicate that participants neither agree nor disagree that there is problem with bullying at the university, so one cannot make a full conclusion as to whether or not upperclassmen think bullying is a problem.

Qualitative

At the end of the survey, participants wrote about a real incident in which they witnessed or were victims of bullying since coming to college. The participants described the incident, including who was involved, the location, what occurred, and the aftermath. Of the 171 people who took the survey, 73.7% (N=126) of the participants described the incident. The 126 narratives in this survey show that students have experience in a broad array of situations and experiences of bullying. Like the quantitative data, verbal bullying narratives were, by far, the most abundant (58.7%). Social bullying occurred in 15.1% of the narratives, followed by cyber bullying (7.9%), and physical bullying (7.1%). Finally, 11.1% of the narratives were not relevant or the bullying type could not be identified. The narratives ranged from one sentence to whole paragraphs, and from generic situations to very specific complex situations.

It is worthy to note that some of the situations described cannot exactly be considered bullying, as they do not meet the three criteria of Olweus's (1999) definition of bullying. The directions may have contributed this, as there was no emphasis that the situation does not need to be repeated. Most of the narratives that do not meet the criteria do not contain the repeated occurrence criteria of the definition. But nonetheless, those narratives are still important to investigate, as they are precursors to bullying. The participants wrote narratives discussing all four types of bullying (verbal, physical, social, and cyber).

Verbal Bullying

Echoing the quantitative data, participants reported verbal bullying the most, with many of the examples involving

derogatory name-calling and teasing. Residence halls, the dining hall, and classrooms were the most discussed places in which verbal bullying occurred. Altercations between roommates and suitemates emerged numerous times throughout the narratives. One participant wrote about how her roommate refers to her as a "little hobbit" because she is short. Several stories involved race/ethnicity-related teasing. One woman's story went as follows:

> *Because I am black, other students of a different race feel that I do not belong at college. My freshman year, I lived in _____ and I'll often get comments that said, "How can you afford to attend college" and "Take your lazy ass up the stairs, you probably get food stamps." This occurred from people I do not know and who do not know me. I still get called "townie" or "ratchet" because students of a different race do not believe I attend this university.*

Other popular reasons people gave for being made fun of were their style of dress, the way they act, and sexual orientation.

The narratives show that verbal bullying does not just happen between students; several narratives discuss faculty picking on certain students and repeatedly making fun of them. Several students wrote narratives about a certain professor, stating that the professor "tends to pick out individual students in classes...and pressure them, or degrade them with his words. The professor treats the students with no respect." According to another narrative, a professor called a student a "pig pen" because the student wore sweatpants to class. Verbal bullying remains the most popular form of bullying reported in the narratives, and this shows that it is potentially a pervasive problem.

Physical Bullying

Several narratives described physical bullying very generically, such as, "People getting in fights with other peers at parties. Frats getting into fights with townies." These incidents may not be classified as bullying because the responses were unclear as to whether or not this was repetitive behavior. A majority of the narratives that describe physical bullying occur at parties in which the perpetrator was described as "too intoxicated." Other narratives that involve physical bullying describe an event such as someone stealing or damaging their possessions on purpose.

Social Bullying

The narratives that describe social bullying are much like the physical bullying narratives in that most are generic situations that do not provide much detail. The main pattern in these narratives involves ignoring or excluding people from a group. Several people discuss how on-campus organizations purposely ignore and do not associate themselves with off-campus organizations. Off-campus organizations are those organizations that are not formally recognized by the university. Other narratives on social bullying involve group projects in classrooms where some students will purposely ignore others in their group that they do not like. One student described her experience: "Lab partners in biology class ignore me like I'm not part of the group. They do everything without me like I'm not even there. I sat quietly, sad and just waited for the end of the lab to ask the professor for help." Social bullying may not be very noticeable, but it seems from these responses that social bullying can have serious effects on people.

Cyber Bullying

Only ten narratives discussed cyber bullying, and all incidences discussed occurred on social media,

including Facebook and Twitter. One participant's Facebook account was hacked by a friend, who deleted all the photos and put up inappropriate statuses. Another participant mentioned CollegeACB, a website where people can bully and make fun of anyone at a university anonymously. Authorities deactivated the website in 2011.

Discussion

The quantitative results of this study indicate that a substantial amount of college bullying does occur. Over a majority of students that participated in this research report having witnessed bullying since coming to college. The most common type of bullying reported was verbal bullying, followed by social bullying, then cyber bullying; the least reported was physical bullying. The results indicate a substantial variation between those who report witnessing bullying and those who have been bullied since coming to college. One possible explanation may be the fact that people are far less likely to admit to being bullied, or their perceptions of being bullied are different from witnessing bullying. Examining this difference may be a future direction for research.

The significant difference between freshmen and seniors and their knowledge on policy, indicate a knowledge gap on policy between upperclassmen and freshmen. One possible explanation to this result may be the fact that freshmen have reviewed the student handbook in their freshmen orientation class, and seniors may no longer be as familiar with all the rules and policies. The significant difference between year in school and the level of which participants think bullying is a problem at the university may be explained through the fact that freshmen had only been in college for three months before they took the survey, and may not have had as many experiences yet.

The narratives show that students experience a broad array of situations involving college bullying. Qualitative results repeat those found in the quantitative data, as verbal bullying was the most common, followed by social, cyber, and physical bullying. The narratives shed light on students' experiences at college, and they are important to consider, as they could be precursors to bullying. One limitation was the wording of the narrative questions. The wording may have misdirected some of the participants' responses, as many individuals did not describe instances of bullying that met the requirements of Olweus's (1999) definition of bullying.

Another limitation in this study is that sophomores and juniors were underrepresented, and a more representative sample of all classes would be ideal for this study. Future directions of research could involve administering this survey again in a couple of years to see if bullying has increased or declined with time. Another future direction is to administer this survey at multiple universities, as more research needs to occur in order to understand the prevalence of college bullying. Lastly, more research on bullying policy and effectiveness of the policy needs to be done, as many universities do not have polices or have limited polices on bullying specifically. This mixed-methods study sheds light on the fact that many people are affected by bullying in college, and further research needs to occur in order to fully understand this problem.

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Photographer:

Alyssa Hayes

"Rachel's Room"
2012

In witnessing my father's struggle with cancer, I learned to question the delineation between hospital and home, encouraging my exploration of environments in which the two are inexplicably bound. In recent years, I have observed and interacted with the community at a local nursing home. This series addresses the irony inherent in the facility's merging of hospital and home through an emphasis on disparities of light, texture, and action. Together these photographs provide the audience an opportunity to experience ordinarily inaccessible perspectives, each a result of my personal involvement with the community, in order to acknowledge the human tendency to create comfort and sanctuary in the presence of entropy.

Death-Related Crime: Applying Bryant's Conceptual Paradigm of Thanatological Crime to Military Settings

Irina Boothe

Dr. Virginia Beard, faculty advisor

Abstract

This research paper begins with a brief introduction of the definition of thanatological crime, followed by an explanation of Clifton Bryant's (2003) paradigm of thanatological crime. It concludes with an application of this paradigm to thanatological crime in a military setting. Finally, a content analysis is conducted of magazines, news transcripts, and newspaper articles to gather information relevant to thanatological crime in a military setting.

Sociologists have long since studied the act of dying to include the process, the act, and the aftermath. Almost all modern-day societies have some type of prescriptive norm regarding the dead. These social cues can include a simple utterance of the deceased's name, funeral processions, body disposal, and the mourning process (Bryant, 2003, p. 974). A majority of societies are similar in that most have strong taboos regarding mistreatment toward the dead with the prevailing theme of a socially reprehensible connotation (Bryant, 2003, p. 974). While some researchers have focused on confronting death, others have devoted their attention to death as a social process (Durkheim 1954 [1915]; Berger 1969). Clifton Bryant not only coined the term *thanatological crime* but also brought this type of deviant behavior to the forefront for the first time in history. Despite the copious amount of deviant acts that occur on a daily basis in our society and around the world, this area of deviance still remains under-studied in sociological literature. Many of the activities discussed by Bryant (2003) in his paradigm of thanatological crime occur within a military setting. The goal of this paper is to review the paradigm of thanatological crime as outlined by Bryant (2003) and provide an application of it to acts of thanatological crime committed in a military setting.

A Paradigm of Thanatological Crime

As noted by Bryant in his paradigm, thanatological crime is comprised of four distinct categories of motivation: functional/instrumental, malicious mischief/amusement, profit/economic advantage, and pathological/compulsive. The first, function/instrumental motivational mode, characterizes

crimes as "purposeful, rational, and functional" (Bryant, 2003 p. 976). These crimes are often fiscally sound in nature, yet still violate traditional societal norms. Crimes of this type are generally aimed at achieving goals of either an individual or a group and include acts perpetrated against the dead, such as cannibalism and desecration of bodies for trophies as well as desecration of graves for souvenirs. In addition to the dead themselves being victimized, the body of the dead can also be used to victimize the living. Here, the functional/instrumental motivation includes acts such as using the dead for a political advantage and using the dead in a military context to decrease moral or intimidate the enemy. Causes frequently include cultural conflict, emergency situations, or extreme need (Bryant, 2003, p. 977).

The second category of motivation, malicious mischief/amusement is defined as acts that are "performed simply because they are 'fun'" (Bryant, 2003, p. 976). The mission of these crimes is generally personal gain or malice. Here, crimes against the dead include desecration of bodies and vandalism of tombs for fun, and collection of bodies for pleasure (Bryant, 2003, p. 977). Conversely, types of crimes utilizing the deceased to victimize the living include playing jokes on families of the deceased. Examples of such acts can include jokes such as making prank phone calls and vandalizing the homes of the deceased. This category of crimes is considered especially heinous due to their pernicious nature (Bryant, 2003, p. 979).

The third motivation of thanatological crime outlined by Bryant (2003) is profit/economic advantage. This category is characterized by a "desire for profit or economic advantage" (Bryant 2003, p. 977). America is home to an expanding materialistic culture, where people without the means to achieve wealth often substitute an honest, hard-working lifestyle with deviant acts to achieve their goals (Bryant, 2003, p. 984). Regrettably, some even resort to deviant acts against the deceased to help facilitate their personal shortcomings. Victimization of the deceased for this category includes selling body parts on the black market, body snatching, stealing items from graves, and posing the dead for profit at events such as carnivals (Bryant, 2003, p. 977). Profit-motivated offenders are mainly focused on harming the family of the deceased. Crimes include burglarizing the home of the deceased during the funeral, delivering goods supposedly bought by the deceased to the victim's family, and exploiting the family by mediums (Bryant, 2003, p. 977).

The final category of motivation, pathological/compulsive, is characterized by "temporary loss of self-control." External acts resulting from this destruction include "overindulgence of alcohol or drugs or so-called temporary insanity" (Bryant, 2003, p. 977). Crimes against the dead include necrophilia, sex with the dead, mutilating the dead, and failure to follow proper burial norms. Crimes using the dead to victimize the living include vandalizing graves, mutilating or kidnapping the dead, and damaging tombstones. All of these acts are committed with the goal of harming the victim's family (Bryant, 2003, p. 976–977)

The dead can be victimized, and in turn the dead can also be used to victimize others (Bryant, 2003, p. 977). In America, and in many other societies, the dead are treated very similar to the living. In particular, in the United States,

people go to extraordinary lengths to comply with the deceased's final wishes. These drastic measures include specific and detailed funerals, long and complex grieving processes, and attempts to communicate with the dead through the use of mediums. This identity affords the dead many of the same social rights as the living. As a result, transgressions of these rights result in two types of sanctions: informal and formal. Informal sanctions, regulated by socialization, include a dirty look or verbal criticism. On the other hand, formal sanctions, enforced by the government, include criminal charges whose severity varies along a continuum. The dead can be victimized through acts such as desecration of bodies, vandalism of tombs and cemeteries, and the selling of body parts on the black market. Conversely, ways in which the dead can be used to victimize others include the use of corpses for intimidation or fear, burglarizing the home of the victim's family, and grave robbing.

Functional/Instrumental Motivation

Bryant (2003) lists desecration of bodies by military personnel as an example of functional/instrumental victimization of the dead. Desecration is defined as "the act of depriving something of its sacred character." As noted in Bryant's thesis, the desecration of corpses in a military setting is not a new phenomenon. In 2011, a group of Marines on deployment in Afghanistan urinated on the bodies of several Taliban fighters and then took trophy photographs with the corpses. When asked why he felt the need to desecrate the corpses, one of the marines, Staff Sgt. Edward Deptola, offered no excuse for his behavior and admitted that he knew his actions were wrong (Royal 2013). Despite new and advanced training on ROE's, or rules of engagement, military personnel still desecrate the corpses of their enemies to obtain personal souvenirs. Also in Afghanistan, Army Staff Sgt. Calvin Gibbs was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for his role and leadership in the killings of three unarmed Afghan men. Gibbs, the highest ranking of the five men involved, was described as a "bloodthirsty leader" by two of the other men involved. After fatally shooting the unarmed victims, Gibbs proceeded to cut off their fingers and even yanked out the tooth of one victim. When asked about the war trophies, Gibbs replied that it was "like keeping the antlers off a deer you'd shoot" (Johnson 2011). These cases offer only a glimpse into the expanding area of military thanatological crime. Both of the perpetrators desecrated bodies for military trophies with seemingly no purpose other than personal gain.

Malicious Mischief/Amusement and Victimization of the Dead

As noted by Bryant (2003), some deviant acts are committed because they cure the hunger for excitement, adventure, or fun. Bryant further specifies vandalism of graves and tombs for fun as a typology of this particular subset of thanatological crime (Bryant , 2003, p. 977). In Des Moines, Iowa, dozens of veterans' graves were vandalized. Vandals took off after ultimately stealing 45 grave markers and 41 American flags. Sgt. Jason Halifax, police spokesman, stated that the "thefts appeared to be a vandalism, rather than a theft for profit" (Aschbrenner 2013). This case goes to show that even at rest, veterans are not safe from the breadth of thanatological crime. Also during the Iraq War, a television documentary showed

U.S soldiers burning the bodies of two Taliban fighters. The accused soldiers were members of the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry Regiment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The burning of the corpses supposedly occurred after an intense gunfight between Taliban and U.S. forces. After burning the bodies, the U.S. soldiers used the charred corpses as a means of harassing and taunting the local Afghan populace (Walsh). These two examples depict Bryant's (2003) malicious mischief/amusement typology of thanatological crime by using the deceased to victimize. The vandals in Des Moines, Iowa, victimized not only the veterans whose graves they targeted but also the families of those veterans. Similarly, the U.S soldiers who killed and then burned the remains of the Taliban fighters victimized the individuals they killed, their families, and the nearby villagers who witnessed or heard about the crime.

Profit/Economic Advantage and Victimization of the Dead

According to Bryant (2003), a majority of thanatological crime is motivated by the desire to accumulate wealth. In an ever-increasing materialistic society, criminals are willing to go to extraordinary lengths to supplement their lavish lifestyles. This incentive has proven to serve as a catalyst for the most heinous of crimes. One specific type of crime under this subset is grave robbing for profit. Sometimes robbers take bronze statues or vases from graves, selling them for high profit to scrap dealers. This was the case in Hubbard, Ohio, where two men cut up a bronze military statue and attempted to sell it for scrap. According to police, one of the perpetrators, Richard Couturiaux, sold the stolen property for $25.50. He was later sentenced to 18 months in prison with felony charges of receiving stolen property and vandalism as well as two misdemeanor counts of desecration. Chaplain David Luther said that Couturiaux "represents the cancer that is eating away at the very heart and soul of the United States of America, wanting to satisfy its own cravings at the cost of everything we hold sacred" (Runyan 2013).

Pathological/Compulsive Motivation and Victimization of the Dead

Some forms of deviant behavior are completely irrational and may be the result of temporary loss of self-control (Bryant 2003). In the southern province of Kandahar, Afghanistan, 12 U.S. soldiers allegedly murdered Afghan civilians, mutilated their corpses, and kept grisly souvenirs of their acts. The soldiers in question allegedly threw grenades at civilians and then proceeded to fire upon them. Staff Sgt. Calvin Gibbs is suspected to have kept finger bones, leg bones, and teeth from the corpses, while Spc. Michael Gagnon II is suspected to have kept a skull from one of the corpses (Starr 2010). In Vietnam, soldiers were court-martialed and later convicted of cutting the ears and fingers off Vietnamese soldiers. General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. troops in Vietnam, cited the soldiers' actions as "subhuman" and "contrary to all policy and below the minimum standards of human decency" (Elliott 2011). These crimes are particularly heinous and egregious as they have no rational motivation. There is no profit or return for the perpetrator. Rather, these acts are committed simply to justify pathological and compulsive desires of the offender.

Functional/Instrumental Motivation and Using the Dead to Victimize

When it comes to defending and fighting for freedom, many countries often adopt the idiom, "All's fair in love and war." The practice of psychological warfare has had a long history of successful practice. In the words of Maj. Ed Rouse, "Psychological Operations or PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of organizations, groups, and individuals" (Rouse n.d.). One subset of Psychological Operations is the use of intimidation. As Bryant (2003) notes, the dead can be used in this process. Military members leave mutilated enemy corpses in a location where they will later be found by opposing forces, with the deliberate intention of striking fear in the enemy. In 2003, a Canadian sniper was accused of mutilating two enemy combatants. Master Corporal Arron Perry allegedly cut off the finger of one enemy combatant and then proceeded to stage the body for a trophy photograph, placing a cigarette in its mouth and propping a sign on its chest with the phrase, "fuck terrorism." He was later accused of defecating on another enemy combatant. Perry was eventually cleared of all allegations due to a lack of evidence (Bell 2003). This case is just one in a handful of many deviant acts committed during the Iraq War. Some U.S. soldiers are choosing to use their newfound knowledge of Muslim culture to devise ways to inflict harm upon the local populace (Graham 2005). Atrocious crimes are also levied by enemy troops against U.S. soldiers. Four American civilians working as contractors in Iraq were killed by grenades and heavy gunfire. Their bodies were then charred and mutilated by a violent mob. The bodies were then tied to a car and dragged through the streets of Falluja to the tune of a cheering crowd. At least two of the four bodies were hung from a bridge (McCarthy and Borger 2004). These examples all comply with the fifth typology of thanatological crime, using the dead to victimize with a functional/instrumental motivation, as outlined by Bryant (2003) in his paradigm. Both the United States and Afghan forces have utilized the act of leaving corpses in plain sight with the main purpose of intimidating or striking fear in the enemy (Bryant 2003).

Malicious Mischief/Amusement and Using the Dead to Victimize

According to Bryant (2003), this category of victimization includes playing jokes on the victim's family and vandalizing the home of the victim's family. These acts are often committed when the family is attending the funeral of their loved one. Criminals will often read obituaries in the newspaper and plan their deviant acts to correspond with the time of the funeral procession. These acts are especially heinous in nature as they take advantage of the death of someone's loved one to fulfill their malicious desires (Bryant 2003). Despite various search attempts, no examples of this type of thanatological crime in a military setting could be found.

Profit/Economic Advantage and Using the Dead to Victimize

Analogous to victimization of the dead for profit or economic advantage, using the dead to victimize for the hopes of high profit returns consummated by stealing from corpses or stealing bodies for economic ransom (Bryant 2003). Perpetrators who commit this

typology of thanatological crime are motivated by the acquisition of wealth, affluence, and money. These criminals are opportunistic in nature and will stop at nothing to make a quick dollar, even if that entails taking advantage of a fallen soldier. Comparable to the previous typology of thanatological crime, despite various search attempts, no examples of this type of thanatological crime in a military setting could be found..

Pathological/Compulsive and Using the Dead to Victimize

The final typology of thanatological crime outlined by Bryant (2003) includes acts that are pathological or compulsive in nature. These crimes include vandalizing graves, kidnapping or mutilating bodies to inflict harm upon the victim's family, and damaging a monument at a gravesite to harm the victim's family or a larger group. The motivation of these criminals varies widely. Their actions are aberrant and irrational and often the result of a loss of self-control, whether that be the result of a mental illness, brain damage, psychosis, or substance abuse. One such example of these heinous crimes involves that of Westboro Baptist Church of Hinesville, Georgia. In August of this year, members of the church vocalized their plans to picket the funeral of Sgt. Stefan Smith, a U.S. soldier who gave the ultimate sacrifice for his country in Afghanistan. In an effort to derail Westboro's demonstration, members of the Hinesville community created a Facebook group that attracted more than 2,000 members. The funeral was even moved to a different day in an attempt to thwart the demonstrators. This case is a perfect example of Bryant's (2003) final typology of crime, using the dead to victimize with a pathological/compulsive motivation. The members of Westboro chose to attend Smith's funeral with the sole purpose of harming his family and friends to justify their overarching belief that the death of soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan is ultimately God's way of punishing the United States for tolerating homosexuality (Huffington Post 2013).

Conclusion

This paper has applied a paradigm of thanatological crime as outlined by Bryant (2003) to crimes committed in a military setting. The examples given in this paper align with the eight typologies depicted by Bryant (2003) in his paradigm. These examples represent a small sample of all thanatological crime committed in military settings. Future research should be conducted to broaden the research presented here and delve further into the area of deviance that is thanatological crime.

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

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



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